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Abstract 
Three studies were conducted to further validate the belief in pure evil (BPE) and belief 
in pure good (BPG) scales (Webster & Saucier, 2012). Study 1 assessed the relationships 
between BPE, BPG, and sociopolitical ideology, while Study 2 assessed the relationships 
between BPE, BPG, and various forms of religiosity. Study 1 and Study 2 also tested whether 
BPE and BPG predicted aggression and helping via support for relevant foreign (Study 1) or 
domestic (Study 2) policy issues above and beyond sociopolitical attitudes and religiosity, 
respectively. Study 3 tested whether BPE and BPG predicted evaluations of a prototypically (vs. 
non-prototypically) evil perpetrator and a prototypically (vs. non-prototypically) good 
apprehender. Together, these three studies showed that BPE consistently related to greater 
aggression and less helping, while greater BPG consistently related to less aggression and more 
helping, while demonstrating convergence but not redundancy with variables known to 
justify/suppress aggression or helping. In sum, these studies further demonstrate the reliability 
and validity of the BPE and BPG scales as well as provide solid groundwork for future 
correlational and experimental research on these constructs. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
“If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously committing evil deeds and 
it were necessary only to separate them from the rest of us and destroy them. But 
the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every human being. And 
who is willing to destroy a piece of his own heart?” 
-Alexander Solzhenitsyn (b. 1918 - d. 2008), novelist and Nobel laureate 
The question of why people help or hurt others is perhaps one of humanity’s oldest and 
most urgent questions. Diverse scholars from different disciplines have argued that it is because 
some individuals just epitomize pure good (“angels”) or pure evil (“demons”) (Baumeister, 
1999; for an interdisciplinary bibliography on pure evil, see Hedgehog Review, 2000). Whether 
or not pure evil or pure good empirically exists is actually irrelevant to the current studies (for 
relevant discussions, see Baumeister, 1999; Batson, 1991; Cialdini, Baumann, & Kenrick, 1981; 
Darley, 1992). Instead, the proposed studies focus on whether people’s perceptions of pure evil 
and pure good affect their own decisions about how to treat others.  
 What Is “Pure Evil”? 
Human beings are naturally inclined to explain the behavior of other people (Ross, 1977), 
although some individuals are more motivated to do this and produce more sophisticated and 
accurate explanations of human behavior (see Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson, & 
Reeder, 1986; Fletcher, Reeder, & Bull, 1990; Fletcher, Rosanowski, Rhodes, & Lange, 1992). 
Because many of us think we are worthy individuals who deserve good things to happen to us, 
when bad things happen to us (or to those similar to us) we seek quick, comforting explanations 
so that our perception of a just, fair world remains intact (see Lerner, 1980).  This may be 
especially true when harm is perceived as consciously deliberate and not commensurate with the 
provocation (if any provocation), which is the most common definition of “evil”1
                                                 
1 In this paper, the term “evil” used alone refers to this definition. Evildoer refers to a person who has engaged  
 (Baumeister, 
1999; Darley, 1992; Miller, 2004; Staub, 1992). Because we are already naturally inclined to 
in evil.  
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attribute anti-social behavior to internal factors2 (i.e., an example of the fundamental attribution 
error or correspondence bias; see Gilbert & Malone, 1995), it appears people are predisposed to 
think that bad things happen because of bad people—because of evil people. Thus, evil appears 
to be a characteristic predominantly used to describe a person or group of people (Baumeister, 
1999; see also Darley, 1992). Following this logic, the word “evil” as an adjective is searched 
significantly more often than “evil” as a noun via Merriam-Webster online searches 
(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/evil).  
This person-centered explanation of harmful behavior, or personal archetype of evil, is 
not new to the twentieth century (Baumeister, 1999). Recorded history shows that cultures all 
over the world developed remarkably similar perceptions of evil (see, e.g., Russell, 1977), such 
that “the same version of evil was invented several different times, in different parts of the world, 
independently” (Baumeister, 1999, p. 66)3. Thus, the notion of evil is fairly universal, and 
perhaps evidences a common underlying psychological process. Regardless, the personal 
archetype of evil has thrived throughout recorded history, and continues to be relevant today. 
Baumeister (1999) discusses how Western thought and culture has continued to propagate what 
he refers to as “the myth of pure evil” (p. 62)4
Horror movies typically begin with innocent people leading happy and peaceful lives 
until their world is throw into turmoil by the invasion of chaos, of “the abnormal into the world 
of normal” (Twitchell, 1985, p. 10). Pre-1960, this evil was typically supernatural in nature (e.g., 
. He searched for converging evidence of “the 
myth” primarily in reviewing popular media (television and movies) and religious texts. 
Baumeister (1999) initially discussed at length how horror movies have particularly personified 
evil via a very consistent narrative (Baumeister, 1999, p. 63).  
                                                 
2 People also tend to attribute others’ positive outcomes to internal factors as well (e.g., Anderson, 1983). 
3 The world “evil” is derived from the Old English (c. 450-1100 AD) word yfel and, before that, from the proto-
Germanic word ubilaz. Yfel and ubilaz are thought to roughly translate as “over and up”, intimating an act of 
transgression (Harper, 2010). In Old English, this word was the most comprehensive adjectival description of 
disapproval, dislike, or disparagement. The more common usage of evil meaning a bad, cruel, or morally wicked 
person did not become widespread until the eighteenth century (Harper, 2010). 
4 This paper eliminates the reference to “the myth” in “the belief in the myth of pure evil/pure good” for two reasons. 
First, it is shorter and less awkward to say and read. Second, as previously mentioned, the focus of this paper is not 
to determine whether pure evil or pure good exists, but to assess whether people’s perceptions of their existence can 
be measured and are valuable to measure. 
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vampires, witches, aliens); interestingly, historians believe that such supernatural killers were 
created to explain medieval serial killers (Schlesinger, 2000). After Hitchcock’s Psycho, a 
second era of horror movies began in which human villains engaged in serial killings or mass 
murder. In the 1970s, Hitchcock’s approach evolved (or devolved depending on one’s tastes) 
into a bloodier, more graphically violent interpretation of the Hitchcock genus: the “slasher” 
film. The stalwarts of the slasher subgenre include The Texas Chainsaw Massacre, Halloween, 
and Friday the 13th. These classic and contemporary horror films portray evil as person-
centered, as unexplainable, and as almost unstoppable (especially given the endless sequels in 
horror movie franchises).  
Of course, action films also personify evil, but such films typically give evildoers more 
purpose to their evil acts (Baumeister, 1999). The evil can be instrumental (e.g., to gain money, 
power), egotistical (e.g., for revenge), or for pleasure (i.e., sadism); however, Gene Siskel and 
Roger Ebert, prominent movie critics in their time, commented during a special episode on 
villains: “Enjoying being evil is key to any successful villain...this is the most important feature” 
(Siskel & Ebert, 1995). In addition to action films, horror films also do portray villains as 
sadistic. For example, Freddy Krueger, from the Nightmare on Elm Street horror franchise, 
seemed to reap pleasure from toying with his victims before ultimately killing them in their 
dreams. Moreover, Hesse and Mack (1991) analyzed and coded children’s cartoons and found 
that villains were routinely portrayed as prototypically sadistic and motivated by greed and 
power—even though many times the villains already possessed plenty of power and money. 
Thus, the personal archetype of evil seems to be cultivated from an early age through cartoons 
and maintained through adulthood by television, movies, and other popular mediums. Religious 
texts, which parallel television and movies in personifying evil (Baumeister, 1999), are included 
as one of these popular mediums (see Study 3). 
Ultimately, Baumeister (1999) identified a constellation of eight different perceptions 
that he believed coalesced into the belief (in the myth of) of pure evil (pp. 72-75). Please note 
that the hypothesized components of BPE do overlap with the scientific consensus of the 
definition of evil—that is, deliberate and unprovoked harmful behavior (Baumeister, 1999; 
Darley, 1992; Miller, 2004); however, the belief in pure evil comprises other attributes about the 
agent of harm and the agent’s motivations for harm.  
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1. Pure evil involves the intentional infliction of harm.  According to BPE, and 
following the correspondence bias, bad things happen because of bad people. Thus, evil is not 
accidental or unintended, but is a willful and conscious action by an agent of destruction. If 
people more often considered circumstantial reasons for evil, the world would seem like a more 
unpredictable place given that people are not generally good at discerning situational causes to 
others’ behaviors (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). That is, people higher in BPE likely maintain that 
bad things happen because of bad people to help maintain a belief in a just, orderly, and 
predictable world.  
2. The evildoer is driven primarily by the wish to inflict harm merely for the 
pleasure of doing so. Accordingly to BPE, bad things not only happen because of bad people, 
these bad people harm for the mere pleasure of it. In cases where power and money seem to be 
motives, such material pursuits are typically seen only as the means to further an evil agenda. 
Indeed, victims of deliberate harm often describe their attackers as having no coherent reasons 
for harming them, except out of sheer malice (see Baumeister, 1999, ch. 2 for a review).  
3. The victim of pure evil is innocent and good.  According to BPE, bad things happen 
because of bad people who harm for the pleasure of it; however, we need to add an additional 
clause: bad things happen to good, innocent people because of bad people. To elucidate, people 
who believe in pure evil think that if another person harms them, it is because the perpetrator 
was evil, not because of something they—the victims—did to provoke the evildoer’s wrath. If 
people who believe in pure evil acknowledge that they did something to provoke harm, then they 
must admit they did something wrong and are partially responsible for the harm. Typically, 
people do not like to admit wrongdoing to preserve a positive view of themselves (see 
Baumeister, 1997, ch. 2). Seeing victims of evil, including ourselves and those similar to us, as 
good and innocent helps preserve the belief in a just world. Moreover, given their sadistic nature, 
evildoers should enjoy hurting those who are less capable of protecting themselves (e.g., 
“helpless” women, the elderly, or children). 
4. Evil represents the antithesis of order, peace, and stability.  Because most people 
like to preserve a predictable, peaceful, and just world (see Lerner, 1980), the injection of pure 
evil—of chaos and the abnormal—disrupts people’s quiet and orderly daily lives. It is likely not 
a coincidence that throughout history (and even today), natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, 
volcano eruptions) were deemed evil (Russell, 1977). As discussed, horror films adeptly 
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exemplify and exploit this component of the BPE; the juxtaposition of an orderly world and 
chaos likely makes a story all the more frightening and suspenseful. 
5. Pure evil comes from the outside.  According to BPE, evildoers purposefully disturb 
good and innocent people’s orderly lives; people who would do intentional harm to such good 
people could not possibly be part of the ingroup. Indeed, in popular fiction, bad boys often both 
look and speak differently than the targeted victim (and audience). Thus, evildoers are often 
outsiders, outgroup members. However, many action and horror movies portray evil as coming 
from the “inside”, that is, from people that both look and sound like ingroup members (e.g., 
Arlington Road, Red Eye), which likely heightens the suspense and exacerbates the terror. In the 
real world, the rise of “homegrown” militantism/terrorism in the U.S. (e.g., the 1995 Oklahoma 
City bombings; see Masters, 2011) also calls into question the idea that evil consistently arises 
from the “outside”. Ultimately, even if evildoers look and sound like ingroup members, they are 
likely perceived as psychologically different. 
6. Pure evil is stable in the person.  According to BPE, evil does not arise from 
ordinary, well-meaning people under difficult conditions. Instead, people are born evil or forever 
corrupted by evil; that is, evil can be dispositional or can forever corrupt someone’s thoughts and 
behavior. Thus, one cannot reason with evil and it is futile to try to understand it; therefore, the 
only choice we have is to permanently incapacitate or annihilate evildoers from this world.  
7. Pure evil is marked by egotism.  Further, accordingly to BPE, evildoers have big 
egos. That is, evildoers do not usually suffer from low self-esteem, but from exaggerated high 
self-esteem. To be more scientifically precise, evildoers likely suffer from high, defensive (i.e., 
unstable) self-esteem, which is more akin to narcissism or self-love (see Baumeister, Smart, & 
Boden, 1996; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Brown, & Correl, 2003). Because of this 
egotism, evildoers lack empathy for others and are oversensitive to interpersonal threats; thus, 
even a little provocation can propel evildoers to harm without compunction. Knowing that one 
will not be distressed by guilt makes hurting others that much easier (Baumeister, 1999).  
8. Pure evil is associated with difficulty in maintaining control over emotions, 
especially anger and rage.  Along with exhibiting greater egotism, BPE portrays evildoers as 
having very low self-restraint or self-regulation over their emotions. That is, accordingly to BPE, 
evildoers are likely to randomly lash out toward other people who anger them because of low 
self-restraint. However, out of all eight components, Baumeister states that the last two BPE 
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components (egotism and poor emotion regulation) are likely not as reliable or consistent with 
evil behavior, especially given the prototype of the cold, calculating (vs. out-of-control) villain 
who enacts harm in a systematic, controlled manner (e.g., Hannibal Lector in Silence of the 
Lambs). Nonetheless, cold, calculating evildoers are still likely perceived as being egotistic in 
that they are self-loving and lack empathy for others. It is also somewhat ironic that these last 
two components are likely the most “true” about violent offenders; that is, considering all known 
proximal causes, egotism and low self-regulation appear to be the two best predictors of violent 
offending (Baumeister, 1999). 
In sum then, pure evil: 
“[S]eeks relentlessly to inflict harm with no positive or comprehensible motive, deriving 
enjoyment from the suffering of others…It maliciously and gratuitously seeks out unsuspecting, 
innocent victims from among the good people of the world. It is the eternal other, the enemy, the 
outsider who despises the orderly and peaceful world of the good and seeks to throw it into 
chaos.” (Baumeister, 1999, p. 75)  
 The Value of Assessing People’s Beliefs in Pure Evil  
Human beings are strongly predisposed to categorize other people into groups, especially 
in terms of sex, race/ethnicity, and age. We identify and affiliate with those that are similar to us 
(Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992), and because we automatically think positively of ourselves, we 
think positively of those similar to us as well. Meanwhile we are suspicious of or hostile toward 
those who are different than us because they look and/or think differently than we do (Allport, 
1954/1979).  
“But if we are good, and you are our opponents, and evil is the opposite of good, then you 
must be evil” (Baumeister, 1999, p. 68). Indeed, people are naturally inclined to blame outgroups 
for bad things that happen to the ingroup (Mullen & Johnson, 1990). It would seem, then, as the 
tendency to identify with the ingroup grows stronger, so does the tendency to see oneself as good 
and rivals/enemies as evil, especially when trying to explain why bad things have occurred. Such 
polarized views are likely used to justify the mistreatment of outgroups; to stomp out evil you 
must get rid of the evil people. “There is no point in being patient, tolerant, and understanding 
when one is dealing with evil” (Baumeister, 1999, p. 69).  
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Indeed, throughout history, people have justified mistreatment of outgroups by accusing 
them of being in league with the Devil (e.g., the Jews; Russell, 1988). As with horror or action 
movie villains, the Devil represents an evildoer driven by sadistic impulses; the Devil is 
motivated to do harm for harm’s sake. It is probably not a coincidence that evildoers in popular 
media often typify outgroup characteristics (e.g., foreign accents and ethnicities), which likely 
makes categorizing them as evil—and harming them—that much easier (Baumeister, 1999). 
Assessing BPE appears valuable, then, because of its potential to justify intergroup (or 
interpersonal) aggression as well as its potential to suppress inclinations to help. People higher in 
BPE should be more likely to perceive worldview-threatening groups as evil in order to justify 
aggression or withholding of help because (accordingly to BPE) evildoers cannot be reasoned 
with. People higher in BPE also may be more likely to notice perpetrators’ behaviors that are 
consistent with BPE, which should exacerbate their aggression toward perpetrators. The only 
option then is to summarily punish or destroy evildoers. Eliminating evildoers eliminates the 
possibility that the evildoers will propagate their dissonant, dangerous worldviews and behavior. 
Accordingly, accusations of evil on both sides of a conflict can foreseeably create a reciprocal 
and escalating pattern of violence (Baumeister, 1999). 
In sum, BPE is theorized to predict higher rates of aggression toward (perceived) 
evildoers, or more broadly, perceived evildoing groups; yet, BPE would also likely be associated 
with less helping toward perpetrators as well. Nonetheless, endorsing harsher punishments (e.g., 
capital punishment) may be perceived as more effective in eliminating worldview threats when 
compared to withholding help (e.g., supporting rehabilitation efforts; c.f. Krueger, Hicks, & 
McGue, 2001). Further, it may be that the more people higher in BPE perceive a target to be evil 
(e.g., by experimentally imbuing a perpetrator with prototypically evil characteristics), the 
severity of punishment will increase or, alternatively, intentions to help should decrease. As 
Becker (1985) sagely stated, “In seeking to avoid evil, man is responsible for bringing more evil 
into the world than organisms could ever do merely by exercising their digestive tracts. It is 
man’s ingenuity, rather than his animal nature, that has given his fellow creatures such a bitter 
earthly fate” (p. 5). However, until recently, no researchers had attempted to empirically confirm 
the multitude of theorizing on BPE.   
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 Preliminary Studies Examining Belief in Pure Evil  
A search of the literature only revealed four extant papers (of which only two have been 
published in peer-reviewed journals) that empirically examined some aspect of BPE. Some of 
these studies directly aimed to develop and validate individual difference measures of BPE, 
while others have taken more of an experimental approach in exploring how evil “cues” affect 
perceptions of violent offenders.  
First, via two conference presentations, Wetering (2005; Wetering, Svekla, Hiebert, 
Olvera, & Dehghan, 2007) described his attempts to construct an individual difference measure 
of BPE based upon Baumeister’s (1999) and Darley’s (1992) theoretical frameworks5
Overall, the psychometric properties of Wetering’s (2005) myth of pure evil scale were 
less than desirable. First, the scale exhibited low internal consistency (alpha = .68). Second, 
exploratory factor analysis results indicated eight theoretically inconsonant factors. Third, the 
scale exhibited low or non-significant inter-correlations between other attitudinal variables 
previously shown to predict intergroup aggression (e.g., the scale moderately correlated with a 
measure of right-wing authoritarianism, but did not correlate with just-world beliefs or support 
for criminal punitiveness). Moreover, the scale was tested using a fairly small sample (N = 121). 
. Wetering 
(2005) first piloted a 22-item measure with eight protrait and contrait items for each of 
Baumeister’s pure evil components as well as six other items (three portrait and three contrait) 
tapping other “ideas espoused” by Baumeister and Darley that did not specifically address one of 
Baumeister’s BPE components; however Wetering did not delineate which items referenced the 
eight evil components vs. the six additional items. 
Wetering et al. (2007) conducted a second study to improve upon his original scale (N = 
54). Wetering et al. developed a sample pool of 56 potential items that was then subjected to 
exploratory factor analysis; however, the conference paper provided few details on how these 
items were created (e.g., whether and how many of these items reflected each of Baumeister’s 
eight components of pure evil). Wetering et al. ultimately retained the top ten loading contrait 
and protrait items (presumably on the first factor) to create a reliable (alpha = .93) 20-item 
measure. This revised scale did positively correlate with an ad-hoc measure of criminal 
punitiveness, but did not correlate with other variables that have been shown to justify intergroup 
                                                 
5 I would like to thank Wetering for so readily providing materials from his conference presentations. 
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aggression (social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, or just-world beliefs). 
Wetering and colleagues should be lauded for being the first to attempt to construct and validate 
a measure assessing belief in pure evil; however, it appears—and Wetering has relented 
(personal communication, February 15, 2011)—that his attempts were not as “fruitful” or 
successful as one could hope. 
Next, Burris and Rempel (2011, Study 1) created a nine-item myth in pure evil scale 
based upon Baumeister’s (1999) BPE components (N = 148), seemingly without knowledge of 
Wetering’s (2005, 2007) earlier attempts. However, in validating the scale, they only tested the 
scale’s internal consistency (alpha = .77), noting that every item “contributed to the scale’s 
internal validity” without providing any specific item-total correlations (p. 71). Burris and 
Rempel then assessed whether they could actually increase people’s perceptions of pure evil via 
three symbol matching tasks. In the “evil” condition, participants had to match evil symbols to 
their infamous users (e.g., swastika/Nazi, Zodiac sign/serial killer). The other two tasks were 
religious (e.g., menorah/Judiasm, Alam al-Shalada/Islam) or scientific (Jupiter/astronomy, 
water/chemisty) in nature (note that Burris and Rempel referred to latter conditions as “neutral”). 
Priming evil symbols did increase scores on their myth in pure evil scale compared to the other 
two control conditions combined (via a planned contrast). That is, priming evil cues increased 
perceptions of pure evil, which may infer that BPE may be more of an attitudinal rather than 
trait-like construct. 
Burris and Rempel (2011) reported two more studies in which they assessed participants’ 
reactions (the tendency to perceive perpetrators as evil and the level of aggression or “nihilistic 
hate” toward perpetrator) to perpetrators with and without evil cues present. The perpetrators 
were a child molester (Study 2) and a group home employee engaging in ambiguous sexually 
harassing behavior (Study 3). Similar to their first study, the vignettes manipulated the presence 
(vs. absence) of evil symbols: the child molester read occult literature in Study 2 and the group 
home employee appeared “Goth” in dress and interests in Study 3.  
Instead of using their myth in pure evil scale as a potential predictor of perceptions of 
evilness and aggression, Burris and Rempel theorized a two-dimensional (Virulent vs. 
Engagement) “Responses to Evil” construct to test as a moderator of participants’ evaluations of 
the perpetrators. The Virulent dimension reflected “individual differences in the extent to which 
people construe evil as a threat”, while the Engagement dimension reflected “individual 
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differences in the extent to which people either prefer to directly confront or to distance 
themselves from evil” (p. 70). Burris and Rempel (2011) crossed the virulence and engagement 
dimensions to identify four distinct patterns of responses, each measured by its own scale: 
“chronic tendencies to attack (high virulence, high engagement), avoid (high virulence, low 
engagement), embrace (low virulence, high engagement), or ignore (low virulence, low 
engagement) evil” (p. 72). In Study 3, they conducted an exploratory factor analysis to support 
the validity of their Responses to Evil; specifically, the factor analysis showed four relatively 
clean factors, with items mapping onto their respective subscale. Alphas for these scales varied 
from Study 1 (alphas = .69 to .72) to Study 2 (alphas = .71 to .86). 
Burris and Rempel (2011) hypothesized that people’s perception of evil as a threat would 
only relate to perceptions of the perpetrator as evil when evil cues were present in the vignettes. 
In support of this, they found that the attack, avoid, and ignore components only positively 
correlated with participants’ perception of the target as evil when the vignettes contained evil 
cues; however, it was not clear why the ignore component was positively correlated with 
participants’ tendency to see the target as evil given that the subscale reflected the tendency to 
discredit evil as a meaningful label. To more thoroughly test the ostensible interaction between 
their Responses to Evil Scale and presence (vs. absence) of evil symbolism, they created one 
“evil as virulent” main effect score by collapsing across the engagement dimensions; that is, they 
subtracted the mean of the embrace and ignore scale scores from the mean of the attack and 
avoid scale scores.  In both Study 2 and Study 3, they found a positive relationship between “evil 
as virulent” and the perception of the perpetrator as evil only when evil symbolism was present 
in the vignette. Perceptions of the target as evil were then positively associated with nihilistic 
hate (i.e., aggressive responses) toward the target whether or not evil symbolism was present in 
both studies. However, it is unclear whether the Responses to Evil Scale predicted aggression 
toward the targets.  
Nonetheless, Burris and Rempel’s (2011) studies, like all others, have limitations. First, 
the development and validity testing of their myth in pure evil scale was limited. It is also 
uncertain whether individual differences in their myth of pure evil scale would have helped 
predict perceptions of the targets as evil or aggression toward the perpetrators. Further, it is 
unclear how their myth in pure evil scale would relate to their Response to Evil Scale; that is, 
does BPE predict (or even overlap) with the tendency to see evil as a threat or the tendency to 
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avoid evil? The Responses to Evil Scale may also be redundant with hypothesized components 
of BPE (e.g., people summarily “attack” evil because evil cannot change). Nevertheless, Burris 
and Rempel (2011) overall showed that priming evil symbolism increased people’s BPE; that 
people’s perception of evil as a potent threat positively predicted labeling targets as evil only 
when evil cues were present; and that labeling targets as evil positively predicted aggression 
toward targets whether or not evil symbolism was present. Burris and Rempel’s studies are 
seminal in demonstrating the effects of evil cues on individuals’ reactions to perpetrators. 
Similarly, the fourth and last paper that has empirically addressed evil assessed the 
“demonizing” of perpetrators after manipulating both the “prototypical evilness” of a violent 
crime and participants’ cognitive load via vignettes (Prooijen & de Veer, 2010). People are less 
likely to thoughtfully process perceptual information—including information concerning 
impression formation—and rely on stereotypes when they do not have the time or energy to do 
so, that is, during high cognitive load (e.g., McCrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). Thus, 
Prooijen and de Veer predicted that high cognitive load would make participants more prone to 
“demonize” a prototypically evil perpetrator.  
Prooijen and de Veer (2010) randomly assigned participants to either memorize a 
difficult- (high cognitive load) or easy-to-remember (low cognitive load) telephone number. 
Prooijen and de Veer then varied the description of the perpetrator of a violent crime—murder in 
Study 1 (N = 80) and kidnapping in Study 2 (N = 84)—via vignettes. In the prototypically evil 
condition, the vignette described the perpetrator (“Marco G.”) as “exceptionally calm” during his 
arrest and as a “socially isolated individual”. The vignette continued, stating that the 
neighborhood children “were terrified of him. Recently, one of the children’s football 
accidentally ended up in Marco G.’s garden. When the child tried to get the ball back, Marco G. 
scared the living daylights out of the child by sneaking up on him from behind, and then chasing 
the child away from his garden while swearing, with a huge smile on his face” (p. 263). Thus, 
Prooijen and de Veer imbued Marco with prototypically evil characteristics based on BPE, 
particularly sadistic pleasure. 
In the non-prototypically evil condition, the perpetrator was described as “exceptionally 
upset” during his arrest and a “quiet person and a real family man” (Prooijen & de Veer, 2010, p. 
264). In lieu of the dramatic episode of Marco G. scaring a child, the vignette read: “Many 
people from the neighborhood attended [his wedding anniversary party], and expressed how 
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enjoyable this event had been. His neighbors said that, the day before the murder, they had talked 
to Marco G. in his garden. Marco G. had said how much he was looking forward to…camping 
outside during the weekends” (p. 264). 
In both studies, Prooijen and de Veer (2010) assessed the extent to which participants 
demonized the perpetrator via an ad-hoc five-item measure (alphas = .90 and .83 for Study 1 and 
2, respectively): “This crime was caused entirely by the offender’s evilness”, “The offender is 
only motivated to destroy everything that is benevolent”, “The offender seems to enjoy hurting 
others”, “The offender is immoral”, and “When thinking of the offender, I can only imagine how 
mean he is”. Prooijen and de Veer’s (2010) “demonizing” scale thus appeared to assess belief in 
pure evil on a person level (i.e., as applicable to the perpetrator only) by addressing some of 
Baumeister’s (1999) pure evil components as applied to the perpetrator only, including the 
degree to which participants thought that the perpetrator was evil, that the perpetrator enjoyed 
hurting others, and that the perpetrator wanted to destroy everything that is benevolent in this 
world. Their results confirmed their hypotheses that, although demonizing scores were overall 
higher in the prototypically evil (vs. non-prototypically evil) conditions, high cognitive load 
increased demonizing when the perpetrator was portrayed as prototypically evil. So, when people 
are robbed of time and energy to think about perpetrators, people seemingly are more likely to 
rely on cultural stereotypes about evildoers. 
In sum, the prior studies are seminal in that they are the first to empirically test previous 
theorizing on BPE. Specifically, both Wetering (2005, 2007) and Burris and Rempel (2011) 
attempted to create and validate a myth in pure evil scale. Burris and Rempel (2011) and 
Prooijen and de Veer (2010) further showed that imbuing perpetrators with evil characteristics 
(either by associating the perpetrator with evil symbols or giving the perpetrator “evil” 
mannerisms) increased aggressive reactions (either nihilistic hate or demonizing) toward 
perpetrators. However, none of these studies attempted to comprehensively develop and validate 
a BPE scale. Given the depth of theorizing on BPE (Baumeister, 1999; see also Darley, 1992), a 
more in-depth approach to measuring BPE, its possible correlates, and its predictive utility 
(above and beyond other known predictors) is warranted. 
First, in reviewing the prior studies, several improvements can be made in developing a 
BPE scale. First, given the limited sample sizes in these past studies, an adequate sample size 
needs to be obtained to satisfactorily test the scales’ psychometric properties. Compromising 
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between the most liberal and most conservative recommendations for scale development (e.g., 
reliability, factor analysis), researchers recommend at least 200 participants (Fabrigar, Wegener, 
MacCullum, & Strahn, 1999) per study. Second, in lieu of using a specific number of items as a 
cutoff point (e.g., Wetering, 2005, 2007), it is likely more prudent to use a statistical cutoff point 
(e.g., loadings or total item-scale correlations > .30; Everitt, 2002; Field, 2005; Nunnally, 1967). 
Using the number of items as a cutoff point could eliminate important items or dimensions that 
contribute to a scale; that is, if we use a specific number of items as a cutoff point, we may 
disregard items pertaining to key BPE dimensions, which is especially relevant to our 
investigation given that eight different dimensions of BPE are hypothesized. Third, a more 
detailed and sophisticated list of potential BPE items is needed (see Churchill, 1979). A closer 
examination of previous BPE items (e.g., Wetering, 2005, 2007) revealed complicated phrasing 
(e.g., “Evil people just are also selfish people. If they were not so, they would understand that 
other people are hurt by what they do”) and confounding attitudes about good and evil (e.g., 
“Bad people were born that way; good people were born good”).  
We (Webster & Saucier, 2012) aimed to resolve these issues in constructing an improved 
BPE scale. Accordingly, first, a large pool of potential items—at least four to six items for each 
hypothesized BPE dimension—was required. These items needed to be prudently and simply 
worded, especially as not to confound attitudes about good and evil. These items would then be 
subjected to a reliability analysis using a large sample of (at least 200) participants. Ideally, two 
sets of participants would complete the potential BPE items. Then, reliability analyses for each 
participant sample would be compared and the items with the highest item-total correlations 
across both participant samples would be retained for the final scale. Further, the final scale 
would need to evidence convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity. That is, the final scale 
should correlate but not be redundant with relevant previously-established constructs and predict 
relevant criteria above and beyond other known predictors (Whitley, 2002). Thus, this is exactly 
what we set out to do in constructing and validating an improved BPE scale as well as in 
constructing, for the first time, a scale assessing perceptions of pure good. Yet, what are the 
components of belief in pure good (BPG)?  
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 What is “Pure Good”? 
Good and evil have been consistently been proposed as opposite ends of the same 
spectrum (Baumeister, 1999); but, evil has received much more attention by scholars even 
though helping others is a universally recognized virtue (Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio, & Piliavin, 
2005). That is not to say that scholars across both the biological and social sciences have debated 
whether pure good—in essence, pure altruism or selfless helping—exists (Batson, 1991; 
Cialdini, Baumann, & Kenrick, 1981; Wilson, 2005); but, again, whether pure good and pure evil 
exist is not pertinent to the current investigation.  
More critical to this research is that, to our knowledge, few scholars have discussed 
whether people’s perceptions of whether pure good exists affects people’s attitudinal or 
behavioral tendencies about whether to harm or help (for an exception, Lichtenberg [2010] wrote 
a popular media article that partly discussed this issue). A search of the psychological literature 
revealed only two books chapters that addressed the issue of “pure good”, and these did so only 
tangentially: the first addressed appealing aspects of evildoers in the Harry Potter series 
(Bousquet, 2009), while the second addressed conditions for terrorism (With, 2004). Moreover, 
even Wikipedia does not have a page on “pure good”—but it does have one on “evil” 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil) and on the comparison of “good and evil” 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Good_and_evil). 
Given that “good” is often perceived to be the opposite of “evil”, can we simply infer that 
the components of BPG are simply the converse of the components of BPG? It seems that in 
some cases we could extract parallel BPG components from the BPE components; however, at 
times, we would be hard-pressed to find a direct opposite. In cases where there appeared to be no 
direct opposite, we (Webster & Saucier, 2012) perused the altruism and volunteerism literature 
(e.g., Batson, 1991; Cialdini et al., 1981; Snyder, Omoto, & Lindsay, 2004) for other qualities 
that may exemplify pure good. Thus, the hypothesized BPG components should somewhat 
overlap with the scientific definition of altruism, as the hypothesized BPE components 
overlapped with the scientific definition of “evil”; however, belief in pure good comprises other 
attributes about the agent of help and his/her motivations for helping. Ultimately, we 
hypothesized eight different BPG components, discussed below. 
1. Pure good is about intentional help. At its core, from a behavioral science 
perspective, pure good—like pure altruism—is about intentionally helping for help’s sake 
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(Batson, 1991; Cialdini et al., 1981; Snyder, Omoto, & Lindsay, 2004). Thus, as BPE perceives 
that evildoers’ harm is intentional and conscious, BPG perceives that do-gooders’ helping is 
equally intentional and conscious. 
2. Pure good is about selfless help. Further, according to pure altruism, people do not 
only intentionally and consciously help, they selflessly help as well; that is, some people help 
others without expectation of intrinsic (to feel good) or extrinsic (to look good to others) rewards 
(Batson, 1991). Thus, while BPE perceives that evildoers harm for the mere pleasure of it, BPG 
holds that do-gooders help without expectation of (intrinsic or extrinsic) reward.  
3. Pure good is about helping anyone in need. Next, if evildoers are perceived to target 
certain people (i.e., good and innocent victims), do do-gooders target certain individuals as well? 
We reasoned that people higher in BPG believe that anyone who needs help with receive help, 
whether they are friends or enemies; if someone is in need of aid, he or she will receive it 
without judgment. Mother Theresa particularly demonstrated this BPG component; as she was 
attributed to having said, “If you judge people, you have no time to love them.” Thus, while 
people who believe in pure good perceive perpetrators as egotistical, people who believe in pure 
good see do-gooders as humble and self-sacrificing. 
4. Pure good is about helping without hurting others. According to BPG, people can 
willfully and selflessly help anyone in need; however, we also likely need to qualify that pure 
good is about helping without resorting to aggression or violence in order to help. Harming 
others, whatever justifications people may provide to help, only nullifies the benefits of the 
intended help; violence conducted in the name of achieving peace still means people are being 
hurt. As Henry Adams sardonically stated, “It’s always the ‘good men’ who do the most harm in 
the world” (see Baumeister, 1999, ch. 6). Indeed, Ghandi, Martin Luther King, and Mother 
Theresa all stressed non-violent means to help the plight of disadvantaged groups (e.g., Brown, 
1989; Spink, 1997).  
5. Pure good cannot be corrupted.  We reasoned that pure good cannot be corrupted by 
the forces of evil; that is, do-gooders can resist the temptations (i.e., the possible abstract or 
material rewards) to joining the “dark side” (using Star Wars nomenclature). Sages and leaders 
both in fiction (e.g., Yoda from Star Wars, Gandalf from The Lord of the Rings) and non-fiction 
(e.g., Mother Theresa, Ghandi) were not viewed as perfect beings; however, they knew what was 
“the right to do” and continually resisted the pleasurable temptations of darker forces (e.g., 
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Gandalf being resistant to taking the one ring of power; Mother Theresa doubting her faith only 
seemed to solidify her faith in good).  
6. Pure good is a stable influence in people. Implicated in the previous BPG axiom is 
the issue of the stability of pure good. According to BPE, evil is a stable trait: people are either 
born evil or forever corrupted by evil. Does pure good parallel evil in that pure good is also a 
stable trait? Are people either born good or become forever good once they “see the error of their 
ways”?  We were unsure as to how people who believe in pure good would think about the 
stability and malleability of goodness. It could be that people who believe in pure good believe 
that do-gooders like Mother Theresa were born purely good; however, people who believe in 
pure good might also feel that people can see “the error of their ways” and strive to be selfless, 
impartial ambassadors of aid. We ensured that we developed and tested items addressing the 
stability of pure good to see if such perceptions were reliably part of the BPG construct. 
7. Pure good is synonymous with peace, order, and stability. People who believe in 
pure good likely want to believe that pure good exists because pure good helps foster a more 
peaceful and orderly society. If more people selflessly helped anyone in need—without thinking 
about themselves and without the use of violence—it does appear that the world would be a more 
peaceful place. Thus, this is one case where a BPE component (i.e., pure evil is the antithesis of 
peace and order) is the direct opposite of a BPG component.    
8. Pure good is rare in the world.  People higher in BPG have to grapple with the fact 
that although pure good helps facilitate a more peaceful society, it appears that history has been 
perpetually plagued with human violence. Accordingly, people higher in BPG may perceive that 
pure good is too rare in this world. Indeed, examples of purely good people seem hard to come 
by. Thus, accordingly to BPG, if there were more pure good in this world, then we would 
achieve a more peaceful and orderly society.  
In sum, BPG is about intentionally and impartially helping any person in need without 
the use of violence, the expectation of reward, or concern for their own welfare; therefore, pure 
good cannot be tempted by the rewards to join the “dark side”. Pure good is seen as necessary to 
help maintain an orderly and peaceful society, and if there was more pure good in this world 
(i.e., pure good is rare), that we would have a more peaceful society. We also considered whether 
pure good was a dispositional or stable personal characteristic given that pure good cannot be 
corrupted by the forces of evil.  
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As we compare BPG and BPE, we again notice that many of the BPG components do not 
entirely parallel the theorized BPE components, which may impact our hypotheses about how 
BPE and BPG are (or are not) related. The popular view is that people concurrently believe in 
both good and evil (i.e., where there is evil, there needs to be pure good; Baumeister, 1999), so it 
is possible that BPE and BPG scores could be positively related; that is, as BPE increases, so 
does BPG. Conversely, one can make a competing hypothesis that BPE and BPG could be 
negatively related given that some BPG components appear to challenge some BPE components; 
for example, people who score higher in BPG believe that doing good means not harming others, 
while people higher in BPE likely feel that violence and aggression are justified to root out 
“evildoers”.  
Despite the competing hypotheses regarding the nature of relationship between BPG and 
BPE, we can make clear predictions in how BPG would relate to intergroup aggression and 
helping responses. People higher in BPG perceive that selfless, impartial, non-violent help does 
exist and more of it would make the world a more peaceful place. Ultimately, then, people higher 
in BPG would be more likely to suppress outright aggressive responses toward perpetrators, and 
more importantly, promote more empathic, indiscriminate helping in general as well. In fact, 
denying pure good exists may actually also serve to justify people’s prosocial apathy: if 
individuals think that no one can act altruistically, then there is no pressure on themselves to 
selflessly and impartially help others. Overall, the hypothesized effects of BPG parallel the 
hypothesized effects of BPE, just in the other direction. Accordingly, to test the hypothesized 
effects of BPE and BPG on intergroup aggression and helping responses, we of course needed to 
create and validate separate BPG and BPE scales. 
 Initial Development and Validation of the BPE and the BPG Scales 
“Many that live deserve death. And some that die deserve life. Can you give it to 
them? Then do not be too eager to deal out death in judgement. For even the very 
wise cannot see all ends.”  
-J.R.R. Tolkien (b. 1892 - d. 1973), The Fellowship of the Ring 
To reiterate, in improving upon the very limited research on BPE (and the non-existent 
literature examining people’s BPG), we formulated a specific methodological and analytic plan 
to create the BPE and BPG scales. First, we created four to six (protrait and contrait) items for 
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each of the BPE and BPG components (Webster & Saucier, 2012); therefore, we started with 
quite a large pool of potential items (65 and 53 items for BPE and BPG, respectively). We did 
postulate four additional theorized components to the myth of pure evil that were not explicitly 
listed by Baumeister (1999), but were developed out of his and others’ works (e.g., Baumeister, 
1999; Darley, 1992; Miller, 2004; Miller, Gordon, & Buddie, 1999): Futile to Understand Evil, 
Too Much Evil, Discounting Situations, and General Endorsement.  
Futile to Understand refers to the extent to which people believe that we should not try to 
understand evil, because this will foster greater empathizing with perpetrators and condoning of 
their harmful behavior; several theorists have commented on this very issue in studying evil (see, 
e.g., Baumeister, 1999; Darley, 1992; Miller et al., 1999). Too Much Evil reflects the possibility 
that some people believe that there is too much evil in the world right now. Discounting 
Situations reflect the idea that mitigating circumstances play a small or no role at all in 
facilitating evil behavior (see Baumeister, 1999; Darley, 1992). General Endorsement solely 
concerns people’s general willingness to say that they believe in pure evil. On a theoretical level, 
we wanted to assess whether people’s general agreement of the existence of pure evil was 
reliably related to the more specified hypothesized components. Accordingly, we generated 
parallel general attitudinal (i.e., General Endorsement) items for BPG as well. 
Nonetheless, in constructing items, we were careful not to include overtly religious 
content so that belief in neither pure good nor pure evil would be confounded with religious 
dogma about good and evil. Further, we were cautious not to confound belief in good and evil 
within the same item so that we get a clearer delineation between these two constructs.  
Two groups of introductory psychology students completed all potential BPE and BPG 
items in separate semesters (Spring/Summer 2011 and Fall 2011). For Spring/Summer 2011, 255 
undergraduates (102 women, 130 men; due to an administration error, the sex of 23 participants 
was not recorded) participated.  They were primarily White (69.4%) and tended to be slightly 
older than an average introductory psychology sample (Mage = 20.02, SDage = 2.85). For Fall 
2011, 286 (190 women, 96 men) primarily White (87.4%) students (Mage = 18.84, SDage = 2.20) 
participated. We conducted reliability analyses on the BPE and BPG items for the 
Summer/Spring and Fall datasets separately and retained items that exhibited item-total 
correlations ≥ .30 in both datasets (Nunnally, 1967; for recent use of parallel statistical 
approaches, see Fletcher et al., 1986; Saucier & Webster, 2010). We used this statistical 
19 
 
approach for a number of reasons. First, BPE and BPG are theorized to be unidimensional 
constructs comprised of several interdependent underlying beliefs; indeed, one of the main draws 
of the construct is its unitary construction, both theoretically and grammatically (“belief in pure 
evil” vs. “beliefs in pure evil”). If these constructs do represent one reliable index, a reliability 
analysis of all the items should show high internal consistency.  
A reliability analysis also allows some BPE and BPG components to be represented more 
just by the sheer number of items that contribute to the averaged BPE and BPG scores. We 
expected that the results would exhibit a pattern in which the items reflecting the “core” 
components of BPE (e.g., Intentional Harm and Joy of Harm) and BPG (e.g., Intentional Help 
and Helping Without Reward) to exhibit some of the highest item-total correlations; meanwhile, 
items reflecting components that we and previous theorists were less confident about (e.g., the 
perceptions that evildoers have low self-control) would likely be more sporadically retained or 
may be eliminated altogether. We selected .30 as the cutoff item-total correlation because this 
value served as a compromise between more liberal (e.g., .20) and more conservative (e.g., .40) 
cutoff recommendations (Everitt, 2002; Field, 2005; Nunnally, 1967).  
The final BPE (22 items) and BPG (28 items) scale items are in Tables 1 and 2, 
respectively. Both the BPE (alphas = .88 and .89, for the Summer/Spring and Fall samples, 
respectively) and BPG (alphas = .91 for both samples) scales exhibited excellent reliability 
across both datasets. Is it interesting to note that only eight of the proposed 12 BPE components 
(including the General Endorsement dimension) were represented in the final set of BPE items; 
items addressing the BPE components of Victim as Innocent, Evil as Outsider, Too Much Evil, 
and Discounting Situations were not included in the final scale. Thus, perceptions that victims 
are always good and innocent, that evil comes from the outside, that there is too much evil in the 
world, and that there are not situational explanations for evil do not appear to be reliably part of 
the BPE construct. Meanwhile, items reflecting eight of the nine (including the General 
Endorsement dimension) hypothesized BPG components were ultimately included in the final 
scale; the only dimension not represented by the final scale items addressed whether pure good 
was dispositional. 
We aimed to replicate BPE and BPG effects on intergroup aggression and helping across 
both participants samples; thus, we included identical sets of measures (including all the 
potential BPE and BPG items) in both studies. We used criminals as the primary group of 
20 
 
interest because it allowed us to examine the extent to which people would both aggress (via 
support for severe punishments) and help (via support for rehabilitation efforts) criminal 
perpetrators; specifically, we assessed participants’ support for the death penalty and criminal 
rehabilitation, respectively (see Sessar, 1999). Participants’ also provided their recommended jail 
sentences (on a progressive scale from less than one year to the death penalty) for different 
crimes that were reliably grouped into three main categories: stealing (i.e., income tax fraud, 
money laundering, shop lifting, and embezzlement), assault (i.e., physical child abuse, child 
kidnapping, and raping a woman), and murder (i.e., intentional and accidental murder)6
We also included other relevant measures that have been shown to be related to levels of 
criminal punitiveness (and thus would be important to statistically control for) and that were 
hypothesized to be related to BPE and BPG: attributional complexity, just-world beliefs, and 
pessimism (Butler & Moran, 2007; Tam, Au, & Leung, 2008; Sargent, 2004). First, given that 
people higher in BPE perceive that bad things happen predominantly because of bad people, 
people higher in BPE are likely not as motivated to think very deeply about other people’s 
harmful behavior and therefore do not consider other possible causes, particularly immediate or 
distal situational factors; that is, people higher in BPE would likely score lower on attributional 
complexity (see Fletcher et al., 1986, 1990, 1992). Concurrently, because we reason that people 
higher in BPE formulate their perceptions of others’ harm-doing to partly help maintain the view 
of an orderly and just world (e.g., evil only happens to good and innocent people), we also 
reasoned that people higher in BPE would be related to greater belief in a just world. We also 
reasoned that people higher in BPE may be more pessimistic about the world in general given 
their overall negative outlook on human nature. 
. We 
predicted that people higher in BPE would report greater intergroup harm (e.g., greater support 
for severe criminal punitiveness) and less intergroup help (e.g., less support for criminal 
rehabilitation), while people higher in BPE would report greater support for intergroup help (e.g., 
more support for criminal rehabilitation) and less support for intergroup harm (e.g., less support 
for severe criminal punitiveness).  
Meanwhile, we reasoned that people higher in BPG probably think more deeply about the 
causes of people’s behavior, especially situational circumstances that can contribute to one’s 
                                                 
6 An exploratory factor analysis was conducted to form the categories. 
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harmful behaviors. To elucidate, people higher in BPG believe that selfless, impartial, and non-
violent helping can improve the world; thus, it would seem that people higher in BPG perceive 
that even people who do bad things can change—that evildoing individuals can be reformed, 
because there are other factors contributing to their bad behavior (aside from potential 
inclinations to do bad things). Thus, people higher in BPG would likely score higher on 
attributional complexity. We also reasoned that people higher in BPG may also be more 
optimistic in general given their belief in reforming people. 
Results first showed that BPE and BPG scores were completely uncorrelated in both 
participant samples7. Second, results confirmed the predicted relationships between BPE/BPG 
and attributional complexity, just-world beliefs, and pessimism. People who scored higher in 
BPE also scored higher in just-world beliefs and lower in attributional complexity, while people 
higher in BPG scored lower in pessimism and higher on attributional complexity. Most 
importantly, in line with predictions, BPE and BPG differentially and uniquely predicted 
intergroup aggression (i.e., support for the death penalty) and helping (i.e., support for 
rehabilitation) with regards to criminal offenders above and beyond other predictors (i.e., 
attributional complexity, pessimism, and just-world beliefs). Specifically, people higher in BPE 
reported greater support for the death penalty, but greater opposition to criminal rehabilitation; 
meanwhile, people higher in BPG reported greater opposition to the death penalty but greater 
support for criminal rehabilitation8
Further, recall that participants also provided their recommendations for punishing 
perpetrators for different types of reasonably severe crimes: stealing (income tax fraud, money 
laundering, shop lifting, and embezzlement), assault (physical child abuse, child kidnapping, and 
raping a woman), and murder (intentional and accidental murder). Across both of our samples, 
.  
                                                 
7 One may wonder why BPE and BPG scores were completely uncorrelated. We speculate that higher BPE 
necessitates greater belief in heroism (violence done in the name of good and peace; see, e.g., Becker, 1973, 1985), 
but not necessarily greater BPG. This is only speculation, though, and will need to be more thoroughly examined in 
future programmatic research. 
8 One may ponder why BPE and BPG showed opposite effects even though BPE and BPG are uncorrelated. 
However, although it seems rare, it is statistically and theoretically possible that two uncorrelated variables can still 
predict the same criterion. For example, even though right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation 
are sometimes not significantly correlated, their positive effects on generalized intergroup bias appear to remain 
consistent (e.g., Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). 
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BPE uniquely and positively predicted harsher punishment for stealing and assault crimes; only 
in the Spring/Summer 2011 dataset did BPG uniquely predict more lenient punishment, but only 
for stealing crimes. We expected more severe sentences from people higher in BPE across both 
types of crimes given their predilection for severe punishment. Meanwhile, we predicted more 
lenient punishments for stealing among people higher in BPG given that there are likely more 
extraneous circumstances that would facilitate a person stealing vs. assaulting women or 
children. Neither BPE nor BPG predicted sentences for murder, a point I hoped to resolve in 
Study 3.  
In sum, the results from our first two studies converged to indicate that BPE and BPG are 
indeed reliable and valid psychological constructs. People higher in BPE were less attributionally 
complex and reported greater just-world beliefs, while people higher in BPG were more 
attributionally complex and less pessimistic. Further, BPE and BPG differentially and uniquely 
predicted intergroup aggression (criminal punitiveness) and helping (criminal rehabilitation 
efforts) after controlling for other known predictors (attributional complexity, just-world beliefs, 
and pessimism).  
 Further Validation of BPE and BPG: Overview of Current Studies 
Three additional studies were conducted to further validate the BPE and BPG scales by 
assessing more possible correlates of BPE and BPG as well as testing their predictive utility 
across more diverse operational definitions of aggression and helping. As for potential correlates, 
these studies assessed the relationship between BPE/BPG and factors related to the justification 
and suppression of aggression and helping responses (see Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Broadly, 
the first study examined the relationship between BPE/BPG and sociopolitical perception (e.g., 
perception of a dangerous world) and ideology (e.g., right-wing authoritarianism, social 
dominance orientation, militant thinking). The dependent variables in Study 1 focused on foreign 
policy issues (e.g., support for militarism and peacemaking). Study 2 concentrate on the 
relationship between BPE/BPG and various forms of religiosity (e.g., fundamentalism, 
internal/external/quest religiosity) given the long history of religious philosophizing on good and 
evil. The dependent variables in Study 2 focused on American social policies targeted to help 
underrepresented or severely disparaged populations (e.g., support for Affirmative Action or 
needle-exchange programs). The third and final proposed study took an experimental approach 
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in assessing how BPE and BPG predict reactions to a prototypically (vs. non-prototypically) evil 
perpetrator who confesses to murder and a prototypically (vs. non-prototypically) good 
apprehender who helps capture the perpetrator. 
Overall, along with the two extant BPE/BPG studies discussed above (Webster & 
Saucier, 2012), the three studies herein aimed to show that perceptions of pure evil and pure 
good uniquely and differentially predict a range of aggression and helping responses. These 
results would further confirm our overall supposition that that how people view others’ harmful 
or hurtful behavior has important implications for people’s own decisions about whether to harm 
or hurt their fellow human beings (or other living beings). 
 Figures and Tables 
Table 1.1 Belief in Pure Evil Scale Items 
Item Component
1. Some people are just pure evil. General
2. People who commit evil acts often dedicate their entire lives plotting ways to intentionally hurt good people. Intentional Harm
3. People who commit evil acts always mean to harm innocent people. Intentional Harm
4. Evil people take every opportunity to make other people’s live a living hell. Intentional Harm
5. The evildoer’s goal is simply to harm other people. Intentional Harm
6. Evil people hurt others because they enjoy inflicting pain and suffering. Joy of Harm
7. Evil people harm others for the joy of it. Joy of Harm
8. Evil people make me sick because they get such pleasure out of harming other people. Joy of Harm
9. We should stop trying to understand evil people and spend more time getting rid of them from this world. Understanding Evil
10. Evil people “get off” by being violent and abusive to other human beings. Joy of Harm
11. Evil people are just compelled to harm others. Low Self-Control
12. Evildoers are actually proud and smug about having harmed other human beings. Egotism
13. Evil people are selfish and only think about themselves. Egotism
14. Evil people have an evil essence, like a stain on their souls, which is almost impossible to get rid of. Eternal/Disposition
15. We could obtain a more peaceful society by simply wiping out all the evildoers. Antithesis of Peace
16. Evildoers want to destroy all that is good in this world. Antithesis of Peace
17. If we catch an evildoer, we should just lock them up and ensure they never get out. Eternal/Disposition
18. Even the forces of good cannot change an evildoer’s heart. Eternal/Disposition                  
society. Antithesis of Peace
20. There is no point in trying to reform evil people. Eternal/Disposition
21. Evil people intend to disrupt our peaceful society with their harmful acts. Antithesis of Peace
22. Evil people are so narcissistic and full of themselves. Egotism
Note : Items presented in the order participants viewed them.  
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Table 1.2 Belief in Pure Good Scale Items 
Item Component
1.       There IS such a thing as a truly selfless/altruistic person. General
2.       I do believe in “pure good.” General
3.       In essence, “pure good” is selflessly helping other people in need. Intentional Help
4.       People have to believe in “pure good” to have a peaceful and orderly society. Facilitates Peace
5.       Purely good people are so selfless that they would endanger themselves to help their enemies. Impartial Help
6.       More selfless helping would produce a more orderly and peaceful society. Facilitates Peace
7.       Selfless people help anyone in need, even their rivals. Impartial Help
8.       People who commit noble, selfless acts often dedicate their entire lives pondering ways to help people. Intentional Help
9.       People only help others because they expect to be rewarded.* Without Reward
10.    We DO NOT need more “purely good” people in this world.* Rare in World
11.    Purely good people always try to avoid hurting others, even when it means helping those in need. Avoids Aggression
12.    People only help those in need because they want to look good to themselves and impress others.* Without Reward
13.    “Pure good” only exists in fictional stories.* General
14.    There are some people who selflessly help others and expect nothing in return. Without Reward
15.    Purely good people do not matter in this world because human societies will always have conflict and chaos.* Facilitates Peace
16.    Purely good people can resist the temptation to do evil things. Defies Corruption
17.    Even selfless people hate helping enemies.* Impartial Help
18.    Purely good people do what is right and good for others without expecting anything in return. Without Reward
19.    “Pure good” is all about doing what is good and right in this world just for the betterment of others. Intentional Help
` Defies Corruption
21.    The forces of good will always prevail in the end. Facilitates Peace
22.    Pure good does not extend to helping wounded enemies.* Impartial Help
23.    Purely good people are too foolish to realize that the world will always be a violent place, and they will eventually Facilitates Peace
24.    “Pure good” is doing unselfish, heroic things for others in need. Intentional Help
25.    Even selfless people enjoy using violence sometimes.* Avoids Aggression
26.    People never  intentionally and selflessly help people.* Intentional Help
27.    Pure-hearted people respect all life and therefore believe anyone is worthy of being helped and cared for. Impartial Help
28.    There are selfless people in this world that help others without any expectation of being rewarded for their heroic Without Reward
Note : *Reverse-coded items. Items presented in the order participants viewed them.   
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Chapter 2 - Study 1 
Various sociopolitical ideological variables appear to justify intergroup aggression and 
suppress helping responses (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). In particular, Duckitt’s (2001, 2006; 
Duckitt & Sibley, 2008, 2010; Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007) dual process model of ideology 
and prejudice holds that perceptions of the world help shape sociopolitical beliefs, which in turn 
influence levels of prejudice. Specifically, in one causal path, greater perceptions of a dangerous 
world increase right-wing authoritarian beliefs (greater support for traditional beliefs, submission 
to authority, and aggression toward those who threaten that authority or beliefs; Altemeyer, 
1998; Funke, 2005), which in turn increase prejudice toward those groups threatening traditional 
social values. Meanwhile, in the second causal path, greater perceptions of a competitive world 
increase social dominance orientation (support for social inequality and group-based dominance 
to enforce inequality or the status quo; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Jost & 
Thompson, 2000), which then increases prejudice toward socioeconomically competitive or 
disadvantaged groups. Both right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are 
also related to other forms of intergroup aggression and helping, including increased support for 
the death penalty (Pratto et al., 1994; McCann, 2008) and decreased support for affirmative 
action (Altemeyer, 1998; Pratto et al., 1994; see also Mirels & Dean, 2006).  
Overall, then, right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation appear to 
justify intergroup aggression and suppress helping toward socially deviant (in right-wing 
authoritarianism’s case) or economically competitive/disadvantaged (in social dominance 
orientation’s case) groups. Similarly, BPE is theorized to justify aggression and suppress helping 
toward perceived perpetrators of harm. Thus, those higher in BPE may endorse some of the same 
types of sociopolitical statements to help bolster their rationalizations for aggressing against (or 
not helping) perceived harm-doing groups. Those higher in right-wing authoritarianism or social 
dominance orientation may also advocate more aggression toward and less helping of some of 
the same groups as those targeted by people higher in BPE. Indeed, people higher in BPE likely 
exhibit greater scores on the components of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance 
orientation that focus on justifying aggression (i.e., aggression toward those who threaten that 
authority or beliefs and group-based dominance to enforce inequality/status quo). Meanwhile, 
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BPG is theorized to suppress aggression toward and promote indiscriminate helping for 
disadvantaged groups; such individuals should report greater opposition to any ideology that 
justifies, in whatever way, greater aggression or less helping. Thus, higher BPG should be related 
to lower right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation.  
Further, given that people higher in BPE have a penchant for seeing lots of evil in the 
world, BPE should positively correlate with the perception of a dangerous world and, quite 
possibly, the perception of a competitive world (an “it’s either us or them” mentality). However, 
people higher in BPG might also perceive the world as dangerous or competitive right now, but 
have a more optimistic outlook about the future.  
Study 1 also assessed whether BPE or BPG are differentially related to self-identified 
political orientation. Political conservatives (vs. liberals) appear to use right-wing authoritarian 
beliefs (and social dominance attitudes to a lesser extent) to justify more prejudicial responding 
toward both socially deviant and economically competitive outgroups (Webster, Burns, 
Pickering, & Saucier, 2012). Political conservatives are also less likely to support various social 
equity policies, such as affirmative action (e.g., Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996).  I reason that 
political conservatives would more likely endorse BPE to similarly justify intergroup aggression 
and suppress intergroup helping, while concurrently being less likely to endorse BPG, which is 
theorized to suppress intergroup aggression and increase indiscriminate helping. 
Study 1 also assessed individuals’ levels of militant-extremist attitudes. After 
qualitatively analyzing the most salient values and beliefs among a representative sample (n = 
13) of extremist/terrorist groups (Saucier, Akers, Shen-Miller, Knežević, & Stankov, 2009), 
Stankov, Saucier, and Knežević (2010) developed an individual differences scale of militant-
extremist thinking composed of three distinct dimensions: pro-violence (toward enemies), a 
perception of a vile and miserable world, and perception of divine power (i.e., God is all-
powerful and reward those most loyal to him). Study 1 focused on the first two of these scales, 
while Study 2 focused on the divine power scale given that Study 2’s focus was on the 
relationship between religiosity and BPE/BPG. Militant-extremist thinking is another 
sociopolitical belief system that likely justifies intergroup aggression and suppresses helping 
responses; if people believe the world is vile because of specific groups of people, eliminating 
those groups of people should produce a more peaceful society. This logic is part of BPE 
theorizing. Thus, the vile world and pro-violence scales are likely positively related to, but not 
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redundant with, BPE. People higher in BPG likely score lower on pro-violence given their 
support for selfless, indiscriminate helping, and also may score lower on the vile world scale 
given their more optimistic view of life.   
Next to right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, empathy has 
shown to be the third strongest predictor of intergroup bias (McFarland & Adelson, 1996; 
Whitley & Kite, 2006). Thus, Study 1 also tested whether BPE and BPG differentially correlated 
with the primary components of empathy (Davis, 1994, pp. 55-57): perspective taking (“the 
tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological view of others in everyday life”) and 
empathic concern (“the tendency to experience feelings of sympathy or compassion for 
unfortunate others”). I expected people higher in BPE to report less perspective taking ability 
given their lack of motivation to look very deeply into the causes for others’ (bad) behaviors , 
while people higher in BPG likely report more perspective taking because of their  motivation to 
look more deeply into the causes for others’ behaviors (Webster & Saucier, 2012). Because of 
BPG’s emphasis on selfless, indiscriminate helping, people higher in BPG also likely feel greater 
compassion for those in need (i.e., score higher in empathic concern for others). People higher in 
BPE likely experience empathic concern, but probably in specific cases (e.g., when a “good and 
innocent” ingroup member needs help; c.f. Saroglou, 2006); thus, we would not find consistent 
or reliable relationships between empathic concern and BPE.  
Given that previous BPE and BPG studies have focused on criminal punitiveness 
variables as dependent variables, to help demonstrate the broader applicability of BPE and BPG, 
Study 1 focused on different operational definitions of intergroup aggression and helping, in this 
case, foreign policy issues. Specifically, the dependent variables of interest included support for 
militarism, for torture, for diplomacy/peacemaking, and for humanitarian wars as well as 
included measures of prejudice toward outgroups targeted in these measures, in this case, 
Muslims and Iranians. Participants also participated in a raffle in which they could have donated 
all or part of their winnings to one of two randomly presented non-profit organizations that either 
supported or opposed pre-emptive war. Higher BPE should be related to greater support for more 
aggressive and less diplomatic policy solutions, whereas higher BPG should be related to support 
for more diplomatic and less aggressive policy solutions. 
In sum, I hypothesized that BPE should positively relate to sociopolitical perceptions and 
ideology that have been shown to justify aggression and suppress helping, while BPG should 
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negatively relate to these variables. Further, after controlling for relevant variables, BPE should 
uniquely predict more support for aggressive solutions to foreign policy issues and less support 
for diplomatic solutions to foreign policy issues, whereas BPG should show opposite effects, 
despite the fact that BPE and BPG are not significantly correlated.  
 Method 
 Participants and Procedure 
In total, 150 introductory psychology students completed the following materials online 
(via Sona Systems) to partially fulfill a course requirement. Seven participants were first 
removed because they had egregious amounts of missing data (> 5.0% of total items); thus the 
final sample included 143 primarily White (71.3%) participants (56 men, 76 women, with 11 not 
reporting their gender; M age = 19.15, SD = 1.42). 
 Materials 
Materials (other than the BPE and BPG scales) for Study 1 are included in Appendix A. 
Unless noted, participants responded to items on a 1 (disagree very strongly) to 9 (agree very 
strongly) Likert-type scale, and all measures were scored as the average response per item with 
higher mean values reflecting higher levels of the construct of interest. 
Empathy.  Dispositional empathy was assessed using Davis’s (1983) well-established 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index, which contains seven-item subscales, each tapping a separate 
facet of empathy: empathic concern (e.g., “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less 
fortunate than me”; alpha = .82); perspective taking (e.g., “I sometimes try to understand my 
friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective”; alpha = .76). 
Political orientation.  It is prudent to distinguish self-identification of political 
orientation (as liberal, moderate/middle-of-the-road, or conservative) from self-reporting support 
or opposition to specific policy attitudes (e.g., affirmative action, military spending, same-sex 
marriage; for a review, see Knight, 1999; for empirical examples, see Pratto et al., 1994; 
Webster, Burns, Pickering, & Saucier, 2012). After reading the prompt, “Although it is often 
difficult to summarize one's political, economic, and social views in a single word or phrase, 
please indicate which of the following positions best represents your viewpoint,” participants 
self-identified as 1 = “liberal” (n = 25), 2 = “middle-of-the-road/moderate” (n = 66), or 3 = 
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“conservative” (n = 35), which approximated a normal distribution (M = 2.08, SD = 0.69, 
Skewness = -0.10).  
BPE and BPG scales.  Belief in pure evil and belief in pure good were assessed using 
Webster and Saucier’s (2012) BPE and BPG scales (see Tables 1 and 2 for BPE and BPG items); 
each scale exhibited excellent reliability, with alphas = .94 and .92, respectively. Participants 
responded on a (disagree very strongly) to 7 (agree very strongly) scale to keep response scales 
parallel to the prior BPE/BPG studies. 
Perception of dangerous and competitive worldviews. Participants completed 
Duckitt’s (2001) dangerous-world (e.g., “Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt around 
us”; alpha = .74) and competitive-jungle world (e.g., “Winning is not the first thing; it’s the only 
thing that matters”; alpha = .83) measures, composed of 11 and 13 items, respectively.  
Right-wing authoritarianism.  Participants complete Funke’s (2005) 12-item right-wing 
authoritarianism scale, which assesses each of right-wing authoritarianism’s three components 
(aggression, conventionalism, and submission to authority) using two protrait and two contrait 
items (for a total of 12 items). Examples of aggression, conventionalism, and submission items 
are, respectively, “What our country really needs is a strong determined leader who crush evil, 
and take us back to our true path,” “The withdrawal from tradition turn out to be a fatal fault 
one day,” and “Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children 
should learn.” Please note that one of the items on Funke’s aggression component referred to the 
German “Chancellor,” was replaced with “President” for the current American sample (see 
Webster et al., 2012).  
Reliabilities for the entire scale are typically above > .70 (e.g., Webster et al., 2011). 
However, the RWA subscales in the current sample did not exhibit even close to acceptable 
internal consistency, with alphas = .16, .52, and .13 for the aggression, conventionalism, and 
submission scales, respectively. The total scale did exhibit mediocre reliability, alpha = .63. 
Nonetheless, due to the extremely low and suspicious reliabilities for the subscales, we 
lamentably did not conduct any analyses using RWA scores. (Note that our recent papers that 
have used the RWA scales have exhibited similar problems with internal consistency, but not to 
the extent seen here; Webster et al., 2012; Webster & Saucier, 2012) 
Social dominance orientation. Participants completed Jost et al.’s revised (“balanced”) 
version of Pratto et al.’s (1994) social dominance orientation scale, which has eight items to 
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assess each of social dominance orientation’s two components: opposition to equality (e.g., “It 
would be good if all groups could be equal” [reverse-scored]; alpha = .79) and group-based 
dominance (“If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems”; alpha = 
.82). Because the two SDO subsclaes were so highly correlated (r = .79) and exhibited virtually 
analogous correlations with other variables, we created an aggregated SDO composite score 
(alpha = .89). Indeed, the only variable that opposition to equality (r = .11, ns) and group-based 
dominance (r = .23, p < .01) differentially correlated with was BPE—in the predicted direction.   
Militant-extremist attitudes.  Participants completed the pro-violence and vile world 
subscales (Stankov et al., 2010), composed of 10 (e.g., “The only way to teach a lesson to our 
enemies is to threaten their lives and make them suffer”; alpha = .85) and six (“War is the 
beginning of salvation”; alpha = .85) items, respectively.  
Support for militarism. Participants completed two measures of support for military 
action tapping either provoked or pre-emptive/unbridled aggression. First, participants completed 
a measure specifically addressing foreign policy attitudes toward Iran (Rothschild, 2008; Vail & 
Moytl, 2010). Specifically, participants rated the extent to which they agreed with using armed 
force against Iran given 11 different scenarios of provocation (e.g., “If Iran is found to be 
providing a safe haven for terrorists who want to attack the United States”; alpha = .89). 
Second, participants completed a more general nine-item measure assessing support for 
extreme/pre-emptive military force by the US against other countries (Weise et al., 2008,e.g., “If 
we could capture or kill top terrorist group leaders we should do it, even if thousands of civilians 
are injured or killed in the process”; alpha = .88).  
Prejudice.  Prejudice toward Muslim and Iranians was assessed given that both of the 
scales assessing support for US militarism focused on aggression toward Iran or other Muslim 
countries. Specifically, participants rated how they felt toward Muslims and Iranians on three 
positive affective descriptors (e.g., warm and friendly, positive, good) and three negative 
descriptors (e.g., cold and distant, negative, bad) (Whitley, 1999; Webster et al., 2011). The 
scores on the positively-worded items were reverse-scored and then averaged together with 
scores on the negatively-worded items to create one affective prejudice mean score (alphas = .82 
and .84, respectively). Participants’ general affectivity was measured given that affect/emotion is 
generally considered the defining characteristic (“core”) of prejudice (Whitley & Kite, 2006, p. 
7). Further, given that prejudice toward Muslims and Iranians correlated at .86, I formed a 
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composite variable of these two variables. The high correlation was not unexpected given that 
Americans’ have trouble differentiating Arabs and Muslims as well (Ernst, Bornstein, & 
Venable, 2003; Rowatt, Franklin, & Cotton, 2005; Whitley & Webster, 2005).  
Support for torture.  To measure participants’ level of agreement with torture practice 
by the U.S., participants completed the attitudes toward torture scale (Crandall, Eidelman, 
Skitka, & Morgan, 2008), composed of seven items (e.g., “Torture techniques must be used when 
people refuse to talk”; alpha = .88). 
Support for peacemaking/diplomacy. To assess participants’ general preference for 
diplomatic or peaceful solutions to foreign policy issues, participants completed Vail and 
Motyl’s (2010) 12-item support for diplomacy scale (e.g., “Leaders of the U.S. should actively 
engage in diplomatic efforts with the leaders of states who sponsor terrorism”; alpha = .87).    
Support for humanitarian wars. In a humanitarian war, warring sides attempt to 
minimize the suffering or death of innocent civilians. Pratto et al. (1994) developed a support for 
humanitarian war scale consisting of six items, but their scale only exhibited an acceptable level 
of reliability (alpha = .73). This is likely because only three of the six items addressed the use of 
humanitarian ideals in war (e.g., “ensure that human rights are respected in countries we go to 
war with”), while the other three items addressed the use of diplomacy in general (e.g., 
“Ultimatums usually lead to war, rather than diplomatic solutions”). Thus, I modified Pratto et 
al.’s (1994) scale first by eliminating the items referencing diplomacy to avoid being redundant 
with Vail and Motyl’s (2010) support for diplomacy scale. Second, I added the main clause 
“When fighting wars in foreign countries, the priority of the U.S. should be to” and also 
augmented the scale with three additional items: “minimize the suffering of unarmed civilians”, 
“impartially and fairly treat any prisoners of war, especially if they are wounded in battle”, and 
“to respect and uphold the region’s customs and culture” (see Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949) 
(final alpha = .92). 
Raffle allocation.  I also included a behavioral measure to assess participants’ general 
tendency to help non-profit organizations that either supported aggressive or diplomatic solutions 
to foreign policy issues (see Webster, Whitley, & Saucier, 2010). Participants were informed that 
they had a chance to win $25 for participating in the study, and if they won “you can keep all the 
money yourself or you may donate some or all of your winnings to the sponsored non-profit 
described below. Please read the mission statement for the non-profit organization then decide 
32 
 
how you allocate your winnings between yourself and the non-profit below”. Participants 
actually were randomly assigned to donate to only one of two non-profit organizations: The 
“Pre-Emptive War Coalition” or the “Pre-Emptive Love Coalition”. The Pre-Emptive Love 
Coalition is a real non-profit organization that is dedicated to improving access to healthcare for 
Iraqi children. However, I modified the mission statements for each of the non-profit 
organizations—based on real arguments by government officials and legal scholars (ProCon.org, 
2009)—to emphasize support or opposition to pre-emptive force against other countries. These 
mission statements were created to be as equivalent and parallel as possible, in framing and 
length (100 vs. 103 words).  
The Pre-Emptive War Coalition statement read:  
“Diplomacy only works up to a certain point; the use of force is sometimes necessary to 
protect United States (U.S.) interests. International law, which at times mirrors U.S. criminal law 
on using self-defense, allows the justification of war when an attack on U.S. interests is 
imminent. Thus, the Pre-Emptive War Coalition is a non-profit organization dedicated to 
supporting the U.S.’s inherent right to protect her interests by the use of preventative or pre-
emptive force against an enemy when diplomacy has evidently failed. This includes the 
possibility of using of conventional and nuclear weapons as well as torturing prisoners of war.”  
In contrast, the Pre-Emptive Love Coalition’s statement read: 
“Diplomacy can and has worked to protect United States (U.S.) interests, while avoiding 
violent and unnecessary conflict with other nations; indeed, the use of pre-emptive force (i.e., 
attacking another country before it presumably can attack us) should never be necessary to 
protect our interests. Further, nothing in international law authorizes a pre-emptive war to 
overthrow and disarm a foreign government. Thus, The Pre-Emptive Love Coalition is a non-
profit organization dedicated to protecting U.S. interests by peaceful and non-violent means 
(diplomacy and negotiation) instead of relying on pre-emptive force, including the prohibition of 
conventional and nuclear warfare as well as torturing prisoners of war.” 
 Participants allocated their potential winnings by selecting one of six options: 1 = “$25 
to [non-profit], and $0 to me”, 2 = “$20 to [non-profit], and $5 to me”, 3 = “$15 to [non-profit], 
and $10 to me”, 4 = “$10 to [non-profit], and $25 to me”, 5 = “$5 to [non-profit], and $20 to 
me”, and 6 = “$0 to [non-profit], and $25 to me”.  
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 Results 
Table 3 provides means, standard deviation, and inter-correlations for variables of 
interest. All scales approximated normal distributions, with Skewness levels all < |1.0|. 
 Correlations with BPE and BPG 
First, as in our previous studies, BPE and BPG were not significantly correlated (r = .06, 
p = .50). More importantly, inter-correlations confirmed the overall hypothesized pattern that 
BPE and BPG would differentially relate to variables that are associated with intergroup 
aggression and helping. First, higher BPE related to greater perceptions of a dangerous world, 
SDO, pro-violence, perceptions of a vile world, provoked militarily aggression, pre-emptive 
military aggression, prejudice toward Muslims and Iranians, and support for torture; however, 
greater BPE did not relate to the more peaceful/diplomatic foreign policies (support for 
peacemaking and humanitarian wars). Meanwhile, higher BPG related to greater empathic 
concern, perspective taking, support for peacemaking, and support for humanitarian wars. Higher 
BPG also related to lower perceptions of a competitive-jungle world, SDO, pro-violence, and 
support for torture. Neither BPE nor BPG correlated with political orientation (which I will 
discuss in the General Discussion section) or raffle donations (at least, on a bivariate level 
collapsing across the different non-profit organizations).  
Intriguingly, BPG also predicted greater support for provoked military aggression (i.e., 
military action in response to Iranian provocation). To probe this relationship further, I 
conducted an exploratory factor analysis (PCA with varimax rotation) on this measure to assess 
whether the responses to the 11 scenarios about Iranian provocations represented different 
factors. Indeed, the factor analysis revealed three factors that explained 58.1% of the variance 
(after rotation). All items loaded > .49 on their own factors and < .40 on all other factors, except 
Item #9 (“If Iran blatantly disregards the international community”), which loaded equally on 
Factors 2 and 3 (loadings = .46 and .49). The first six items (#s 2, 8, 6, 4, 5, and 1) on Factor 1 
appeared to concern whether participants would approve of military aggression by the U.S. 
against Iran if Iran directly threatened the U.S. (e.g., “If Iran threatens to attack the United 
States”, “If hard evidence is found that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is training and 
supplying the insurgents in Iraq with weapons to use against American soldiers”). Two items 
cleanly loaded on Factor 2 (#s 7 and 3), which concerned approval of military aggression by the 
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U.S. against Iran if Iran threatened its neighboring countries (e.g., “If Iran threatens to attack one 
of its neighboring countries”). Two items (#s 11 and 10) cleanly loaded on Factor 3, but did not 
coherently go together. Thus, I assessed how BPE and BPG correlated with Factors 1 and 2 
(alphas = .91 and .64, respectively). Both greater BPE and BPG correlated with greater approved 
provoked aggression when the U.S. was directly threatened (rs = .22 and .40, ps < .01, 
respectively); however, higher BPG (r = .25, p < .01)—but not higher BPE (r = .16, p = .07)—
was related to sanctioned aggression when neighboring countries were attacked. I discuss these 
results further in the General Discussion section. 
 Regression Analyses Predicting Aggressive Foreign Policies 
To assess the predictive/incremental validity of the BPE and BPG scales, hierarchical 
regression analyses tested the unique, differential effects of BPE and BPG scores on the 
aggressive foreign policy variables (support for provoked militarism and pre-emptive militarism, 
prejudice toward Muslims and Iranians, and support for torture) after controlling for any other 
correlated predictors (e.g., empathic concern, SDO). For each regression analysis, I reviewed 
multicollinearity (Tolerance or VIF values) and outlier (Cook’s D) statistics to help ensure that 
the regression models were stable. Please note that the high correlation between SDO and pro-
violence did produce multicollinearity (VIFs > 3.0) and problems with suppression (reversing 
signs of other predictors); thus, when SDO and pro-violence both predicted the criterion, the 
variable that correlated most highly with the criterion was entered. Given the number of 
analyses, I set the critical alpha level at .01. Note that degrees of freedom slightly varied in the 
regression models due to missing data. 
In Step 1, any significant correlates of the criterion were entered. In Step 2, BPE and 
BPG scale scores were entered (if the BPE and/or BPG scales significantly correlated with the 
criterion). If Step 2 showed a significant improvement in the regression model—that is, if Step 2 
significantly increased the model’s R-square value—for a given aggression criterion, then 
BPE/BPG added predictive utility to the model9
                                                 
9 The interaction term between BPE and BPG was not examined given that (a) I did not make specific predictions 
with regards to these interactions; (b) such interactions potentially add more error (vs. explained) variance thereby 
. The individual BPE and BPG regression 
coefficients informed whether BPE, BPG, or both variables uniquely predicted the criterion.  
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Provoked aggression (direct threat against U.S.).  Given that there were no other 
significant correlates of provoked military aggression (when the U.S. was threatened directly) 
besides BPE and BPG, BPE and BPG were the only scores entered into the regression analysis. 
Higher BPG (β = .41, p < .001), but not BPE (β = .16, p = .038), uniquely predicted provoked 
aggression in the model, R2 = .21, F (2, 132) = 17.53, p < .001; that is, people higher in BPG (but 
not those higher in BPE) supported U.S. military action when provoked by Iran.  
Pre-emptive aggression.  Scores for participant sex (dummy-coded variable), empathic 
concern, perceptions of a dangerous world, perceptions of a competitive-jungle world, pro-
violence, and perceptions of a vile world correlated with pre-emptive aggression scores and were 
entered in Step 1 of the regression model. These predictors accounted for a significant amount of 
variance, R2 = .255, F (5, 124) = 8.48, p < .001; however, only pro-violence was a unique 
predictor, β = .40, p < .001 (all other βs < |.17|, ps > .07), such that higher pro-violence predicted 
greater support for pre-emptive military aggression. 
BPE, but not BPG, correlated with pre-emptive aggression; thus, only BPE scores were 
added in Step 2. The addition of BPE scores in Step 2 did account for a significant amount of 
additional variance, R2 = .086, F (1, 123) = 16.07, p < .001; thus, BPE uniquely predicted pre-
emptive aggression, β = .35, p < .001, such that people higher in BPE more greatly supported 
pre-emptive aggression even after controlling for a host of other predictors. 
Prejudice.  Scores for empathic concern, perspective taking, competitive-jungle world, 
and SDO correlated with prejudice scores and were thus entered in Step 1, which accounted for a 
significant amount of variance, R2 = .19, F (5, 125) = 5.82, p < .001; however, SDO was the only 
significant predictor, β = .35, p < .001 (all other βs = |.18|, ps > .066); that is, higher SDO 
predicted higher levels of prejudice.  
Next, because BPE (but not BPG) correlated with prejudice, only BPE scores were 
entered in Step 2. Step 2, though, did not reach significance, R2 = .017, F (1, 124) = 2.70, p = 
.10; thus, BPE did not predict prejudice above and beyond the other correlates in Step 1.  
                                                                                                                                                             
decreasing the likelihood of finding our hypothesized effects; and (c) in our previous two studies BPE and BPG did 
not consistently or meaningfully interact with each other (i.e., only one interaction out of 10 possible analyses was 
significant). 
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Support for torture.  Given that participant sex (dummy-coded variable), empathic 
concern, perspective taking, competitive-jungle world, and pro-violence correlated with support 
for torture, these scores were entered in Step 1. These variables accounted for a significant 
amount of variance, R2 = .19, F (5, 125) = 5.82, p < .001; as for unique predictors, pro-violence 
(β = .30, p = .002) and sex (β = -.22, p = .005) reached the critical alpha level, while perceptions 
of a competitive-jungle world approached the critical alpha level, β = .25, p = .015 (all other βs = 
|.02|, ps > .85). Thus, men, people higher in pro-violence, and people who perceive a 
competitive-jungle world more greatly supported torture. 
Next, because BPE and BPG both correlated with support for torture, both BPE and BPG 
scores were entered in Step 2. Step 2 closely approached our significance level, R2 = .042, F 
(2, 122) = 4.46, p = .014, with BPE approaching the critical alpha level, β = .16, p = .036, while 
BPG did not, β = .13, p = .19. 
 Regression Analyses Predicting Peaceful/Diplomatic Foreign Policies 
I used the same analytic approach above to assess the unique effects of BPE and BPG on 
support for peaceful/diplomatic foreign policy positions.  
Support for peacemaking.  Scores for participant sex (dummy-coded variable), political 
orientation, empathic concern, perspective taking, competitive-jungle world, and SDO correlated 
with support for peacemaking and were entered in Step 1, which accounted for a significant 
amount of variance, R2 = .35, F (6, 116) = 10.58, p < .001; however, SDO was the only unique 
predictor, β = -.32, p = .002 (all other βs = |.18|, ps > .08). Thus, higher SDO predicted lower 
support for peacemaking.  
Next, BPG scores (but not BPE scores) correlated with support for peacemaking and 
were entered in Step 2, although Step 2 did not account for a significant amount of variance, 
R2 = .01, F (1, 115) < 1.0, p = .34.  
Support for humanitarian wars.  Scores for participant sex (dummy-coded variable), 
empathic concern, perspective taking, competitive-jungle world, and SDO correlated with 
support for humanitarian wars and were entered in Step 1, which accounted for a significant 
amount of variance, R2 = .36, F (4, 125) = 17.51, p < .001. As for unique predictors, both 
empathic concern (β = .39, p = .002) and SDO (β = -.30, p = .002) reached significance (all other 
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βs = |.07|, ps > .42), with higher empathic concern and lower SDO predicting support for 
humanitarian wars. 
BPG scores (but not BPE scores) correlated with support for humanitarian wars and were 
entered in Step 2. Step 2 did account for a significant amount of variance, R2 = .056, F (1, 124) 
= 11.79, p = .001; thus, BPG scores uniquely and positively predicted support for humanitarian 
wars, β = .33, p = .001, which also rendered the prediction of SDO non-significant (p = .09). 
Preference for Aggressive or Peaceful Foreign Policies 
Nonetheless, what Study 1 has not yet directly shown is whether people higher in BPE 
prefer more aggressive policy positions, while people higher in BPE prefer more peaceful policy 
positions. Thus, after ensuring that the aggressive (provoked military intervention, pre-emptive 
military intervention, and support for torture) and diplomatic/peaceful (support for peacemaking 
and support for humanitarian wars) scale scores loaded onto separate factors via exploratory 
factor analysis, I created two composite mean scores of the aggressive (alpha = .70) and 
diplomatic/peaceful (alpha = .75) foreign policy variables. Then, I created a difference score, 
subtracting the mean support for peaceful policies from the mean support for aggressive policies; 
thus, higher mean scores indicated greater preference for aggressive solutions. Results showed 
that people higher in BPE preferred more aggressive solutions, r = .21, p < .01, while people 
higher in BPG preferred more diplomatic solutions, r = -.34, p < .01. When considering the 
composite scores separately, BPE scores (r = .40, p < .01)—but not BPG scores (r = -.04, p = 
.67)—significantly and positively correlated with support for aggressive foreign policies, while 
BPG scores (r = .50, p < .01)—but not BPE scores (r = .04, p = .61)—significantly and positively 
correlated with support for peaceful/diplomatic foreign policies. 
 Regression Analysis Predicting Raffle Donations 
Hierarchal regression analysis was used again to test the unique effects of BPE and BPG 
on raffle donations as a function of the non-profit organization to which participants donated 
(Pre-Emptive Love vs. Pre-Emptive War Coalition). First, sex and political orientation correlated 
on a bivariate level with donations and were entered in Step 1. Standardized BPE and BPG 
scores were entered in Step 2. A dummy-coded variable representing the different non-profits (0 
= “Pre-Emptive Love Coalition”, 1 = “Pre-Emptive War Coalition”) was entered in Step 3, 
followed by the two-way interaction terms between the dummy-coded non-profit variable, BPE 
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scores, and BPG scores (Non-Profit x BPE; Non-Profit x BPG) in Step 4. Recall that higher 
donation scores indicated more greed (participants kept more money for themselves).  
Step 1 did account for a significant amount of variance, R2 = .15, F (2, 113) = 9.95, p = 
.002. Both sex (β = -.31, p = .001) and political orientation (β = -.26, p = .003) uniquely 
predicted raffle donations, with men and more conservative individuals donating less money 
overall. 
Next, the addition of the BPE and BPG scores in Step 2 did not significantly account for 
variance, R2 < 1.0, F (2, 111) < 1.0, p = .68; however, the addition of the type of non-profit in 
Step 3 did explain a significant amount of variance, R2 = .056, F (1, 110) = 7.76, p = .006; 
participants were less greedy (kept less money for themselves) when donating to the Pre-
Emptive Love Coalition, β = .24, p = .006. Nonetheless, this main effect was qualified by an 
interaction; Step 4 explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = .044, F (2, 108) = 3.17, p = 
.046, with only the BPG x Non-Profit interaction term being significant, β = .30, p = .015. 
Simple slopes showed that people higher in BPG were more greedy (kept more money for 
themselves) when donating to the Pre-Emptive War Coalition, B = 0.58 (SE = 0.24), p = .015; 
however, this pattern was reversed—but not significantly so—when donating to the Pre-Emptive 
Love Coalition, B = -0.23 (SE = 0.24), p = .34. 
 Discussion 
In sum, Study 1 further demonstrated the value of lay people’s beliefs in pure evil 
(broadly, the tendency to think that people hurt others because of malevolent intentions) and pure 
good (broadly, the tendency to think that people help because of selfless intentions) in explaining 
aggression and helping responses; in this case, participants rated their support for various 
aggressive and peaceful foreign policies as well as sociopolitical perceptions and ideology 
previously known to predict support for (or opposition to) such policies. 
Specifically, on a bivariate level, results first showed that people higher in BPE more 
strongly endorsed ideological perceptions and attitudes known to help justify intergroup 
aggression and to suppress helping, including greater: perceptions of a dangerous world, 
perceptions of a vile world, SDO, and pro-violence solutions. Further, BPE also related to actual 
aggression in that people higher in BPE supported provoked militarily aggression (only when 
Iran threatened the security of the U.S., but not its neighbors), pre-emptive military aggression, 
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prejudice toward Muslims and Iranians, and support for torture. Although greater BPE did not 
relate to more peaceful/diplomatic foreign policy positions (support for peacemaking and 
humanitarian wars), the relationships between BPE and the aggression variables provide 
convergent validity for the BPE scale.  
Meanwhile, people higher in BPG scored higher on empathic concern and perspective 
taking, two variables previously associated with greater rates of prosocial actions. Moreover, 
people higher in BPG also more greatly opposed ideological attitudes known to help justify 
aggression and suppress helping, including lower perceptions of a competitive-jungle world, 
SDO, and pro-violence. Indeed, it seems that higher empathy and lower SDO/pro-violence—that 
is, the tendencies to feel compassion for others and to oppose dominance/violence to solve 
problems—are strongly associated with BPG given the robust correlations10
Finally, aggregating support for more aggressive and peaceful foreign policies, people 
higher in BPE preferred more aggressive foreign policies, while people higher in BPE preferred 
more peaceful policy solutions. This pattern of effects fits our overall hypothesis that people 
higher in BPE would take a more belligerent stance in foreign relations, while people higher in 
BPG would advocate a more diplomatic route.  
. Accordingly, 
people higher in BPG more greatly supported more peaceful policy positions (support for 
peacemaking and humanitarian wars), although such individuals more greatly approved of 
military intervention against Iran when the U.S. or neighbors are directly threatened; it may be 
that people higher in BPG were spurred to take military action when a belligerent country 
threatened to attack their own country or other nations, but not to take pre-emptive or extreme 
military action, especially when innocent lives are at stake.  Ultimately, the pattern of 
correlations between BPG and both the aggression and helping variables in Study 1 provide 
convergent validity for the BPG scale.  
As for establishing predictive validity for BPE and BPG, BPE uniquely predicted pre-
emptive military aggression and torture, while BPG uniquely predicted provoked military 
intervention and support for humanitarian wars above and beyond other correlates of the criteria. 
                                                 
10 It is important to note that these high correlations did not indicate redundancy. Even though BPG highly 
correlated with empathic concern, SDO, and pro-violence, (a) BPG predicted criteria that empathic concern, SDO, 
and pro-violence did not; and (b) when empathic concern, SDO, and/or pro-violence correlated with criteria, BPG 
uniquely predicted criteria above and beyond these other variables. 
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Moreover, BPG uniquely predicted raffle donations, but only for the Pre-Emptive War Coalition; 
specifically, people higher in BPG kept more money for themselves thereby depriving money 
from the Pre-Emptive War Coalition. Although BPE and BPG only uniquely predicted a handful 
of criteria, this is still a respectable showing given that BPE and BPG were being put in a 
statistical cage match with some of the best known individual difference predictors of aggression 
and helping.  
In sum, Study 1 results showed that higher BPE related to greater intergroup aggression 
and greater endorsement of ideological stances known to justify aggression/suppress helping; 
concurrently, higher BPG related to greater support for more peaceful and diplomatic foreign 
policies, greater opposition to ideological stances known to justify aggression/suppress helping, 
and greater endorsement of general traits known to suppress aggression/increase helping. 
Ultimately, Study 1 further demonstrates that perceptions of others’ motivations for harmdoing 
and helping partially explain their own choices about whether to harm or help others.  
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 Figures and Tables 
Table 2.1 Descriptives and Intercorrelations for Variables of Interest (Study 1) 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1. BPE 3.93 1.05 -
2. BPG 5.04 0.88 .10 -
3. Sex - - -.05 .11 -
4. Pol Orien 2.08 0.69 .02 .08 -.06 -
5. Empathy: EC 6.31 1.37 -.02 .55 .34 -.05 -
6. Empathy: PT 5.66 1.21 -.02 .36 .10 -.02 .54 -
7. Dang World 5.08 0.99 .43 .06 .08 .08 .20 -.07 -
8. Comp World 3.77 1.17 .13 -.57 -.35 -.03 -.61 -.37 -.09 -
9. SDO 3.85 1.34 .18 -.58 -.25 .08 -.51 -.25 -.05 .61 -
10. Pro-violence 4.02 1.38 .27 -.56 -.32 -.01 -.57 -.34 -.01 .59 .76 -
11. Vile World 3.94 1.29 .37 -.11 -.10 .03 -.03 -.13 .50 .20 .24 .25 -
12. Provoked Agg 3.53 1.35 .28 .32 -.07 -.06 .12 .05 .16 .00 -.02 -.01 .11 -
13. Pre-empt Agg 4.42 1.44 .42 -.10 -.19 .06 -.22 -.05 .18 .39 .39 .45 .29 .51 -
14. Muslim Prej 6.11 1.39 .18 -.16 -.17 .12 -.24 -.27 .07 .28 .37 .29 .12 .25 .27 -
15. Iranian Prej 4.73 1.53 .21 -.04 -.12 .11 -.13 -.23 .21 .20 .30 .22 .11 .33 .31 .86 -
16. Torture 5.21 1.52 .25 -.25 -.42 .03 -.41 -.20 .04 .53 .43 .51 .16 .28 .52 .22 .22 -
17. Peacemaking 5.56 1.55 -.05 .40 .24 -.18 .44 .25 .14 -.50 -.52 -.49 .03 -.03 -.34 -.31 -.31 -.44 -
18. Humani War 4.13 1.70 .10 .50 .23 -.10 .50 .21 .16 -.49 -.51 -.47 .04 .23 -.19 -.18 -.12 -.30 .63 -
19. Donations 5.71 1.16 -.08 -.03 -.28 -.20 -.17 -.04 -.15 .04 .00 .08 -.06 .11 -.04 -.04 -.03 .17 -.06 .04  
Note: Correlations significant at p < .05 (rs > |.17|) are bolded.  BPE = Belief in Pure Evil; BPG = 
Belief in Pure Good; Pol Orien = Political Orientation; Empathy: EC = Empathic Concern; 
Empathy: PT = Perspective Taking; Dang World = Dangerous World; Comp World = 
Competitive World; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; Provoked Agg = Iran Provoke 
U.S. Aggression; Pre-empt Agg = Pre-Emptive U.S. Militarism; Muslim Prej = Muslim 
Prejudice; Iranian Prej = Iranian Prejudice; Torture = Support for Torture; Peacemaking = 
Support for Peacemaking; Humani War = Humanitarian War; Donations = Non-Profit 
Donations (collapsed across non-profits). Scores ranged from 1 to 9, except for (a) BPE and 
BPG scores, which ranged from 1 to 7; and (b) Donations, which ranged from 1 (more money 
to non-profit) to 6 (more money to themselves). Higher scores indicate greater levels of the 
construct. Sex coded as 0 = “Male”, 1 = “Female”; Political Orientation coded as 1 = 
“Liberal”, 2 = “Moderate”, and 3 = “Conservative”. 
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Chapter 3 - Study 2 
 While Study 1 examined the relationships between BPE/BPG and sociopolitical 
attitudes, Study 2 assessed the relationships between BPE/BPG and religiosity. Baumeister 
(1999) argued that “probably the best place to learn how people think of evil is in religion, which 
often provides explicit, vivid explanations of evil” (p. 66). In fact, religions across time and 
space have developed remarkably similar perceptions of good and evil. First and foremost, “evil” 
and “good” are posited as complete opposites: “Evil does not exist by itself—there must be some 
positive forces of good, some conceptions of what is right and desirable” (Baumeister, 1999, p. 
67). The forces of good are then needed to combat the forces of evil, and it is usually believed 
that the forces of good ultimately be victorious.  
For example, in Christian thought, the general notion is that God is all powerful and will 
eventually crush the forces of evil, personified by Satan or the Devil (Russell, 1977). Very 
similar dogma is echoed by Judaist and Hindu (their concept of Dharma) traditions. Meanwhile, 
Buddhists believe evil means “harmful”, resulting from three selfish emotions: desire, hate, and 
delusion. Although we (Webster & Saucier, 2012) were careful to exclude any religious content 
in our BPE and BPG items, we still expect some forms of religiosity to be related to perceptions 
of pure evil and pure good given the prominence of good and evil in religious thought.  
Religiosity can be operationally defined in three primary ways (see, e.g., Whitley, 2009). 
First, researchers can assess individuals’ frequency of religious behaviors, such as how often one 
attends religious services, how often one prays, or how often one volunteers for or donates 
money to religious organizations. Second, researchers can assess the content of people’s 
religious beliefs. In U.S. studies, given the prevalence of Christianity (78.5% identified as 
“Christian” in a 2004 Pew poll; see http://religions.pewforum.org/affiliations), the primary 
measures of religious content are fundamentalism (adhering to a “literal” interpretation of the 
Bible; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) and Christian orthodoxy (adhering to the prevailing 
principles of Christianity; Fullerton & Hunsberger, 1982).  
Third, researchers can assess individuals’ functional beliefs regarding religion, that is, 
what people perceive the role of religion to be in their lives (see Greer, Berman, Varan, 
Bobrycki, & Watson, 2005; Leach, Berman, & Eubanks, 2008). Previous research has identified 
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three major dimensions of functional religion beliefs: intrinsic/internal (adhering to religious 
dogma for intrinsic rewards, such as relief, comfort, and protection from the vicissitudes of life; 
Allport & Ross, 1967), external/extrinsic (adhering to religious dogma for the social or extrinsic 
benefits; Allport & Ross, 1967), and quest (religion as a lifelong pursuit of an eternal truth; 
Batson, 1976). Extant research investigating the relationship between religiosity and 
aggression/helping is not clear-cut given the complexity of religiosity as a construct. However, 
recent research has begun to address this relationship on a more detailed level by teasing apart 
the effects of the three different types of religiosity on relevant aggression and helping variables.  
With regards to prejudice, a recent meta-analysis showed that some forms of religiosity 
(higher fundamentalism, Christian orthodoxy, and internality) were associated with higher anti-
gay prejudice, but less racism (Whitley, 2009); meanwhile, higher quest was negatively 
associated with both forms of prejudice. Further, with regards to aggression, internally religious 
people may self-report that they are less aggressive, but do not act more or less aggressive; 
however, questing individuals appear more modest in that they do not report being less or more 
aggressive, but behave less aggressively (Greer, Berman, Varan, Bobrycki, & Watson, 2005; 
Leach, Berman, & Eubanks, 2008). Nonetheless, when God sanctions violence in a secular or 
Biblical context, aggression increases among those who believe in God (Bushman, Ridge, Das, 
Key, & Busath, 2007). Overall, then, it appears religion can both facilitate and inhibit aggression 
depending on form of religiosity as well as based on the situational context; at times, too, it 
appears some religious individuals desire to be less aggressive, but do not exhibit more or less 
aggression via behavioral measures. Nonetheless, people scoring higher in quest seem to be more 
consistent in reporting less prejudice and behaving less aggressively.  
With regards to helping, a recent review of the literature (Saroglou, 2006) revealed that 
religious people tend to endorse prosocial values and behavior, as evidenced by reports of 
volunteering, agreeableness, forgiveness, and a sense of generativity (i.e., giving back to the 
community in middle or old age). However, Saroglou elucidates several problems in interpreting 
these results. First, the higher rates of volunteering among religious people may simply be an 
artifact of being involved in religious services and programs. Second, the size of the associations 
between religiosity and self-reported prosociality is relatively smaller in nature (correlations 
around .20).  Third, as described above, certain forms of religiosity are related to prejudice and 
discrimination toward specific social groups. Fourth, and most importantly, when assessing 
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prosociality using behavioral measures (vs. attitudes), religiosity (those internally religious or 
those espousing Christian beliefs) does not predict helping as well because, as Saroglou solemnly 
speculates, it appears that religious people are more motivated to be perceived by others as 
prosocial than actually acting prosocially; this is in line with the findings on religiosity and 
aggression described above.  
Given these findings, Saroglou (2006) suggested that the relationship between religiosity 
and helping is likely “restricted to a minimal prosociality”, that is, “limited to some targets and 
some conditions” (p. 2; see also Sarogou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004). Indeed, a series of 
studies (Saroglou, Pichon, Trompette, Verscheuren, & Darnelle, 2005; Blogowska & Sarogou, 
2011) showed that self-reported religiosity best predicted intentions to help when the targets of 
aid share their worldviews, that is, when the targets were family or friends (vs. unknown 
persons). Moreover, the relationship between religiosity and helping held when religiosity and 
helping was measured using peer ratings of friends, but not when using peer ratings of work 
colleagues. Thus, overall, the relationship between religiosity and helping appears limited in 
scope. Nonetheless, preliminary evidence indicates that priming the concept of “God” can 
overall increase people’s prosocial tendencies (Pichon, Boccato, & Saroglou, 2010; Shariff & 
Norenzayan, 2007), but the limits of this prosociality have not been investigated as thoroughly as 
self-report, non-priming studies. Further, feeling that one has been ostracized by God can 
diminish prosocial tendencies, especially for more intrinsically religious individuals (van Beest 
& Williams, 2011). 
Ultimately, though, what is the predicted relationship between BPE, BPG, and the 
various forms of religiosity? I reasoned that people’s rate of volunteering for church activities 
should positively correlate with BPG given that volunteerism is an extreme form of helping—
that is, more of a selfless, reliable form of helping in that people consistently take time out of 
their lives to help others (Snyder et al., 2004). As for actual religious content, I expected 
Christian orthodoxy and fundamentalism to correlate positively with BPE given Christianity’s 
moral absolutism on perceiving and combating evil; however, I predicted no reliable relationship 
between BPG and religious content given the “minimal” relationship between religiosity and 
helping.  As for functional beliefs, given quest’s negative relationship with aggression and 
positive relationship with helping, I predicted quest to negatively relate to BPE and positively 
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relate to BPG.  No other predictions were made given the inconsistent relationships between 
internality, externality, and aggression/helping variables. 
In Study 2, I also assessed individuals’ scores on the “divine power” subscale from the 
militant-extremist thinking measure (Stankov et al., 2010). Although the authors assumed that 
the scores of divine power were redundant with fundamentalist thinking, they did not include a 
conventional measure of fundamentalism. But, like fundamentalism, divine power should be 
positively correlated with BPE, but likely not reliably related to BPG.  
Lastly, the dependent variables for Study 2 focus on support or opposition to various 
American social policy issues that help disadvantaged or severely disparaged groups, including 
policies designed to help equalize opportunity between social groups (e.g., affirmative action, 
increased taxation of the rich) as well as policies targeting groups that receive government or 
private assistance in order to meet basic survival needs. Some of these latter groups include the 
“lowest of the low”: groups perceived as low in warmth and low in competence (disliked, 
disrespected groups; see Fiske, 2004), including the homeless and drug addicts. Participants also 
completed a raffle measure similar to Study 1, except that the two targeted non-profits focus on 
support or opposition to needle-exchange programs. BPG should uniquely predict indiscriminate 
prosociality, that is, support for racial and others social programs benefiting the disadvantaged 
and disparaged. BPE would likely only negatively predict support for such programs when the 
target is engaging in some type of harmful behavior, which can include perceived criminally 
deviant behavior (e.g., drug addicts may be perceived as breaking the law because they are 
addicted to illegal drugs) or socially deviant behavior or nuisances (e.g., homeless people 
begging). Thus, I reasoned that BPE should predict, for example, greater opposition to needle-
exchange programs more than opposition to affirmative action.  
Given the nature of the dependent variables, I also included a measure of humanitarian-
egalitarian attitudes, which assesses the degree to which people endorse “the democratic ideals of 
equality, social justice, and concern for the others’ well-being” (Katz & Hass, 1988, p. 894). It 
was important to control for humanitarian-egalitarian beliefs before assessing the unique effects 
of BPG and BPE on Study 2 criteria; nonetheless, humanitarian-egalitarian beliefs should also 
positively correlate with BPG, but not likely correlate with BPE given the expected “limited 
prosociality” of BPE; that is, people higher in BPE likely hold more egalitarian and humanitarian 
attitudes toward specific groups that align with their worldviews, but not in general. 
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In sum, Study 2 assessed the relationships between BPE, BPG, and various forms of 
religiosity as well as other relevant attitudinal (humanitarianism-egalitarianism) correlates. I 
hypothesized that among the forms of religiosity that fundamentalism and quest would likely 
most reliably correlate with BPE and BPG given fundamentalism’s focus on combating evil and 
quest’s flexible approach to religion as a lifelong pursuit of an eternal truth. Further, egalitarian-
humanitarian beliefs should positively relate to BPG. Finally, I expected BPG to positively and 
uniquely predict support for racial and social programs benefiting disadvantaged groups, while 
BPE would uniquely predict opposition to programs that aim to help people who engage in 
harmful behavior.  
 Method 
 Participants and Procedure 
In total, 113 introductory psychology students completed the following materials online 
(via Sona Systems) to partially fulfill a course requirement; however, 12 participants were 
removed from the data set due to missing data (> 5.0% of the total items). Thus, the final sample 
included 101 (54 men, 47 women; M age = 19.46, SD = 2.50) primarily White (86.1%) and 
Christian (79.2%) participants.  
 Materials 
Materials (other than the BPE and BPG scales) for Study 2 are included in Appendix B. 
Unless noted, participants responded to items on a 1 (disagree very strongly) to 9 (agree very 
strongly) Likert-type scale, and all measures were scored as the average response per item with 
higher mean values reflecting higher levels of the construct of interest. 
Political orientation.  Using the same measure as in Study 1, participants self-identified 
as 1 = “liberal” (n = 15), 2 = “middle-of-the-road/moderate” (n = 45) or 3 = “conservative” (n = 
39), which approximated a normal distribution (M = 2.24, SD = 0.70, Skewness = -0.38). 
 BPE and BPG scales.  Belief in pure evil and belief in pure good were assessed using 
Webster and Saucier’s (2012) BPE and BPG scales (see Tables 1 and 2 for BPE and BPG items); 
each scale exhibited excellent reliability, with alphas = .95 and .92, respectively. Participants 
responded on a (disagree very strongly) to 7 (agree very strongly) scale to keep response scales 
consistent with the prior BPE/BPG studies. 
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Frequency of Religious Behavior.  Participants self-reported how often they attend 
religious services, how often they pray, and how often they volunteer for religious and non-
secular organizations on the same response scale to keep responses parallel (1 = “More than once 
a week”, 2 = “Once a week”, 3= “Every other week”, 4 = “About once a month”, 5 = “Every 
other month”, 6 = “A few times a year” 7 = “Once a Year” and 8 = “Never”). The frequencies of 
religious behavior (religious services, praying, religious volunteering) all highly intercorrelated 
(rs = .43 to .70) and showed consistent correlations with the other variables in Study 2; thus, I 
formed a reliable composite of these three behaviors (alpha = .80). 
Fundamentalism. To assess Christian fundamentalism, participants completed 
Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (2004) “short-form” of their original religious fundamentalism 
instrument (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), which is composed of 12 items (e.g., “God has 
given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally 
followed”; alpha = .92).  
Christian Orthodoxy.  Participants completed Hunsberger’s (1989) Christian orthodoxy 
scale—short form, composed of six items (e.g., “Jesus was crucified, died, and was buried but 
on the third day He arose from the dead”), half of which are protrait (see Fullerton & 
Hunsberger, 1982). The items address issues of the divinity of Christ, inspiration of the Bible, 
the concept of God as superstition, forgiveness of sin, God’s awareness of human actions, and 
the resurrection (alpha = .93 in this sample).  
Divine power.  Participants completed Stankov et al.’s (2009) eight-item divine power 
scale, which is the last dimension in their militant-extremist mind set measure (e.g., “All 
suffering in this life is small in comparison to the eternal pleasures one receive after death”; 
alpha = .84). 
Functional religious beliefs. To assess the perceived role of religion in participants’ 
lives, they completed the internal/intrinsic, external/extrinsic, and quest religiosity scales 
(Batson, 1976; Batson & Ventis, 1982). The intrinsic scale is composed of 9 items (e.g., “My 
religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life”; alpha = .94), the 
extrinsic scale 11 items (e.g., “A primary reason for my interest in religion is that my church is a 
congenial social activity”; alpha = .83), and the quest scale 12 items (e.g., “Questions are far 
more central to my religious experience than are answers”; alpha = .81). All scales have been 
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extensively used in the literature and have excellent psychometric properties (Batson, 1976; 
Batson & Ventis, 1982).  
Here, I would like to note that religious behaviors, religious fundamentalism, divine 
power, Christian orthodoxy, and intrinsic religiosity all intercorrelated very highly (rs ranged 
from .61 to .81). These variables would likely create some egregious multicollinearity, so I 
formed a very reliable composite of these religiosity variables (alpha = .93), henceforth referred 
to as Christian beliefs/practices. 
Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism.  To assess humanitarian-egalitarian attitudes, 
participants completed Katz and Hass’s (1988) well-established 10-item humanitarianism-
egalitarianism scale (e.g., “One should find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself”; 
alpha = .88). 
Support for racial policies.  To assess the general tendency to support racial equity 
policies, participants completed Pratto et al.’s (1994) racial policy scale, composed of seven 
items addressing issues related to housing, busing, jobs, and education; the initial reliability was 
low (alpha = .62), but after dropping the items related to racial quotas and desegregated school 
busing, which demonstrated very low item-total rs (-.13 and -.01, respectively), the alpha 
increased to .85.  
A separate set of six items addressed support for affirmative action (e.g., “Government 
has a social responsibility to recruit members of minority groups”; Davis & West, 1984; Swim 
& Miller, 1999), which is likely one of the most controversial racial equity policies in recent 
American history (Davis & West, 1984). Two items regarding hiring (#1, #3) exhibited item-
total correlations below .30 (rs = .21 and .25, respectively); indeed, an exploratory factor 
analysis showed that these items loaded separately on a second factor, yet they did not form a 
reliable composite (alpha = .37). Thus, these items were entirely dropped, while retaining the 
other four items, which formed a reliable composite (alpha = .80). 
Prejudice. Given that Study 2 assessed support for racial policy, I also measured 
participants’ racism using Saucier and Miller’s (2003) Racial Argument Scale (RAS)—Short 
Form. Specifically, participants read five racial arguments and their respective conclusions (all 
negative in orientation), then reported how well each argument supported the conclusion made 
(e.g., “Whites are more intelligent than African-Americans”; alpha = .55) in lieu of actually 
specifying their attitudes toward Blacks, per se. Their scale was selected because racial argument 
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scale scores were reliable and predicted racist behavior above other well-known measures of 
subtle or modern racism (Saucier & Miller, 2003). 
Support for social programs. To assess general support for social programs, 
participants completed an adapted version of Pratto et al.’s (1994) social program scale. 
Specifically, participants rated their support for 22 different social policies or programs designed 
to benefit the public, especially poor or disadvantaged groups (e.g., increased taxation of the 
rich, government sponsored healthcare, low income housing). Pratto et al.’s scale (which only 
measured attitudes toward 10 social programs) exhibited good internal consistency, with alphas 
ranging from .77 to .86 across four samples (Pratto et al., 1994). However, a factor analysis was 
conducted to assess whether ratings of social programs could be differently grouped (e.g., social 
policies targeting economically disadvantaged grouped separately from those targeting truly 
maligned groups). The factor analysis revealed seven factors with eigenvalues > 1.0. Only one or 
two items loaded onto Factors 4 to 7. Among the items loading on factors one to three, these did 
not form very reliable composites (alphas = .77, .63, and .58) and did not hold together strong 
theoretically. Thus, I conducted a second factor analysis in which I forced one factor; five items 
loaded poorly (< |.25|, with all other items loading > .41). After disregarding these five items (#s 
15 to 20), a highly reliable composite was formed of the remaining 17 items (alpha = .88). 
Additionally, one set of items focused more in detail on needle exchange programs 
because the public likely has attributions for the programs’ targeted audience: a stigmatized and 
criminally deviant population of intravenous drug users. Although such programs are 
controversial (MacNeil & Pauly, 2010), they are designed to reduce crime and transmitted 
disease, counter negative stigma, and provide access to clean supplies and to mental health 
services (MacNeil & Pauly, 2011). The set of nine items, adapted from a household survey 
completed by Jones, Case, and Meehan (1998), addressed perceptions about needle exchange 
programs (e.g., “Needle exchange programs help reduce diseases transmitted diseases”) as well 
as general support for needle exchange programs/policies (e.g., “Pharmacies should allow 
anyone to buy clean needles”); the final alpha for the scale was adequate at .71.  
Raffle allocation. The general procedure for the raffle paralleled that of Study 1. 
However, in Study 2, participants read mission statements for “LifePoint: Supporting Needle 
Exchange” or “DeathPoint: Opposing Needle Exchange”. LifePoint is a real non-profit 
organization based in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (http://www.facebook.com/pages/LifePoint-
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Needle-Exchange/136458519749799
The LifePoint mission statement (78 words long) read: 
), and the mission statements for both groups were adapted 
from their website.  
“LifePoint is a non-profit organization dedicated to funding needle exchange programs 
operating throughout the state of Kansas. Needle exchange programs like ours offer drug users 
free, clean needles in exchange for their dirty, used needles. Needle exchange programs also 
provide much-needed health and mental counseling for drug users. We also advocate that all 
pharmacies should sell clean needles to anyone. Needle exchange programs in the long run help 
reduce crime, transmitted diseases, and stigma towards drug users.” 
The DeathPoint mission statement (79 words long) read: 
“DeathPoint is a non-profit organization dedicated to eliminating needle exchange 
programs operating throughout the state of Kansas. Needle exchange programs offer drug users 
free, clean needles in exchange for their dirty, used needles. Needle exchange programs also 
provide so-called health and mental counseling for drug users. Needle exchange programs, as 
well as letting pharmacies sell clean needles to anyone, in the long run only encourage drug 
addiction and increase crime associated with drug use.” 
 Results 
 Table 4 provides means, standard deviation, and inter-correlations for variables of 
interest. All scales approximated normal distributions, with all Skewness levels < |1.00|. 
 Correlations with BPE and BPG 
 First, BPE and BPG were again not significantly correlated (r = .05, p = .59). 
Surprisingly, BPG—but not BPE—correlated with several religiosity variables. People scoring 
higher in Christian beliefs/practices (again, a combination of religious behaviors, religious 
fundamentalism, divine power, Christian orthodoxy, and intrinsic religiosity) as well as those 
reporting more secular volunteering more strongly endorsed BPG. Quest and extrinsic religiosity 
did not correlate significantly with either BPE or BPG. Nonetheless, BPG correlated positively 
with humanitarian-egalitarian beliefs, as predicted.  
Looking at our criteria for Study 2, people higher in BPE reported more opposition to 
supportive racial policies, supportive social policies, and needle-exchange programs while 
concurrently reporting more racial prejudice via the RAS. Meanwhile, BPG did not significantly 
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correlate with any of our criteria, despite the positive relationship between humanitarianism-
egalitarianism (which positively correlated with helpful social policies and programs). This 
pattern was puzzling, given I predicted BPG to correlate more positively to helping variables. 
Thus, I reviewed the correlations between BPG and all of the social programs/policies. BPG only 
significantly correlated (rs = .24, p < .01) with two items that related to helping children: “Free 
school lunches for low-income children” and “Free healthcare for children in low-income 
households”. For exploratory reasons, I created a composite variable of these two items (alpha = 
.74). Thus, people higher in BPG only reported wanting to help what is likely the most helpless 
population—children, in that children consistently depend on adults to support them (note that 
the correlation between helping children and BPE was marginally negatively significant at r = -
.19, p = .056).  
Lastly, neither BPE nor BPG significantly correlated with attitudes toward needle-
exchange programs or raffle donations (at least on a bivariate level collapsing across the different 
non-profit organizations). 
 Regression Analyses Predicting Racism Variables 
To assess the predictive/incremental validity of BPE and BPG, hierarchical regression 
analyses tested the unique, differential effects of BPE and BPG on the racism variables 
(supportive racial policies, support for affirmative action, and RAS) after controlling for other 
correlated predictors. For each regression analysis, I reviewed multicollinearity (Tolerance or 
VIF values) and outlier (Cook’s D) statistics to help ensure that the regression models were 
stable.  
In Step 1, any significant correlates of the criterion were entered. In Step 2, BPE and 
BPG scale scores were entered if the BPE and/or BPG scales significantly correlated with the 
criterion. If Step 2 showed a significant improvement in the regression model—that is, if Step 2 
significantly increased the model’s R-square value—for a given criterion, then BPE/BPG added 
predictive utility to the model. The individual BPE and BPG regression coefficients informed 
whether BPE, BPG, or both variables uniquely predicted the criterion.  
Supportive racial policies.  Scores for political orientation, Christian beliefs/practices, 
and humanitarianism-egalitarianism correlated with supportive racial policies and were entered 
in Step 1, which explained a significant and appreciable amount of variance, R2 = .41, F (3, 93) = 
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21.75, p < .001. As for individual predictors, only humanitarianism-egalitarianism uniquely and 
positively predicted supportive racial policies, β = .45, p < .001 (all other βs < -.13, ps > .17).  
BPE, but not BPG, correlated with supportive racial policies; thus, only BPE was entered 
in Step 2, which also explained a significant amount of variance above any beyond Step 1, R2 
= .049, F (1, 92) = 8.33, p = .005; thus, BPE uniquely and negatively predicted support for racial 
policies, β = -.23, p = .005. Thus, people higher in BPE reported greater opposition to supportive 
racial policies, even after controlling for political orientation, Christian beliefs/practices, and 
humanitarianism-egalitarianism. 
Support for affirmative action. Given that neither BPE nor BPG correlated with 
support for affirmative action, no regression analysis was conducted. 
Anti-Black prejudice (RAS). Scores for political orientation correlated with RAS scores 
and were entered in Step 1, which explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = .065, F (1, 
93) = 6.45, p = .012; thus, political orientation uniquely predicted RAS scores, such that more 
conservative individuals reported more prejudice, β = .24, p = .012. 
Next, because BPE—but not BPG—scores correlated with RAS scores, only BPE scores 
were entered in Step 2, which also explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = .075, F (1, 
92) = 8.04, p = .006; thus, BPE scores uniquely predicted RAS scores above and beyond political 
orientation, such that people higher in BPE reported more prejudice, β = .28, p = .006. 
 Regression Analyses Predicting Domestic Policies 
I used the same analytic approach above to assess the unique effects of BPE and BPG on 
support for social programs/policies.  
Support for social programs/policies. Scores for participant sex, political orientation, 
Christian beliefs/practices, quest, and humanitarianism-egalitarianism correlated with support for 
social programs/policies and were entered in Step 1, which explained a significant and 
appreciable amount of variance, R2 = .57, F (5, 91) = 24.02, p < .01. As for individual predictors, 
participant sex, (β = .16, p = .03), political orientation (β = -.29, p = .001) and humanitarianism-
egalitarianism (β = .52, p < .001) were unique predictors; thus, more conservatives individuals 
more greatly opposed social programs, while women and people higher in humanitarianism-
egalitarianism more greatly supported such programs.  
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Only BPE correlated with support for social programs, so only BPE was entered in Step 
2, which also explained a significant amount of additional variance, R2 = .042, F (1, 90) = 
9.82, p = .002; thus, BPE uniquely predicted support for social programs above and beyond a 
host of other predictors, such that people higher in BPE more greatly opposed such social 
programs, β = -.22, p = .002. In total, predictors explained a whopping 61.2% of the variance in 
support for helpful social programs/policies. 
Support for social programs/policies: Helping children. Scores for political orientation 
(negatively) and humanitarian-egalitarian beliefs (positively) correlated with policies designed to 
help children and were entered in Step 1, which explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = 
.327, F (1, 90) = 23.32, p < .01. As for individual predictors, only humanitarianism-
egalitarianism uniquely and positively predicted support for helping children, β = .52, p < .01.  
BPG, but not BPE, correlated with supporting children and was entered in Step 2. Step 2 
did not explain a significant amount of variance above and beyond Step 1,  R2 = .011, F (1, 95) 
= 1.59, p = .21. Thus, BPG did not add any unique variance in predicting support for policies 
designed to help children. 
Attitudes toward needle-exchange programs. Neither BPE nor BPG significantly 
correlated with attitudes toward needle-exchange programs; thus, no regression analysis was 
performed.  
 Regression Analyses Predicting Raffle Donations 
I changed the regression analysis for the non-profit donation (raffle) scores given that 
participants were randomly assigned to donate to one of two non-profits. Extrinsic religiosity 
scores correlated with donations on a bivariate level and were entered in Step 1. In Step 2, 
(standardized) BPE and BPG scores were entered. In Step 3, a dummy-coded variable 
representing the different non-profits (0 = LifePoint, 1 = DeathPoint) was entered. In Step 4, the 
two-way interaction terms between the dummy-coded non-profit variable, BPE scores, and BPG 
scores (Non-Profit x BPE; Non-Profit x BPG) were entered. Again, I predicted that BPE and 
BPG should differentially predict non-profit donations depending on the presented non-profit, 
such that BPE should predict smaller donations to LifePoint and greater donations to DeathPoint, 
whereas BPG should show opposite effects.  
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Step 1 explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = .042, F (1, 98) = 4.24, p = .042; 
thus, extrinsic religiosity positively predicted raffle donations across conditions, β = .20, p = 
.042. However, Steps 2, 3, and 4 did not predict significant amounts of additional variance, R2 
s < .015, Fs < 1.00. Thus, BPE or BPG did not alone predict or interact with the type of non-
profit to predict raffle donation scores; perhaps these null results may have been due to 
participants’ limited knowledge of needle-exchange programs (M of two knowledge questions = 
2.94, SD = 2.14). 
 Discussion 
In sum, Study 2 further demonstrated the value of BPE and (to a lesser extent) BPG in 
explaining aggression and helping responses; in this case, participants rated their support for 
various supportive domestic policies (in addition to anti-Black prejudice) as well as various 
forms of religiosity and humanitarian-egalitarian attitudes.  
Specifically, on a bivariate level, BPG—but not BPE—correlated with religiosity, such 
that as people’s Christian beliefs/practices (a composite variable of religious behaviors, religious 
fundamentalism, divine power, Christian orthodoxy, and intrinsic religiosity) increased, so did 
their endorsement of BPG. However, people scoring higher in Christian beliefs/practices did not 
report more prosocial or helpful responses; indeed, such individuals reported more opposition to 
social programs in general and more negative attitudes about needle exchange programs. Thus, it 
appears that some religious individuals strongly believe in pure good, but this does not seem to 
facilitate helping responses in general. This finding does confirm Saroglou’s (2003) “limited 
prosociality” hypothesis about the relationship between religiosity and helping (i.e., religious 
individuals tend to help only closer ingroup members).  Nonetheless, we (Webster & Saucier, 
2012) aimed to scrub any religious content from the BPE and BPG scales, and the pattern of 
correlations support that BPE and BPG can be differentiated from religious beliefs. 
Additionally, people higher in BPG reported more secular volunteering and endorsed 
greater humanitarian-egalitarian beliefs thereby providing convergent validity for the BPG scale. 
However, despite people scoring higher on greater volunteerism and humanitarianism-
egalitarianism, people higher in BPG did not indiscriminately respond more prosocially (note 
that people higher in BPE did report lower marginally lower humanitarian-egalitarian beliefs); 
such individuals only supported policies aimed to help needy children. However, humanitarian-
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egalitarian beliefs rendered the relationship between BPG and support for helping needy children 
non-significant. In fact, BPG did not uniquely predict any of our criteria in Study 2. I will discuss 
possible explanations for these effects (or more precisely, lack thereof) in the broader context of 
the BPE/BPG studies overall in the General Discussion section.  
 Study 2, though, strongly demonstrated the predictive validity of BPE; higher 
BPE uniquely predicted greater aggression and less helpful responding (specifically, greater 
opposition to supportive racial policies, greater racism via the RAS, and greater opposition to 
helpful domestic policies in general) above and beyond other predictors (e.g., political 
orientation, Christian beliefs/practices, humanitarianism-egalitarianism).  
So far Studies 1 and 2 converge with our previous studies to support the reliability, 
convergent validity, discriminant validity, and predictive validity of the BPE and BPG scales. In 
general, BPE has consistently related to greater aggression and less helping, while greater BPG 
has consistently related to less aggression and more helping (though to a lesser extent in Study 
2), while demonstrating convergence but not redundancy with variables known to 
justify/suppress aggression or helping.    
 Tables and Figures 
Table 3.1 Descriptives and Intercorrelations for Variables of Interest (Study 2) 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. Belief in Pure Evil 3.60 1.06 -
2. Belief in Pure Good 5.05 0.79 .05 -
3. Sex - - -.13 .06 -
4. Political Orientation 2.24 0.70 .13 .14 -.21 -
5. Secular Volunteerism 3.45 1.83 -.01 .28 .16 .16 -
6. Christian beliefs/practices 5.49 1.65 .05 .44 -.04 .47 .33 -
7. Extrinsic Religiosity 4.28 1.34 .06 -.06 -.03 -.04 .08 -.13 -
8. Quest 4.75 1.32 -.16 -.04 .09 -.23 .12 -.26 .33 -
9. Human-Egalitarianism 6.72 1.37 -.18 .38 .12 -.27 .10 .12 -.04 .15 -
10. Supportive Racial Policies 6.89 1.66 -.29 .16 .14 -.32 -.01 -.07 -.03 .13 .59 -
11. Support Affirmative Action 3.51 1.77 -.01 -.18 .13 -.29 .14 -.18 .14 .15 -.06 .15 -
12. Racial Attitude Scale 4.78 1.31 .29 .09 -.07 .25 .12 .09 .00 .02 -.10 -.29 -.15 -
13. Support Social Policies 6.03 1.34 -.30 .09 .26 -.53 -.02 -.23 .05 .23 .58 .75 .29 -.24 -
14. Support needy children 6.95 1.83 -.19 .27 .11 -.28 .00 -.09 -.05 .14 .56 .66 .21 -.17 .77
15. Support Needle Exchange 4.48 1.20 -.14 -.17 -.05 -.24 -.03 -.38 .13 .12 .06 .18 .23 -.09 .26 .16 -
16. Raffle Donations 3.99 2.04 .04 .02 -.06 .07 .07 -.01 .20 .07 -.02 -.21 -.14 .14 -.18 -.12 -.21  
Note: Correlations significant at p < .05 (rs > |.19|) are bolded. Scores ranged from 1 to 9, except 
for (a) BPE and BPG scores, which ranged from 1 to 7; and (b) Donations, which ranged 
from 1 (more money to non-profit) to 6 (more money to themselves). Higher scores indicate 
greater levels of the construct. Sex coded as 0 = “Male”, 1 = “Female”; Political Orientation 
coded as 1 = “Liberal”, 2 = “Moderate”, and 3 = “Conservative”. Raffle donations are 
collapsed across the two different non-profit organizations. 
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Chapter 4 - Study 3 
The purpose of Study 3 was to assess whether BPE and BPG predict participants’ 
reactions to a perpetrator and his apprehender in an individual criminal incident. Specifically, 
participants were randomly assigned to evaluate a perpetrator and his apprehender via scenarios 
in which the perpetrator and apprehender are imbued (or not imbued) with stereotypically evil or 
good characteristics, respectively (see Prooijen & de Veer, 2010); thus, the study comprised a 2 
(Prototypically vs. Non-Prototypically Evil Murderer) x 2 (Prototypically vs. Non-Prototypically 
Good Apprehender) between-subjects design. Participants then completed several measures 
assessing their reactions to the perpetrator and apprehender. For the perpetrator, I measured 
participants’ level of demonization (i.e., perceptions of evilness) and nihilistic hate (i.e., 
motivations to rid the world of the perpetrator) as well as their recommendations for bail and 
punishment if convicted. I also assessed more specific attitudes about the death penalty (its 
function and humaneness), about retribution, and about fears of being murdered. For the 
apprehender, I measured how much participants’ deified (saw him as good/moral) and effusively 
praised the apprehender as well as recommendations for rewarding his actions. Study 3 also 
assessed perceptions of how rewards increase or decrease helping behavior in general. 
Neither BPE nor BPG reliably predicted the level of punishment for murders in our 
previous BPE/BPG studies (Webster & Saucier, 2012). There may be several reasons for these 
non-significant findings, and Study 3 aimed to investigate these possibilities. First, in our 
previous BPE/BPG studies, we did not discriminate between “life in prison” and “the death 
penalty” in the response options for punishment; people higher in BPG (or higher in BPE) may 
discriminate more greatly between life in prison vs. the death penalty in recommending 
punishment. Second, it may be that people are generally harsher on murderers unless there are 
mitigating details, such as evil cues (e.g., Prooijen & de Veer, 2010); thus, Study 3 assessed how 
participants punished a murderer with and without such evil cues. Scenario-based 
methodological paradigms, like the ones used in other seminal research on pure evil (Burris & 
Rempel, 2011; Prooijen & de Veer, 2010), provide an excellent means to manipulate a 
perpetrator’s evil and an apprehender’s good characteristics. Such manipulations help clarify the 
predictive limits of BPE and BPG on aggression and prosocial action as well as confirm that 
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BPE and BPG predict responses to specific criminal incidents in addition to more generalized 
attitudes regarding criminal punitiveness. 
 Hypotheses 
One could argue for competing hypotheses here about the effects of BPE and BPG in the 
different experimental conditions. First, BPE may be pervasiveness enough to influence people’s 
perceptions whether or not there are mitigating details about the perpetrator, that is, whether 
there are behavioral indicators of pure evil. BPE did predict criminal punitiveness across 
different types of crimes in previous research regardless of mitigating details; however, given 
that BPE did not reliably predict criminal punishment for murderers in past studies (Webster & 
Saucier, 2012), it may be that BPE only would predict evaluations of the perpetrator in the 
prototypically evil scenario. Specifically, in the prototypically evil scenario, higher BPE may 
have been related to greater perceptions of the perpetrator as evil, more severe bail sentences and 
punishment of the perpetrator, greater retribution and instrumentality (but not likely lesser 
humanitarian) motives for punishment, and greater concern about murder in general. Thus, 
overall, BPE should be related to greater aggressive thoughts and attitudes toward murderers, but 
only when evil cues are present. Further, BPE would not likely be reliably related to evaluations 
of the apprehender given that BPE addresses perceptions of bad behavior, not perceptions of 
good behavior.   
BPG, though, should predict greater positive evaluations of the apprehender in the 
prototypically good scenario. That is, in the prototypically good scenario, higher BPG should 
predict greater perceptions of the apprehender as good, higher agreement that they would have 
replicated the apprehender’s actions, greater recommendations for commendations (but not 
monetary rewards), and greater perception that providing monetary awards likely lead to less 
helping long-term. Remember that BPG reflects help for the sake of helping without expectation 
of reward, and providing monetary awards is likely seen as more detrimental because such 
awards may be perceived as making helping contingent upon extrinsic rewards. In the non-
prototypically good scenario, one could reason that BPG would actually predict less positive 
reactions to the apprehender given the apprehender’s arrogance, fondness for violence, and focus 
on material rewards for helping. Thus, overall, higher BPG should be related to more favorable 
evaluations of the apprehender when “pure good” cues are present. Lastly, BPG may also predict 
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less severe evaluations to the perpetrator, in particular concerning punishment. People higher in 
BPG should likely find the death penalty more inhumane and opt for life in prison over the death 
penalty regardless of whether evil cues are present. 
 Method 
 Participants  
In total, 227 introductory psychology students completed the following materials online 
(via Sona Systems) to partially fulfill a course requirement. These participants completed the 
BPE and BPG scales earlier in the semester via a short online Sona survey and were recruited for 
the current study starting approximately 30 days later. Seven participants completed less than 5% 
of the items and were removed from the final data set. Further, three participants did not 
correctly complete the manipulation check (which was to correctly identify the names of the 
perpetrator and apprehender) and were removed. Lastly, four participants did not complete the 
BPE and BPG scales in the mass screening earlier in the semester and were also removed from 
the final data set.  
The final sample thus included 212 primarily White (88.7%) participants (84 men and 
128 women; M age = 20.01, SD = 4.23), who were randomly distributed throughout the four 
possible experimental conditions (ns ranged from 46-56 in each cell). 
 Materials and Procedure 
As mentioned above, participants first completed the BPE (alpha = .92) and BPG (alpha 
= .89) measures in the beginning of the Spring 2012 semester to help eliminate any demand 
characteristics, that is, in having participants link their responses on the BPE and BPG scales to 
their perceptions of a perpetrator as being pure evil or an apprehender being perceived as pure 
good11
                                                 
11 Please note that Sona allowed participants to complete only one of the three proposed disssertation studies.  
. Later in the semester, participants who participated in the mass screening were allowed 
to participate in an ostensibly separate study. Specifically, in this second study, participants were 
randomly assigned to read scenarios in which the perpetrator and apprehender are imbued (or not 
imbued) with stereotypical evil and good characteristics, respectively; thus, participants were 
randomly assigned in a 2 (Prototypically vs. Non-Prototypically Evil Murderer) x 2 
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(Prototypically vs. Non-Prototypically Good Apprehender) between-subjects design. The 
scenarios were predominantly adapted from Prooijen and de Veer’s (2010) prototypical and non-
prototypical evil scenarios (see also Rosenblatt et al., 1989).  
Participants read an ostensibly real newspaper article from the Kansas City Star 
(http://www.kansascity.com/) about a murder that occurred in the past two weeks in Kansas City 
(the closest major city to Manhattan): 
“Two weeks ago, an unidentified woman was found dead in the alley behind the Dillon’s 
grocery store in Shawnee Mission (13214 West 62nd)12
The prototypically good scenario at this point highlighted two dimensions of the belief in 
pure good: helping without expectation for intrinsic or extrinsic motivation as well as not 
avoiding, if at all possible, violence to help. 
. Police determined that she died of blunt 
force trauma to the head. From a credible witness, a police sketch artist was able to draw a facial 
composite of a suspicious person seen the night before the victim was found dead. Mr. Jacob 
Carter, a resident of Overland Park, saw the police artist sketch on the local news and thought he 
recognized the suspect as his neighbor, now identified as Mr. Mark Beatty. Mr. Carter 
immediately called the police. But, before the police could arrive, Mr. Beatty appeared to be 
preparing to flee area. Despite the obvious personal risk, Mr. Carter decided to try to delay the 
suspect’s attempt to flee by going outside and trying to nonchalantly ‘chat up’ the suspect until 
police could arrive. When the police pulled up the street, Mr. Beatty started to run and Mr. Carter 
prevented the suspect from escaping the scene by tackling him to the ground.” 
“Mr. Carter stated that he tried to convince Mr. Beatty to not flee and to submit to arrest, 
but that he did not want to hurt the suspect: ‘I do not like hurting people, even when it means 
helping others. But I felt I had no other choice at that point than to physically stop [Mr. 
Beatty]…without seriously injuring him.’ Some of Mr. Carter’s neighbors have called him a hero 
for helping subdue the suspect. To that Mr. Carter said, ‘I am not a hero. I am just guy who felt 
compelled to help. I don’t expect anything in return, and I do not expect to be treated differently. 
I help for the sake of helping.’ Other neighbors agreed that Mr. Carter is generally a modest man 
who consistently volunteers to help elderly or otherwise handicapped neighbors around the 
area.”  
                                                 
12 This store and location are real. 
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In the non-prototypically good scenario,  
“Mr. Carter stated that he tried to convince the suspect to not flee and submit to arrest, 
but that he enjoyed being able to tackle the suspect himself: ‘It felt good to tackle that guy; I 
even kicked him for good measure. I felt I had no other choice at that point than to physically 
stop [Mr. Beatty].’ Some of Mr. Carter’s neighbors have called him a hero for helping subdue 
the suspect. To that Mr. Carter said, ‘Well, I do not mean to gloat, but I do feel a sense of pride 
for taking the guy down—Bam! It was awesome. Anyhow, neighbors have also bought me 
drinks out at the bar, and I am getting more attention from the ladies around town now, too!’ Mr. 
Carter’s neighbors stated that Mr. Carter has not done a lot of volunteering around town, but is 
an otherwise friendly neighbor.” 
The overall scenario continued, 
“As for the suspect, Mr. Beatty confessed to the murder after being presented with 
forensic evidence linking him to the murder. The suspect refrained from commenting on his 
motives to commit the crime at this time. Mr. Beatty has no previous criminal record. He is 40 
years-old and worked long hours as a truck driver.” 
Following Prooijen and de Veer (2010), the prototypically evil scenario then read: 
“Mr. Beatty did not resist police officers after being subdued by Mr. Carter, and seemed 
exceptionally calm during his arrest. However, Mr. Beatty was described by other people from 
his neighborhood as a socially isolated individual who rarely left the house. Occasionally, 
children from the neighborhood who came too close to him were yelled at, and as a result, 
children were terrified of him. Recently, one of the children’s footballs accidentally ended up in 
the Mr. Beatty’s garden. When the child tried to get the ball back, Mr. Beatty scared the living 
daylights out of the child by sneaking up on him from behind, and then chasing the child away 
from his garden while yelling obscenities with a huge smile on his face.”   
The non-prototypically evil scenario read: 
“Mr. Beatty did not resist police officers after being subdued by Mr. Carter, but seemed 
exceptionally distraught during his arrest. However, Mr. Beatty was described by people from 
his neighborhood as a quiet person and a family man. He and his wife also recently celebrated 
their 10-year wedding anniversary. Many people from the neighborhood attended the 
celebration, and expressed how enjoyable this event had been. Mr. Beatty’s neighbors said that 
they had talked to Mr. Beatty in his garden the day before the murder. Mr. Beatty had reportedly 
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talked about how much he was looking forward to camping outside when the weather got 
warmer.” 
Participants then provided their reactions and perceptions of the perpetrator (Mr. Beatty) 
and his apprehender (Mr. Carter). Questionnaires (other than the BPE and BPG scales) for Study 
3 are included in Appendix C. Unless noted, participants responded to items on a 1 (disagree 
very strongly) to 9 (agree very strongly) Likert-type scale, and all measures were scored as the 
average response per item with higher mean values reflecting higher levels of the construct of 
interest. 
Perceptions of the perpetrator (Mr. Beatty).  Participants first completed Prooijen and 
de Veer’s (2010) demonizing scale (5 items; alpha = .87) as well as Burris and Rempel’s (2011) 
nihilistic hate scale, which is composed of four items: “Very simply, I can see nothing good in 
Mr. Beatty. He seems like a waste of space”; “I feel that everything would be better if Mr. Beatty 
simply ceased to exist, but not before he suffers a lot”; “The worst harm I could possibly imagine 
still seems too good for him”; and “If every reminder that Mr. Beatty ever existed were 
destroyed, the world would be a better place” (alpha = .85). These two scales were highly 
correlated (r = .66, p < .01) and thus were aggregated into a single composite, “Perpetrator as 
Evil” (alpha = .80). 
Participants also completed three exploratory items inquiring about how the role of 
mitigating circumstances in Mr. Beatty’s murder of the woman: “I cannot really think of any 
situation that would justify Mr. Beatty’s murder of the young woman”; “I think there may be 
circumstances that we are not yet aware of that would help explain why Mr. Beatty murdered the 
young woman”; “There might be circumstances that we don’t know about that would influence 
my judgment of Mr. Beatty in this crime” (alpha = .76). 
Bail recommendations for perpetrator. Participants also provided their 
recommendations for bail. First, participants were informed about what “posting bail” is: 
“Allowing Mr. Beatty to post bail means that he deposit money so he can be released from jail 
on the understanding that he would return for his criminal trial; however, some courts deny 
suspects bail because there is too much risk that the suspect would harm themselves or others, or 
flee from the area”. Participants then rated their agreement with statements about the acute risk 
posed by the perpetrator if released on bail: “If the suspect (Mr. Beatty) was released from jail on 
bail, I would fear that he would harm himself or other people”; “If the suspect (Mr. Beatty) was 
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released from jail on bail, I would bet that he would try to flee the area” (alpha = .75). 
Participants then were asked whether they would allow Mr. Beatty to post bail (0 = “Yes” vs. 1 = 
“No”). Participants were then asked if Mr. Beatty was allowed to post bail, what dollar amount 
would they recommend. Participants were asked to provide a numerical dollar amount between 
$25,000 and $1,000,000 (based on assumptive rates for manslaughter and murder via 
http://bailbondservices.com/penalcodes.htm). One participant provided a response out of range 
(“8,000”) and his/her response was removed from the data. 
Punishment of perpetrator. Next, participants were asked “If Mr. Beatty is convicted in 
a court of law for murder, what punishment would you recommend as a juror?” Participants 
decided the punishment in terms of community service, probation, jail time, and the death 
penalty; each of these terms was defined for participants (e.g., “Probation
Participants also provided their recommendations for imprisonment, probation, and 
community service separately. Participants were asked to provide a numerical number of years 
for imprisonment (1 to 60) and probation (1 to 30); one value for probation was out of range 
(“55”) and deleted. For hours of community service, participants responded on an 11-point scale 
from 1 = “8 hours = 1 day” to 11 = “More than 2 years/5376 hours”. I thought it was most 
prudent to provide participants with specific response options for community service and to 
present the options in two different numerical formats (hours and days/years) to maximize 
understandability (Brase, 2002).    
: A freed convicted 
criminal that must meet conditions set forth by the court and regularly meet with a probation 
officer. Typically, offenders are required to refrain from possession of firearms, ordered to 
remain employed, abide to a curfew, live at a directed place, participate in criminal rehabilitation 
programs, and not leave the immediate area”). Participants then selected, 1 = “Jail time with 
opportunity for parole but NO community service” (n = 26); 2 = “Jail time with opportunity for 
parole PLUS community service” (n = 72); 3 = “Jail time with NO opportunity for 
parole/probation” (n = 100); or 4 = “The death penalty” (n = 14). Participants also rated how 
much they supported each of the four different punishments separately (e.g., “If convicted, I 
would recommend the death penalty for Mr. Beatty”) using a Likert-type scale with 1 = 
“Strongly Disagree” and 9 = “Strongly Agree”. 
For reasons of parsimony, I investigated whether items addressing punishment could be 
reliably grouped together (after standardizing all variables), except that I analyzed support for the 
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death penalty separately because BPG (and possibly BPE) may differentially predict support for 
sentencing (jail time, probation, and community service) vs. support for the death penalty. An 
exploratory factor analysis revealed that support for the different punishments (jail time with no 
community service, jail time with community service, and jail time with no probation), actual 
recommendations for punishment (for jail time, probation, and community service), and the final 
forced-choice recommendation for punishment (choosing one of the four punishment options) all 
loaded on one factor (loadings ranged from |.56| to |.85|) that explained 55.46% of the variance. 
The items regarding support for jail time with parole (with and without community service) 
loaded negatively and were reverse-coded before computing an aggregated “sentencing” score 
for each participant (alpha = .86), with higher scores then representing harsher sentencing. 
Attitudes toward the death penalty. Participants also completed additional items 
assessing attitudes toward the death penalty. Previous research has identified three primary 
motives in supporting or opposing severe (e.g., capital) punishments (see Tyler & Weber, 1982): 
retribution (i.e., supporting the death penalty for revenge; 5 items, e.g., “Society does not have 
the right to get revenge for murder” [reverse-coded]), humanitarianism (i.e., opposition based on 
cruel and unusual punishment; 5 items, e.g., “No matter what crime a person has committed, 
executing the person is too cruel a punishment”), and instrumentality (i.e., to deter others from 
committing crimes in the future; 4 items, e.g., “Executing a person for murder discourages 
others from committing murder in future”). These scales exhibited adequate reliability (alphas = 
.77, .93, and .77, respectively). For consistency, higher scores all reflected greater supportive 
attitudes for the death penalty.  
Concerns about murder. Participants also completed items regarding murder in general 
(Tyler & Weber, 1982). Participants were asked how much they worried about being victims of 
murder (“I often worry about being murdered”, “I do not really dwell on the possibility that I will 
be a victim of murder”) as well as the likelihood of being a victim of murder (“I think my 
chances of being murdered are really low”; “I believe that there is a high probability that I will 
be murdered”). Participants’ were also asked about the perceived seriousness (“Murder is a 
serious threat in the greater Kansas City area”; “The Kansas City area should concern itself 
about other more relevant crimes besides murder”) and pervasiveness (by asking participants to 
estimate the number of murders that occur in Manhattan, Lawrence, and Kansas City 
metropolitan area from 2009-2010) of murder in greater Kansas City area.  
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A factor analysis of these items revealed that the four items addressing fears about one’s 
own murder loaded with the item “Murder is a serious threat in the greater Kansas City area”; 
thus, these five items were aggregated to form a reliable “fear of murder” index (alpha = .81). 
The other two items loaded on separate factors and did not correlate with any of the variables in 
the study; thus, they were disregarded. 
Perceptions of the apprehender (Mr. Carter).  Participants first completed an adapted 
version of Prooijen and de Veer’s (2010) demonizing scale, such that the scale reflected aspects 
of pure good not pure evil (i.e., deification in lieu of demonization): “The apprehender’s (Mr. 
Carter’s) actions were caused entirely by the his goodness”, “Mr. Carter was only motivated to 
protect everything that is kind”, “Mr. Carter seems to enjoy helping others”, “Mr. Carter is a 
moral man”, and “When thinking of Mr. Carter, I can only imagine how compassionate he is” 
(alpha = .90). Burris and Rempel’s (2011) nihilistic hate scale was similarly adapted to reflect 
effusive praise for the apprehender: “Very simply, I can see nothing but good in Mr. Carter”; “I 
feel that the world would be worse off if Mr. Carter simply ceased to exist”; “I could not give 
enough praise for Mr. Carter’s actions”; and “If every reminder that Mr. Carter ever existed 
were destroyed, the world would be a worse place” (alpha = .76). 
Next, I asked participants about the perceived motivation behind Mr. Carter’s actions: 
“Mr. Carter helped stop Mr. Beatty for the glory of it”; “Mr. Carter had no ulterior motive in 
helping capture Mr. Beatty”; “Mr. Carter helped apprehend the bad guy just because Mr. Carter 
was truly a good guy”; “Mr. Carter was arrogant in boasting about apprehending the suspect, 
Mr. Beatty”; “Mr. Carter’s actions to apprehend the suspect were not heroic” (alpha = .79). A 
set of exploratory items then asked participants about whether they would have intervened as Mr. 
Carter’s had (“If I had been in Mr. Carter’s place, I would have done the same thing he did”; “I 
think I would have acted differently if I had been in Mr. Carter’s place”; “I would encourage all 
people to act as Mr. Carter did”); the last of these three items was ultimately dropped because 
the alpha improved dramatically without it (from .69 to .81).  Participants also reported on the 
perceived amount of danger Mr. Carter was in by confronting the perpetrator: “Mr. Carter put 
himself at much risk by confronting Mr. Beatty”; “Mr. Carter was NOT really in a lot danger 
when he tried to stop Mr. Beatty from fleeing the area” (alpha = .74).  
The deifying, effusive praise, and perceived motivation scales for the apprehender were 
highly correlated (rs ranged from .57 to .73); thus, a composite—“Apprehender as Good”— of 
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these scales was formed (alpha = .84). The “apprehender in danger” and “intentions to 
intervene” scales correlated at low enough levels with each other and the other scales (rs ranged 
from .16 to .44) to make it appropriate to treat them as separate variables. 
Rewarding apprehender. Next, participants provided their agreement with possible 
recommendations for rewarding Mr. Carter for his actions: “I would recommend Mr. Carter for 
an official mayoral award from Kansas City”; “I would recommend Mr. Carter for Kansas’s 
statewide Good Samaritan Award”; “I would recommend Mr. Carter for the National (U.S.) 
Good Samaritan Award”; “I would recommend a monetary award”. The first three items 
correlated highly with each other (rs ranged from .53 to .75) and were aggregated to form a 
composite, “Recommendation for Award” (alpha = .84). These three items correlated lower with 
the monetary reward recommendation item (all rs < .27); thus, I treated this latter item as a 
separate variable. 
Participants next were asked, “If Mr. Carter does receive a monetary award from 
authorities, how much money do you think Mr. Carter should receive? Monetary awards in such 
cases typically range from $500 to $5,000” (see Rosenblatt et al., 1989). All participants’ values 
fell within this range. 
Participants also provided their opinions on the function of providing such rewards via 
six items. An exploratory factor analysis of these six items indicated a two-factor solution. First, 
four items (“Giving money to people for helping sets a bad example because people will not help 
in the future unless they expect money in return” ; “Giving awards to people for helping sets a 
bad example because people will not help in the future unless they expect an award”; “We should 
give commendations, not monetary awards, to people who help”; “There is nothing much we can 
do to make people be more helpful and altruistic”) cleanly loaded (all items loaded > .49 on the 
first factor and < .40 on the second) on the first factor. Second, two items loaded cleanly (all 
items loaded > .82 on the second factor and < .40 on the first) on the second factor (“Giving 
awards to people who help increases people’s motivation to help long-term”; “Giving money to 
people for helping increases people’s motivations to help long-term”). These items formed 
moderately reliable composites: “Rewards set bad example” (alpha = .66) and “Rewards 
Increase Help” (alpha = .67). 
Lastly, participants were fully debriefed as to the true nature of the study, with special 
emphasis placed on the fact that the events and persons depicted were completely fictitious.  
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 Results 
 Intercorrelations Between BPE, BPG, and Experimental Conditions 
First, BPE and BPG were again non-significantly correlated (r = .13, p = .06). Second, 
BPE and BPG did not vary according to experimental condition (all rs < .06, ps > .40); thus, it 
appears BPE and BPG scores were randomly spread across both experimental manipulations. 
Below, I first discuss results for perpetrator-related variables, and then I discuss results 
for apprehender-related variables. 
 Intercorrelations Between BPE, BPG, and Perpetrator Variables 
Intercorrelations between BPE, BPG, and the perpetrator items are located in Table 5 
(along with relevant Ms and SDs). Regardless of experimental condition, people higher in BPE 
perceived the perpetrator as more evil, reported more fear about granting him bail, and more 
harshly punished the perpetrator across all criteria (recommended higher bail amounts, more 
greatly supported the death penalty, and harsher sentencing overall). People higher in BPE also 
more strongly believed in retribution, that the death penalty deters crime, and that the death 
penalty is humane. People higher in BPE also worried about getting murdered, although the 
correlation was fairly small (r = .14).  
BPG was related to fewer variables across experimental conditions; specifically, people 
higher in BPG reported greater fears about granting the perpetrator bail and more strongly 
believed that the death penalty deters crime, although such individuals also concurrently thought 
that the death penalty was more inhumane.  
Further, correlations indicate that the prototypical (vs. non-prototypical) evil condition 
increased perceptions of the perpetrator as evil as well as increased participants’ support for the 
death penalty for the perpetrator and harsher punishment overall. Lastly, the prototypical good 
condition did not increase or decrease scores on the perpetrator items. 
 Regression Analyses for Perpetrator Variables 
The basic research question here is whether BPE and BPG predict perceptions of the 
perpetrator differently based upon whether the perpetrator or his apprehender were portrayed as 
prototypically evil or good, respectively. To answer this question, hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses tested the main effects of and interactions between our independent variables 
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in predicting evaluations of the perpetrator (Mr. Beatty) and his apprehender (Mr. Carter) in the 
prototypical (vs. non-prototypical) scenarios. For every dependent variable, BPE and BPG 
(centered) scores were entered in Step 1. If Step 1 of the regression analysis is significant, then 
the individual BPE and BPG regression coefficients inform us as to whether BPE and/or BPG 
uniquely predicted the criterion. In Step 2, two dummy-coded variables representing the 
prototypically (vs. non-prototypically) evil and prototypically (vs. non-prototypically) good 
manipulations were entered in Step 2.  
In Step 3, product terms representing the two-way interactions between the experimental 
manipulations and individual differences were entered: Prototypical Evil x Prototypical Good, 
Prototypical Evil x BPE, Prototypical Evil x BPG, Prototypical Good x BPE, and Prototypical 
Good x BPG. If any of these interaction terms were significant, then simple effects or simple 
slopes analyses were conducted to probe the interactions. Further, significant interaction terms 
indicated that BPE or BPG scores differentially predicted criterion depending on the presence of 
evil or good cues, which was hypothesized. Alternatively, any significant main effects of BPE 
and BPG in absence of significant interactions would indicate that BPE and BPG predicted 
criteria regardless of whether evil or good cues are present. 
Because of the number of criteria, the critical alpha was set at p = .01. 
Perpetrator as Evil.  Step 1 contributed a significant amount of variance, R2 = .18, F (2, 
206) = 22.17, p < .001; BPE (β = .42, p < .001)—but not BPG (β = -.02, p = .73)—uniquely 
predicted perceptions of the perpetrator as evil. That is, as BPE increased, so did perceptions of 
the perpetrator as evil. 
Second, Step 2 also contributed a significant amount of variance, R2 = .09, F (2, 204) = 
12.61, p < .001; the Evilness manipulation (β = .30, p < .001), but not the Goodness 
manipulation (β = .04, p = .55), uniquely predicted perceptions of evil, such that participants saw 
the perpetrator as more evil in the prototypically (M = 4.27, SD = 1.32) evil vs. non-prototypical 
(M = 3.33, SD = 1.24) evil condition, d = 0.69. 
Finally, Step 3 did not contribute a significant amount of variance, R2 = .034, F (5, 
199) = 1.94, p = .089. Thus, BPE and the prototypical evil condition were associated with higher 
perceptions of evil. However, BPE and the Evilness manipulation did not interact to predict these 
perceptions; that is, BPE predicted greater perceptions of evil regardless of whether the 
perpetrator displayed prototypically evil characteristics.  
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Mitigating circumstances. Step 1 contributed a marginal amount of variance, R2 = .034, 
F (2, 208) = 3.63, p = .028; BPE (β = -.17, p = .021)—but not BPG (β = .09, p = .21)—
marginally predicted perceptions of mitigating circumstances. That is, people higher in BPE 
were marginally less likely to believe that there were mitigating circumstances to help explain 
why the perpetrator murdered the young woman.  
Next, Step 2 did not contribute a significant amount of variance, R2 = .01, F (2, 206) < 
1.0, p = .44; thus, the experimental manipulations did not affect perceptions of mitigating 
circumstances. However, Step 3 was significant, R2 = .068, F (5, 201) = 3.09, p = .01. Looking 
at individual interaction terms, only the Prototypical Evil x BPE term reached significance, β = -
.28, p = .007 (all other βs < |.14|, ps > .15). Simple slopes analyses showed that the relationship 
between BPE and perceptions of mitigating circumstances was significant in the prototypically 
evil condition (B = -0.74, p < .001), but not in the non-prototypically evil condition (B = 0.16, p 
= .31). Thus, only in the prototypically evil condition were people higher in BPE less likely to 
perceive mitigating circumstances in the perpetrator’s murder of the young woman.  
Fears about granting bail. Step 1 explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = .11, 
F (2, 207) = 12.82, p < .001. Looking at individual coefficients, BPG uniquely predicted fears 
about granting bail (β = .29, p < .001), while BPE was a marginal predictor (β = .14, p = .036). 
Thus, people higher in BPG (and marginally for those higher in BPE) reported more concerns 
about releasing the murderer on bail. 
Neither Step 2 nor Step 3 explained a significant amount of variance, R2s < .012, Fs < 
1.0. Thus, neither did the experimental manipulations alone or together with BPE/BPG predict 
fears about bail. 
Grant Bail: No vs. Yes. Given that the granting bail was forced-choice/dichotomous, a 
logistical regression analysis was conducted. None of the Steps/Blocks were significant, though, 
χ2s < 3.56, ps > .17. This is not that unexpected given that only 28 (13.2%) of participants said 
that they would allow the murderer to post bail, thus presenting problems with restriction in 
variance. 
Recommended bail amount ($). Step 1 explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = 
.047, F (2, 198) = 4.86, p = .009; BPE (β = .18, p = .01), but not BPG (β = .11, p = .12), uniquely 
predicted bail amounts, such that people higher in BPE recommended higher bail.  
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Neither Step 2 nor Step 3 predicted bail amounts, though, R2s < .016, Fs < 1.70. Thus, the 
effect of BPE on bail amounts was consistent across experimental manipulations, and the 
experimental conditions did not alone or with BPE/BPG predict recommended bail amounts. 
Overall sentencing (composite variable).  Step 1 explained a significant amount of 
variance, R2 = .11, F (2, 207) = 12.47, p < .001; BPE (β = .32, p < .001), but not BPG (β = .05, p 
= .45), uniquely predicted punishment, such that people higher in BPE recommended harsher 
sentencing of the perpetrator.  
Neither Step 2, R2 = .022, F (2, 205) = 2.57, p = .079, nor Step 3, R2 = .041, F (5, 
200) = 1.98, p = .084, approached our critical alpha level. Thus, the effect of BPE on punishment 
was consistent across experimental manipulations, and the experimental manipulations alone or 
with BPE/BPG did not predict punishment. 
Support for death penalty.  Step 1 explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = .16, 
F (2, 206) = 19.89, p < .001; BPE (β = .40, p < .001) uniquely predicted support for the death 
penalty for the murderer, such that people higher in BPE more greatly supported the death 
penalty. BPG was a marginal unique predictor, β = -.14, p < .036, such that people higher in BPE 
marginally opposed the death penalty. Given that the zero-order correlation between BPG and 
support for the death penalty was non-significant and low (r = -.08), BPE’s variance is likely 
inflating the relationship, although this is strange given the low correlation between BPE and 
BPG.  
Step 2 approached the critical alpha level, R2 = .025, F (2, 204) = 3.14, p = .045, with 
the Evilness manipulation (β = .15, p = .019), but not Goodness manipulation (β = -.04, p = .50), 
being a marginal predictor. Looking at means, participants in the prototypically evil condition (M 
= 3.63, SD = 2.28) marginally supported the death penalty more than those in the non-
prototypically evil condition (M = 2.84, SD = 2.27), d = 0.35. 
Step 3 did not explain a significant amount of variance, R2 = .026, F (5, 199) = 1.30, p 
= .27; thus, BPE and the Evilness Manipulation did not interact to predict support for the death 
penalty.  
Death penalty deters crime.  Step 1 explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = 
.089, F (2, 206) = 10.14, p < .001. BPE (β = .23, p = .001) was a unique predictor, such that 
people higher in BPE more strongly believed that the death penalty helps deter crime. BPG was 
also a unique predictor, β = .17, p = .021, such that people higher in BPG also more strongly 
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thought that the death penalty helps deter crimes. These effects were consistent across condition 
given that both Step 2, R2 = .015, F (2, 206) = 1.30, p = .19, and Step 3, R2 = .018, F (5, 
201) < 1.0, p = .53, were non-significant. 
Death penalty is humane. Step 1 explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = .10, F 
(2, 208) = 11.58, p < .001. Both BPE (β = .22, p = .001) and BPG (β = -.25, p < .001) were 
unique but differential predictors, such that people higher in BPE more strongly believed that the 
death penalty is humane, while people higher in BPG more strongly believed that the death 
penalty is inhumane. These effects were significant above and beyond as well as across 
experimental conditions given that both Steps 2 and 3 were non-significant, R2s < 1.0, Fs < 
1.0.  
Belief in retribution. Step 1 explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = .187, F (2, 
208) = 24.00, p < .001; BPE (β = .43, p < .001) but not BPG (β < .01, p = .98) uniquely predicted 
belief in retribution, such that people higher in BPE more strongly believed in retribution. These 
effects were significant across experimental conditions given that both Steps 2 and 3 were non-
significant, R2s < 1.0, Fs < 1.0.  
Worry about being murdered. Step 1 explained a marginal amount of variance, R2 = 
.037, F (2, 208) = 3.97, p = .02. Both BPE (β = .14, p = .046) and BPG (β < -.15, p = .03) 
approached the critical alpha level, with people higher in BPE marginally more worried about 
being murdered, and people lower in BPG marginally worrying less.  
Step 2 did not explain a significant amount of variance, R2 < 1.0, F < 1.0; however, 
Step 3 did, R2 = .07, F (5, 201) = 3.17, p = .009. Only the BPG x Goodness manipulation 
interaction term reached significance, β = -.36, p < .001 (all other βs < |.13|, ps > .28). Simple 
slope analyses showed that the relationship between BPG and worry about murder was 
significant in the prototypically good condition (B = -0.49, p < .001), but not in the non-
prototypically good condition (B = 0.15, p = 0.31). Thus, only when the apprehender portrayed 
“purely good” characteristics did people higher in BPG report worrying less about being 
murdered. It appears the presence of a prototypical good guy helped alleviate distress related to 
being murdered, at least for those higher in BPG. 
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 Mediational Analyses for BPE and Perpetrator Punishment 
Regardless of experimental condition, people higher in BPE more greatly perceived the 
perpetrator as more evil and more greatly supported harsher punishment—both in terms of 
overall sentencing (jail time, probation, community service) and the death penalty. Further, 
regardless of experimental condition, people higher in BPE more strongly believed that the death 
penalty deters crime and is humane as well as more strongly believed in retribution. Meanwhile, 
perceptions of the perpetrator’s evilness and belief in retribution both correlated with harsher 
sentencing (both overall sentencing and the death penalty). However, perpetrator’s evilness, 
belief in retribution, and attitudes about the death penalty (belief that the death penalty deters 
crime and is just) all correlated with support for the death penalty. Thus, I conducted two 
mediational analyses (using Preacher & Hayes [2008] multiple mediation analysis script): the 
first assessed whether perceptions of the perpetrator as evil and belief in retribution mediated 
(i.e., explained) the relationship between BPE and overall harsher sentencing, while the second 
assessed whether perceptions of the perpetrator as evil, belief in retribution, and attitudes about 
the death penalty mediated (i.e., explained) the relationship between BPE and support for the 
murderer’s capital execution.  
 BPE  Harsher sentencing. First, higher BPE predicted both perceptions of the 
perpetrator as more evil, B = 0.62 (SE = 0.10), p < .001, and greater belief in retribution, B = 
0.52 (SE = 0.08), p < .001. Second, BPE predicted harsher sentencing, as was found in the 
regression analysis above, B = 0.25 (SE = 0.05), p < .001. Meanwhile, both perceptions of the 
perpetrator as more evil, B = 0.19 (SE = 0.03), p < .001, and greater belief in retribution, B = 
0.11 (SE = 0.04), p = .008, predicted harsher sentencing.  
Importantly, after controlling for perceptions of the perpetrator as evil and belief in 
retribution, the relationship between BPE and sentencing was rendered non-significant, c’ path B 
= 0.07 (SE = 0.05), p = .17. Bootstrap confidence intervals (CIs) for the indirect effects indicated 
that both greater perceptions of the perpetrator as evil (CI = 0.08, 0.18) and greater belief in 
retribution (CI = 0.02, 0.11) had significant indirect effects (because the CIs did not include 
zero); that is, both variables helped fully explain the relationship between BPE and sentencing. 
Additionally, the mediational model explained a total of 27.7% of the variance in sentencing.  
This pattern of effects slightly changed in the prototypically evil condition, though. 
Recall the people higher in BPE were less likely to believe that there were mitigating 
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circumstances in the perpetrator’s murder of the young woman, but only in the prototypically 
evil condition; thus, it was reasonable to assess whether the perception of mitigating 
circumstances helped mediate the relationship between BPE and overall sentencing in the 
prototypically evil condition. In fact, beliefs about mitigating circumstances had a significant 
indirect effect in the prototypically evil condition (bootstrap CIs = 0.03, 0.18); the mediating 
effects of perceptions of the perpetrator as evil (bootstrap CIs = 0.01, 0.18) and of belief in 
retribution (bootstrap CIs = 0.02, 0.14) also remained significant.  
Thus, people higher in BPE sentenced the perpetrator more harshly because they saw the 
perpetrator as more evil and because they more strongly believed in retribution; and, in the 
prototypically evil condition, the perception of fewer mitigating circumstances also helped 
explain why people higher in BPE sentenced the perpetrator more harshly. Thus, results indicate 
that both perceptions of the situation (i.e., the criminal himself) and dispositional beliefs (i.e., 
about retribution) fueled harsher sentencing by people higher in BPE. 
BPE  Support for the death penalty. First, higher BPE predicted greater perceptions 
of the perpetrator as evil, B = 0.61 (SE = 0.10), p < .001; stronger beliefs that the death penalty 
deters crime, B = 0.49 (SE = 0.14), p < .001; stronger beliefs that the death penalty is 
just/humane, B = 0.28 (SE = 0.11), p = .014; and stronger belief in retribution, B = 0.48 (SE = 
0.07), p < .001. Second, as the hierarchical regression analyses showed above, BPE also 
predicted greater support for the death penalty, B = 0.75 (SE = 0.15), p < .001. Meanwhile, 
greater perceptions of the perpetrator as evil, B = 0.40 (SE = 0.09), p < .001, stronger beliefs that 
the death penalty deters crime, B = 0.18 (SE = 0.06), p = .007, stronger beliefs that the death 
penalty is just/humane, B = 0.43 (SE = 0.09), p < .001, and stronger belief in retribution, B = 0.31 
(SE = 0.15), p = .028, all predicted greater support for the death penalty.  
Importantly, after controlling for perceptions of the perpetrator as evil, attitudes toward 
the death penalty, and belief in retribution, the relationship between BPE and support for the 
death penalty was rendered non-significant, c’ path B = 0.15 (SE = 0.15), p = .30. Bootstrap CIs 
for the indirect effects indicated that greater perceptions of the perpetrator as evil (CI = 0.12, 
0.40), belief that death penalty deters crime (CI = 0.02, 0.22), belief that the death penalty is just 
(CI = 0.03, 0.24), and greater belief in retribution (CI = 0.03, 0.29) all had significant indirect 
effects (because the CIs did not include zero); that is, all four variables helped fully explain the 
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relationship between BPE and sentencing13
Thus, people higher in BPE reported greater support for the murderer’s capital execution 
because they saw the perpetrator as more evil; because they believed that the death penalty helps 
deter crime and is humane; and because they more strongly believed in retribution. Thus, results 
indicate that both perceptions of the situation (i.e., the criminal himself) and dispositional beliefs 
(i.e., about the death penalty and retribution) fueled greater support for the murderer’s execution 
by people higher in BPE. 
. Additionally, the mediational model explained a 
total of 40.0% of the variance in support for the death penalty. 
Intercorrelations Between BPE, BPG, and Apprehender Variables 
Intercorrelations between BPE, BPG, and the apprehender items are located in Table 6 
(along with relevant Ms and SDs). First, and interestingly, BPE significantly correlated with 
several of the variables regarding the apprehender regardless of the experimental conditions. 
People higher in BPE reported that they would have been more likely to intervene as the 
apprehender had and more greatly supported rewards for the apprehender (support for 
awards/commendations, support for a monetary reward, and a higher monetary reward amount). 
People higher in BPE also more greatly felt that rewards promote helping in general. Meanwhile, 
across experimental conditions, people higher in BPG perceived the apprehender as more good, 
perceived the apprehender to be in more danger, and more strongly recommended awards (but 
not a monetary award) for the apprehender.  
Further, intercorrelations indicated that the Goodness manipulation appreciably affected 
participants’ perceptions about the apprehender: The prototypical good condition appeared to 
increase perceptions of the apprehender as good, perceptions that the apprehender was in greater 
danger, and the belief that participants would have intervened as the apprehender had. The 
prototypical good conditions also appeared to increase participants’ recommendation for 
awards—but not monetary rewards. Lastly, the prototypical evil condition seemed to decrease 
participants’ willingness to act as the same as the apprehender did, which is not that unexpected 
given the increased perceived evilness of the perpetrator in this condition. 
                                                 
13 Beliefs in mitigating circumstances did not help mediate the relationship between BPE and support for the death 
penalty in the prototypically evil condition.  
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 Regression Analyses for Apprehender Variables 
As I did for the perpetrator-related criteria, I ran hierarchical regression analyses 
examining the effects of BPE, BPG, and the experimental conditions on criteria related to the 
apprehender. To refresh, in Step 1 BPE and BPG (centered) scores were entered; in Step 2, the 
dummy-coded variables for the Evilness and Goodness manipulations were entered; in Step 3, 
three-way interaction terms were entered: Prototypical Evil x Prototypical Good, Prototypical 
Evil x BPE, Prototypical Evil x BPG, Prototypical Good x BPE, and Prototypical Good x BPG. 
If any of these interaction terms were significant, then simple effects or simple slopes analyses 
were conducted to probe the interactions. Further, significant interaction terms indicated that 
BPE or BPG scores differentially predicted criterion depending on the presence of evil or good 
cues. Alternatively, any significant main effects of BPE and BPG in absence of significant 
interactions would indicate that BPE and BPG predicted criteria regardless of whether evil or 
good cues are present. 
Because of the number of criteria, the critical alpha was set at p = .01. 
Apprehender as good. Step 1 explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = .044, F 
(2, 206) = 4.74, p = .01. BPG (β = .17, p = .017), but not BPE (β = .11, p = .12), closely 
approached the critical alpha level; thus, people higher in BPG saw the apprehender as 
marginally more good.   
Step 2 also explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = .37, F (2, 204) = 63.31, p 
< .001. The Goodness manipulation (β = .61, p < .001), but not the Evilness manipulation (β = -
.01, p = .92), uniquely predicted perceptions of the apprehender as good. Participants in the 
prototypically good condition (M = 6.14, SD = 1.10) rated the apprehender as considerably more 
good than those participants in the non-prototypically good scenario (M = 4.41, SD = 1.18), d = 
1.52. 
However, Step 3 explained a significant amount of variance as well, R2 = .040, F (5, 
199) = 2.92, p = .014. Only the BPG x Goodness interaction term was significant, β = .61, p < 
.001 (all other βs < |.07|, ps > .46). Simple slope analyses showed that the relationship between 
BPG and perceptions of the apprehender as good was significant in the prototypically good 
condition (B = 0.54, p < .001), but not in the non-prototypically good condition (B = -0.02, p = 
.86).  
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Thus, overall, participants perceived the apprehender who portrayed “pure good” 
characteristics as more good and moral. People higher in BPG also saw the apprehender as more 
good as well, but only in the prototypically good condition.     
Apprehender in danger. Step 1 explained a marginal amount of variance, R2 = .03, F (2, 
207) = 3.25, p = .04. BPG (β = .17, p = .012), but not BPE (β = .01, p = .90), uniquely predicted 
the perception that the apprehender was in danger, such that people higher in BPG saw the 
apprehender as somewhat more in danger.  
Step 2 also explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = .063, F (2, 205) = 7.09, p 
= .001. The Goodness manipulation (β = .25, p < .001), but not the Evilness manipulation (β = 
.05, p = .48), uniquely predicted the perception that the apprehender was in danger. Participants 
in the prototypically good condition (M = 7.04, SD = 1.39) rated the apprehender as more in 
danger than those participants in the non-prototypically good scenario (M = 6.25, SD = 1.70), d = 
0.51. 
Step 3, though, did not explain a significant amount of variance, R2 = .026, F (5, 200) 
= 1.17, p = .33.  
Intentions to intervene. Step 1 explained a marginal amount of variance, R2 = .038, F (2, 
208) = 4.09, p = .018. BPE (β = .19, p = .005), but not BPG (β = -.05, p = .49), uniquely 
predicted participants’ belief that they would have acted the same, such that people higher in 
BPE believe that they would have acted the same as the apprehender.  
Step 2 also explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = .09, F (2, 206) = 10.64, p 
< .001. Both the Goodness (β = .22, p = .001) and Evilness (β = -.20, p = .003) conditions 
uniquely predicted participants’ belief that they would have intervened. Participants in the 
prototypically good condition (M = 5.77, SD = 1.60) more greatly reported that they would have 
intervened as the apprehender had when compared to those participants in the non-prototypically 
good scenario (M = 4.91, SD = 1.93), d = 0.49. Meanwhile, this pattern of results was reversed in 
the Evilness conditions; participants in the prototypically evil condition (M = 5.04, SD = 1.67) 
reported that they would been less likely to intervene than those in the non-prototypically evil 
condition (M = 5.71, SD = 1.91), d = -0.37.  Step 3, though, did not explain a significant amount 
of variance, R2 < 1.0, F < 1.0.  
To recap, the prototypically (vs. non-prototypically) good condition increased 
participants’ intentions to intervene; however, this pattern was reversed in the Evilness 
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conditions, such that the prototypically evil condition decreased participants’ belief that they 
would have intervene when compared to those in the non-prototypically evil condition. That is, 
being confronted with a really good guy made people want to emulate his valiant behavior, while 
being confronted with a really bad guy seemed to suppress intentions to intervene, likely because 
of the perpetrators’ increased evilness. But for people higher in BPE, reading about a good guy 
or bad guy did not matter; regardless of experimental conditions, people higher in BPE more 
strongly believed that they would have intervened. 
Support for awards/commendations. Step 1 explained a significant amount of variance, 
R2 = .055, F (2, 203) = 5.96, p = .003. BPE (β = .17, p = .013) uniquely predicted award 
recommendations, such that people higher in BPE more strongly supported the apprehender 
being awarded. BPG was a marginal predictor (β = .15, p = .034), such that people higher in 
BPG also marginally supported the apprehender getting awards.  
Step 2 also explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = .20, F (2, 201) = 26.81, p 
< .001. The Goodness (β = .44, p < .001) manipulation, but not the Evilness manipulation (β = 
.09, p = .17), predicted award recommendations. Participants in the prototypically good 
condition (M = 5.19, SD = 1.67) more greatly supported award recommendations compared to 
those in the non-prototypically good scenario (M = 3.56, SD = 1.60), d = .99.  
Step 3, though, did not explain a significant amount of variance, R2 = .02, F (5, 196) = 
1.07, p = .38. Thus, both people higher in BPE and BPG felt that the apprehender deserved some 
type of award for capturing the perpetrator; however, being presented with a prototypical “good 
guy” (vs. non-prototypically good guy) appeared to have a stronger effect in increasing 
participants’ award recommendations.  
Support for monetary reward. Step 1 explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = 
.053, F (2, 208) = 5.82, p = .003. BPE (β = .28, p < .001) uniquely predicted support for a 
monetary award, such that people higher in BPE more strongly supported the apprehender being 
rewarded with money. BPG was not a significant predictor (β = -.08, p = .22).  
Neither Step 2, R2 = .02, F (2, 206) = 2.41, p = .09, nor Step 3, R2 = .01, F (5, 201) < 
1.0, p = .78, explained a significant amount of variation in monetary reward recommendations. 
Thus, only BPE predicted support for a monetary reward for the apprehender. 
Recommended $ reward amount.  Step 1 explained a significant amount of variance, R2 
= .079, F (2, 197) = 8.44, p < .001. BPE (β = .23, p = .001) uniquely predicted monetary reward 
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amounts, such that people higher in BPE recommended higher reward amounts. BPG was not a 
significant predictor (β = .02, p = .83).  
Neither Step 2, R2 = .02, F (2, 195) = 2.20, p = .11, nor Step 3, R2 = .02, F (5, 190) < 
1.0, p = .66, explained a significant amount of variation in monetary award recommendations. 
Thus, only BPE predicted actual monetary reward recommendations. 
Rewards increase help. Step 1 explained a significant amount of variance, R2 = .063, F 
(2, 209) = 7.05, p = .001. BPE (β = .24, p < .001) uniquely predicted the belief that rewards 
increase help, such that people higher in BPE more strongly believed that rewards increase help. 
BPG was not a significant predictor (β = .04, p = .57).  
Neither Step 2, R2 = .017, F (2, 209) = 1.90, p = .15, nor Step 3, R2 = .04, F (5, 202) 
= 1.82, p = .11, explained a significant amount of variation in monetary award recommendations. 
Thus, only BPE predicted beliefs that rewards increase help. 
Rewards set bad example.  Unfortunately, none of the regression model steps reached 
significance in predicting the belief that rewards set a bad example, all R2s < .02, Fs < 1.0. 
 Mediational Analyses for Apprehender Award/Reward 
 Goodness manipulation  Award recommendations. When the apprehender was 
portrayed as prototypically “good”, recommendations for awards increased. This may have been 
because participants’ in the prototypically good condition perceived the apprehender to be more 
good and moral, perceived the apprehender to be more in danger, or felt that they would have 
also intervened; importantly, all three of these variables correlated with award recommendations, 
so all three are possible mediators. Thus, using Preacher and Hayes (2008) multiple mediation 
analysis, I tested whether perceptions of the apprehender as good and moral, perceptions of the 
apprehender in danger, and the belief that participants would have also intervened mediated the 
relationship between the Goodness manipulation and award recommendations. 
 First, as regression analyses showed above, the Goodness manipulation predicted 
perceptions of the apprehender as good and moral (B = 1.76, SE = 0.17, p < .001), perceptions of 
the apprehender in danger (B = 0.78, SE = 0.21, p < .001), and the belief that participants would 
have acted similarly to the apprehender (B = 0.79, SE = 0.25, p = .002). Additionally, the 
Goodness manipulation also predicted award recommendations (B = 1.52, SE = 0.23, p < .001). 
Meanwhile, of the potential mediators, only perceptions of the apprehender as good uniquely 
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predicted award recommendations (B = 0.69, SE = 0.10, p < .001); thus, perceptions of the 
apprehender in danger (B = 0.09, SE = 0.07, p = .23) and the belief that participants would have 
also intervened (B = 0.01, SE = 0.06, p = .98) did not uniquely predict award recommendations.  
Importantly, though, the relationship between the Goodness manipulation and award 
recommendations was rendered non-significant after controlling for the perceptions of the 
apprehender as good, c’ path B = 0.24, SE = 0.25, p = .34. Thus, the prototypically (vs. non-
prototypically) good condition increased participants’ award recommendations entirely because 
they saw the apprehender as more good and moral. Lastly, the mediation model explained 38.0% 
of the variance in award recommendations. 
 BPG  Award recommendations. People higher in BPG more greatly supported award 
recommendations for the apprehender regardless of experimental condition; however, I was most 
interested in whether their increased perceptions of the apprehender as good (and perceptions of 
the apprehender in danger) mediated the relationship between BPG and award recommendations 
in the prototypically good condition.  
 First, as in the regression analyses above, higher BPG predicted greater perceptions of the 
apprehender as good (B = 0.53, SE = 0.10, p < .001) and an in danger (B = 0.38, SE = 0.13, p = 
.005). Second, higher BPG predicted greater award recommendations, B = 0.38 (SE = 0.16), p = 
.02. Meanwhile, perceptions of the apprehender as good (B = 0.68, SE = 0.16, p < .001), but not 
perceptions of the apprehender in danger (B = 0.05, SE = 0.17, p = .65), uniquely predicted 
award recommendations (mirroring the mediation analysis above). Importantly, though, the 
relationship between BPG and award recommendations was rendered non-significant after 
controlling for perceptions of the apprehender as good, c’ path B < 0.01, SE = 0.17, p = .99. 
Thus, people higher in BPG recommended higher awards to the prototypically good apprehender 
entirely because of increased perceptions of the apprehender as good and moral. 
 BPE  Rewarding apprehender. The case of BPE and rewards for the apprehender is a 
little different. Across experimental conditions people higher in BPE more strongly supported 
awards and a monetary reward as well as suggested higher monetary reward amounts. However, 
people higher in BPE did not see the apprehender as more or less good depending on the 
experimental condition; thus, perceptions of the apprehender as good could not have mediated 
the relationship between BPE and rewards for the apprehender. Across experimental conditions 
though, people higher in BPE more strongly believed they would have intervened as the 
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apprehender did and believed that rewards in general increase helping; given that these two 
variables also related to greater rewards for the apprehender, these may have acted as mediators. 
In lieu of conducting three mediation analyses predicting three different criteria (support for 
awards, support for a monetary recommendation, and actual monetary amounts), I formed a 
composite of these variables (alpha = .74) for reasons of parsimony.  
 First, in the mediational model, higher BPE predicted the belief that participants would 
have also intervened (B = 0.30, SE = 0.13, p = .018) and the belief that rewards increase helping 
(B = 0.38, SE = 0.10, p < .001). Second, higher BPE also predicted greater rewards for the 
apprehender in general, B = 0.19 (SE = 0.05), p < .001. Meanwhile, beliefs about intervening (B 
= 0.07, SE = 0.03, p = .006) and about rewards increasing helping (B = 0.13, SE = 0.03, p < .001) 
both uniquely predicted greater rewards for the apprehender. After controlling for beliefs about 
intervening and about rewards increasing helping, the relationship between BPE and rewards for 
the apprehender was significantly decreased (total indirect effect bootstrap CI = 0.03, 0.12) but 
was still significant, c’ path B = 0.12, SE = 0.05, p = .016.  
I then reviewed the correlations between variables related to perceptions of the 
perpetrator and reward amounts; in fact, perceptions of the perpetrator as evil and worries about 
being murdered both more greatly related to BPE and greater support for awards, support for a 
monetary reward, and actual recommended monetary reward amounts. It is reasonable then that 
greater perceptions of the perpetrator as evil and worries about being murdered also pressed 
people higher in BPE to reward the apprehender more. Adding perceptions of the perpetrator as 
evil and worries about murder to the mediation model rendered the relationship between BPE 
and apprehender rewards non-significant, c’ path B = 0.07, SE = 0.05, p = .17. Both perceptions 
of the perpetrator as evil (B = 0.07, SE = 0.04, p = .05) and worries about murder (B = 0.07, SE = 
0.03, p < .025) predicted apprehender rewards; however, only worries about murder (bootstrap 
CI = 0.01, 0.04), beliefs about intervening (bootstrap CI = 0.01, 0.06), and beliefs about rewards 
increasing helping (bootstrap CI = 0.02, 0.09) had significant indirect effects. Thus, people 
higher in BPE more greatly wanted to reward the apprehender because they were more 
concerned about being murdered, believed that they would have intervened as the apprehender 
did, and also believed that rewards in general increase helping. Lastly, the final mediation model 
explained 21.2% of the variance in reward recommendations. 
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 Discussion 
 Study 3 assessed how BPE and BPG differentially related to perceptions of a 
stereotypically (vs. non-stereotypically) evil perpetrator who confessed to a murder and a 
stereotypically (vs. non-stereotypically) good apprehender who helped capture the perpetrator.  
Overall, higher BPE predicted more negative perceptions and evaluations of the 
perpetrator regardless of whether or not the perpetrator displayed prototypically evil 
characteristics. Specifically, regardless of experimental condition, people higher in BPE more 
greatly supported harsher sentencing because of greater perceptions of the perpetrator as evil and 
because of a greater belief in retribution. Further, people higher in BPE more greatly supported 
the perpetrator’s execution because of greater perceptions of the perpetrator as evil, because of a 
stronger belief in retribution, and because of more positive attitudes about the death penalty (they 
viewed the death penalty as more useful and more humane). Again, the effects of BPE held 
across experimental conditions, likely because the situational constraints were not strong enough 
to overpower the individual contribution of BPE; this is not to say that the prototypical evil 
manipulation was entirely ineffective given that the prototypically evil perpetrator increased 
perceptions of the perpetrator’s evilness and (marginally) support for the death penalty.  
In addition, higher BPE also predicted greater rewards (both commendations and 
monetary rewards) to the apprehender; however, this was not because of their perceptions of the 
apprehender as more or less good, but because they more strongly believed that they would have 
intervened as the apprehender did, because they reported greater concerns about being murdered, 
and because they thought that rewards generally increase helping.  
Meanwhile, BPG did not consistently predict perceptions and evaluations of the 
perpetrator. Interestingly, people higher in BPG were more worried about granting the 
perpetrator bail and more strongly believed that the death penalty deters crime (these 
peculiarities are addressed in the broader context of all three studies in the General Discussion 
section); however, this did not lead people higher in BPE to more or less harshly punish the 
perpetrator, perhaps because they also more strongly believed the death penalty to be inhumane. 
Conversely, higher BPG did strongly predict perceptions of the apprehender as good when the 
apprehender displayed prototypically good characteristics, which then increased their support for 
awards/commendations (but not monetary rewards). It is important to note that the differences in 
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responses to the prototypically and non-prototypically good apprehenders was striking: The 
prototypically good condition appreciably increased participants’ perceptions of the apprehender 
as good and moral, which also increased support for awards/commendations (but not monetary 
rewards). 
In sum, Study 3 confirmed that even with a crime as grave as murder, BPE and BPG still 
predicted reactions to a perpetrator who commits it and to the apprehender who helps capture the 
perpetrator. Importantly, the effects of BPE were powerful enough that the situational constraints 
did not moderate them, while it seems that people higher in BPG are more susceptible to the 
situational context. Further, this study showed that BPE and BPG can predict reactions to a 
particular criminal target in addition to predicting more generalized attitudes regarding criminal 
punitiveness (Webster & Saucier, 2012).  
 Tables and Figures 
Table 4.1 Descriptives for and Intercorrelations between BPE, BPG, and Perpetrator Items 
(Study 3) 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Predictors
1.      BPE 3.67 0.91 -
2.      BPG 5.08 0.74 .13 -
3.      Sex - - -.04 .08 -
4.      Goodness manipulation - - .01 .00 -.05 -
5.      Evilness manipulation - - .06 .01 -.03 -.06 -
Criteria/Potential Mediators
6.      Perpetrator as evil 3.88 1.52 .42 .04 .05 .02 .33 -
7.      Mitigating circumstances 6.07 1.76 -.12 .10 .02 -.09 -.02 -.37 -
8.      Fears about granting bail 6.30 1.74 .14 .24 .23 .04 .12 .39 -.18 -
9.      Grant Bail: No vs. Yes. 0.13 0.34 -.01 -.10 -.17 -.01 -.13 -.18 .01 -.39 -
10.  Bail amount ($) 402229.85 389718.00 .19 .12 .07 .12 .06 .27 -.11 .33 -.21 -
11.  Support for death penalty 3.32 2.36 .38 -.08 -.11 -.06 .17 .37 -.15 .20 -.16 .24 -
12.  Sentencing (Composite) 0.00 0.74 .32 .05 .08 .00 .17 .48 -.34 .37 -.25 .47 .45 -
13.  Death penalty deters crime 4.58 2.08 .23 .19 -.22 -.08 .11 .22 -.04 .07 -.02 .05 .37 .14 -
14.  Death penalty is humane 4.00 1.63 .17 -.23 -.17 .08 .01 .16 -.12 -.06 .08 .13 .48 .16 .28 -
15.  Belief in retribution 4.43 1.17 .43 .04 -.06 .04 .06 .28 -.03 .16 .00 .26 .46 .33 .33 .51 -
16.  Worry about murder 3.53 1.53 .14 -.14 .18 .01 .03 .24 -.06 .07 -.09 .00 .18 .10 .02 .05 .00  
Note:  Correlations significant at p < .05 (rs > |.13|) are bolded.  
Scores ranged from 1 to 9, except for BPE and BPG scores, which ranged from 1 to 7. 
Higher scores indicate greater levels of the construct. Sex coded as 0 = “Male”, 1 = 
“Female”; Goodness and Evilness manipulations coded as 0 = “Non-Prototypical” and 1 = 
“Prototypical”. 
82 
 
 
Table 4.2 Descriptives for and Intercorrelations between BPE, BPG, and Apprehender 
Items (Study 3) 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Predictors
1. BPE 3.67 0.91 -
2. BPG 5.08 0.74 .13 -
3. Sex - - -.04 .08 -
4. Goodness manipulation - - .01 .00 -.05 -
5. Evilness manipulation - - .06 .01 -.03 -.06 -
Criteria/Potential Mediators
6. Apprehender as good 5.30 1.46 .11 .21 -.01 .60 -.02 -
7. Apprehender in danger 6.68 1.60 .02 .16 .11 .24 .02 .43 -
8. Would have intervened 5.40 1.84 .16 -.03 -.24 .22 -.18 .28 .06 -
9. Support for awards 4.43 1.86 .19 .16 -.09 .45 .03 .62 .32 .17 -
10. Support for monetary reward 4.15 2.14 .21 -.06 .04 .13 -.06 .30 .05 .21 .30 -
11. Reward amount ($) 1131.31 1059.33 .23 .05 .00 .17 .03 .29 .05 .15 .33 .45 -
12. Rewards increase help 5.35 1.54 .25 .07 .00 -.13 .00 .10 .02 .14 .19 .37 .19 -
13. Rewards set bad example 5.50 1.37 .01 .08 .10 -.09 .02 -.14 .13 -.12 -.10 -.19 -.15 -.22  
Note:  Correlations significant at p < .05 (rs > |.13|) are bolded.  
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Chapter 5 - General Discussion 
The three current studies provide strong support for the reliability and validity of BPE 
and BPG scales. First, these studies further confirm that we can reliably measure BPE (broadly, 
broadly, the tendency to think that people hurt others because of malevolent intentions) and BPG 
(broadly, the tendency to think that people help because of selfless intentions). Specifically, the 
BPE and BPG scales exhibited high reliability across all studies (alphas ranged from .89 to .95). 
Such high and consistent reliability confirms that BPE’s and BPG’s different component beliefs 
do successfully coalesce into their respective unitary constructs. One of the main attractions of 
these constructs is their singularity—both theoretically and grammatically; we can assuredly and 
parsimoniously say that we are measuring belief (not beliefs) in pure evil and in pure good.  
Second, the three studies demonstrated convergent and discriminant validity for the 
scales. Table 7 presents an overview of BPE and BPG effects from the three current studies. 
People higher in BPE consistently scored higher on perceptions and attitudes that foster greater 
antisocial and less prosocial responding (e.g., greater perceptions of vile world, pro-violence, and 
belief in retribution); meanwhile people higher in BPG in large part opposed attitudes that foster 
greater antisocial and less prosocial responding (e.g., greater empathy and humanitarianism, 
lower pro-violence). Moreover, people higher in BPE consistently scored higher on actual 
measures of aggression (e.g., anti-Black and anti-Muslim/Iranian prejudice, support for extreme 
military action, support for torture) and lower in measures of prosociality (lower support for 
beneficial racial and social policies); meanwhile, people higher in BPG scored lower on 
measures of aggression (e.g., support for torture) and higher in measures of prosociality (e.g., 
support for peacemaking, for humanitarian wars, for programs benefiting needy children). We 
find these effects despite non-significant correlations between BPE and BPG. 
Based upon the patterns of relationships, it appears that BPG more strongly correlated 
with aggression- (n = 19) vs. helping- (n = 7) related variables, whereas BPG appeared to equally 
correlate with the aggression- (n = 10) and helping- (n = 10) related variables. Nonetheless, BPG 
exhibited a couple of seemingly paradoxical effects, particularly in how BPG uniquely predicted 
support for military aggression when the U.S. is hypothetically provoked by Iran. In stereotypic 
extremity, based upon the pattern of effects, people may ultimately ask: Are people higher in 
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BPE belligerent bullies with no room for compromise, and are people higher in BPG hypocritical 
pacifists?  
At first glance, people higher in BPG may come across as principally pacifistic given (a) 
their strong opposition to pro-violence, SDO, competitive-jungle world beliefs, and pre-emptive 
military force; and (b) their strong support for empathy, peacemaking, and humanitarianism. 
However, people higher in BPG remained neutral on (i.e., showed no greater or lesser tendency 
to endorse) many aggression variables (see Table 7) and actually favored military aggression 
when the U.S. is provoked by Iran. Thus, it appears that for people higher in BPG, peacemaking 
and diplomacy are the best courses to stable intergroup relations and will only aggress reactively 
when it means protecting Americans, other peaceful nations, or innocent people. And when we 
aggressively act, people higher in BPG support humanitarian ideals in armed conflict.   
Meanwhile, people higher in BPE do seem to consistently favor aggression to solve 
intergroup problems, from crime to war; however, while people higher in BPE seem to prefer 
aggressive solutions, this does not mean that they necessarily discount more peaceful routes to 
solving problems (i.e., BPE did not significantly correlate with support for peacemaking). 
Perhaps people higher in BPE are more proactive in applying aggression partly because of their 
greater perceptions of a dangerous and vile world—“better safe than sorry”. It would be 
interesting to assess how people higher in BPE (as well as higher in BPG) act in situations that 
require compromise and negotiation, including peace processes after transgressions (i.e., 
forgiveness and reconciliation), both on an intergroup and interpersonal level. While people 
higher in BPE may not completely rule out diplomacy, they may be hard pressed to forgive and 
reconciliate with people who have, at least in their own perceptions, harmed them or others close 
to them, unless circumstances force them into arbitration (e.g., by allies). Regardless, people 
higher in BPE thought that extrinsic incentives were the best way to increase helping; thus, such 
individuals may also respond better to such incentives as well. 
Regardless, it appears that the effects of BPE (vs. BPG) were more consistent across 
studies and under the situational constraints imposed in Study 3 (i.e., whether or not perpetrators 
were stereotypically evil or apprehenders were stereotypically good), despite having moderately 
lower test-retest reliability (r = .68) compared to BPG (r = .80) in a previous study (Webster & 
Saucier, 2012). People higher in BPG seemed to endorse broader generalizations about how we 
should treat each other (e.g., greater empathy, humanitarianism-egalitarianism, and support for 
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non-violent solutions), but seemed to withhold judgments about particular issues or people 
without substantive information (perhaps because of their greater attributional complexity). For 
example, people higher in BPG more strongly advocated that people should be treated humanely 
and equally, but such individuals seemed to be more reticent in applying those principles in 
specific situations (e.g., support for affirmative action), except when it is egregiously justified 
(e.g., when it benefits children, a very needy population). It may be that people higher in BPG do 
not more greatly support (or oppose) programs and policies if any such policies and programs 
benefit particular populations of people unless there is an appreciably strong need. 
Study 3 also revealed some other peculiarities with BPG. First, BPG was related to 
greater fears of the perpetrator posting bail. It is likely that people higher in BPG were more 
concerned with innocent people that the perpetrator might harm rather than the perpetrator 
himself. After all, the perpetrator did confess to the murder in the newspaper article, but the 
perpetrator or article did not articulate on specific details why; so, people higher in BPG might 
have been justly concerned about the murderer trying to flee or hurt other innocent people. 
Second, people higher in BPG reported that the death penalty helps deter crime, yet also that the 
death penalty is inhumane. Perhaps people higher in BPG believe that the threat of capital 
punishment may help deter some crimes, but overall may have greater reservations about the use 
of the capital punishment in general (Webster & Saucier, 2012). Indeed, after subtracting support 
for the death penalty from support for harsher sentencing (so that higher scores reflect greater 
preference for the death penalty), people higher in BPG did prefer harsher sentencing over the 
death penalty (r = -.15, p = .036). Regardless of these peculiarities, the pattern of BPG effects in 
Study 3 (as well as in Studies 1 and 2) is consistent with our underlying theoretical framework. 
It is important to note here that I think the small inconsistencies in the data are likely not 
due to imprecise measurement of BPE and BPG, but due to the nature of the constructs 
themselves. The BPE and BPG scales were theoretically and carefully crafted and have 
unwaveringly exhibited high internal consistency; but, BPE and BPG are still inherently complex 
belief systems about how we interpret others’ harmful and helpful behaviors; indeed, a 
constellation of seven interdependent dimensions (not counting the general endorsement items) 
each coalesce into BPE and BPG. Also, given the novelty of these variables, we will no doubt 
refine the theoretical framework underlying these constructs as more research is conducted.  
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Regardless, we have now conducted eight (including the current three) BPE and BPG 
studies, which constitute the first systematic examinations of BPE and BPG. All eight studies 
consistently supported our general premise that higher BPE relates to greater 
aggression/antisocial and lesser helping/prosocial attitudes and behavior, while higher BPG 
relates to lower aggression/antisocial and greater helping/prosocial attitudes and behavior. While 
these studies have helped validate the BPE and BPG scales, these studies also set the foundation 
for future correlational and experimental work on these constructs. 
 Future Research Prospects 
First, the methodological paradigm (adapted from Prooijen & de Veer, 2010) in Study 3 
is extremely flexible for accommodating further experimental manipulations, from changing the 
race and sex of the targets (in-text or via pictures) to altering the details of the aftermath of the 
crime (e.g., having the perpetrator apologize or not apologize for his actions). Such experimental 
manipulations would likely change responses toward the targets and further test the contribution 
of BPE and BPG across different experimental constraints, as well as augment other 
psychological theories of helping (e.g., cost-reward model; see Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & 
Penner, 2006), prejudice (justification-suppression model of prejudice; Crandall & Eshleman, 
2003), and aggression (general aggression model; Anderson & Carnagey, 2004). For example, 
given the still pervasive effects of racism in the U.S. court system (Rosich, 2007), would BPE 
still predict punishment of a Black (vs. White) perpetrator above and beyond the effects of 
individuals’ level of racism? It is also easy to change the dependent variables (e.g., include items 
about forgiveness and reconciliation) completed by participants after reading the allegedly real 
newspaper article. Changing the dependent variables will provide insight into how BPE and BPG 
affect other critical responses to perpetrators and apprehenders not considered in Study 3.  
Further, one of the more intriguing findings from these studies is that participants higher 
in BPG were less worried about being murdered after reading about a prototypical “good guy” 
who helped capture a perpetrator (in Study 3). That is, when people higher in BPG were 
reminded that there is good in this world, people higher in BPG felt safer. The alleviation of 
distress in emergency situations is important; at times, people likely do not help because they are 
too stressed and hence too cognitively busy to notice an emergency, take responsibility for the 
event, or feel confident in knowing how to handle such an event (see Darley & Batson, 1973). 
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Perhaps because people higher in BPG feel greater equanimity after reading about a really good 
guy, such individuals would be cognitively be more ready to deal with an emergency. However, 
in Study 3, people higher in BPG did not report that they would have been more or less likely to 
intervene as the apprehender did to capture the perpetrator; thus, higher BPG and priming good 
role models may serve solely to alleviate anxiety, but not promote prosocial responding. 
Nevertheless, future research should more fully investigate this speculation.  
Moreover, BPE and BPG were unilaterally treated as predictors in the current set of 
studies; thus, future research needs to assess whether people’s level of BPE and BPG may 
change depending on the situational context. Burris and Rempel (2011) increased participants’ 
levels of BPE by explicitly priming evil symbols. Thus, I suggest similar studies investigate 
whether priming well-known “purely evil” and “purely good” non-fictional (e.g., Adolph Hitler 
and Mother Theresa, respectively) and fictional (e.g., Lord Voldemort and Albus Dumbledore, 
respectively, from the Harry Potter series) persons can affect levels of BPE and BPG, which 
then may affect endorsement of various antisocial and prosocial beliefs and behaviors. Such 
studies could not only demonstrate that situational constraints can affect levels of BPE and BPG 
(and consequently alter other attitudes and behaviors), but such studies can also help show how 
societies help transmit and maintain beliefs about good and evil.  
Given that children are bombarded with social media, it would be also be interesting to 
asses at what age children start developing beliefs about good and evil as well as when they start 
applying such beliefs to interpret others’ behavior and to make decisions on how to treat others. 
Subsequently, how do beliefs about good and evil change over the course of adulthood? One of 
our previous BPE and BPG studies using a public sample showed that as age increased, BPE and 
BPG also increased (Webster & Saucier, 2012). Moreover, two separate samples of adults (Ns = 
157 and 812) have shown that conservatives score appreciably higher on BPE than liberals 
(Webster & Saucier, 2012; http://www.yourmorals.org/bpebpg_process.php, respectively); 
however, we did not find such correlations in Studies 1 and 2. Thus, the moderating effects of 
age need to be more fully investigated in future research. 
 Limitations 
The current studies do have specific limitations that must be outlined (some of which 
were alluded to in the previous section). First, the participants were all general psychology 
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students; although we are currently assessing whether the overarching hypotheses apply to other 
samples, the studies herein are inherently limited in their generalizabiltiy beyond a student 
sample. Further, generalizabiltiy is also limited by location; the samples from the current studies 
were all drawn from one Midwestern university, which is located relatively close (within 20 
minutes) to a large military base; meaning, students may have themselves or have many friends 
or family that actively or have previously served in the military. Midwestern and military culture 
thus may have contributed meaningful variance to the studies’ results; for example, the positive 
relationship between BPG and support for military action when provoked (in Study 1) may have 
been partly explained by participants’ associations with military culture. Accordingly, it would 
be interesting to assess how levels and the effects of BPE and BPG change in cultures, especially 
given the culture of honor (how threats to reputation egregiously spur aggression; Nisbett & 
Cohen, 1996) that is so prevalent in the Southern U.S. and other parts of the world. 
Moreover, all measures in the current studies were self-report. Given that attitudes and 
behavior do not always correlate (e.g., Weigel, Vernon, & Tognacci, 1974), it would be prudent 
to assess the effects of BPG and BPE on actual behavioral measures of aggression (e.g., 
allocating hot sauce to worldview deviants; McGregor et al., 1998) and prosociality (e.g., 
donating to charity; e.g., Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002). It was rather 
unfortunate, too, that some measures did not exhibit good reliability, including the measure of 
right-wing authoritarianism in Study 1 and the RAS in Study 2. Future research should ensure 
that more reliable scales are used.  
 Concluding Remarks 
Does “pure evil” or “pure good” exist? This is a timeless question, and the current studies 
do not answer (and essentially are not concerned about answering) it specifically. Rather, this 
line of research aimed to assess whether (a) there are individual differences in how people 
answer this timeless question, and (b) whether such differences are worth measuring. Our data 
affirmatively answer both of these questions. First, we can reliably measure people’s beliefs 
about good and evil; and second, our data show a consistent pattern of effects: people higher in 
BPE endorse perceptions and attitudes that help rationalize greater antisocial behavior and also 
act more antisocially, while people higher in BPG endorse perceptions and attitudes that help 
promote prosocial behavior and also act more prosocially.  
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Behavioral scientists have long theorized on and empirically examined some of the most 
fundamental questions of human behavior, including why people choose to harm or help others. 
Now, we have now shown that individuals’ perceptions of why others choose to harm or help 
their fellow human beings—that is, people’s beliefs in pure evil and pure good—partially answer 
this pertinent scholarly question. Perceiving more pure good or more pure evil in the world does 
meaningfully impact how people treat their fellow human beings, for good or ill. 
 Tables and Figures 
Table 5.1 Overview of BPE and BPG Effects from Studies 1-3 
BPE BPG BPE BPG BPE BPG
Aggression/Anti-Social Aggression/Anti-Social Perpetrator Items
Predictors Predictors Predictors
Dangerous world + Christian beliefs/practices + Perpetrator as evil +*
Competitive-jungle world − Extrinsic religiosity Mitigating circumstances − PE
Social dominance orientation + − Death penalty deters crime +* +*
Pro-violence solutions + − Death penalty is humane +* −*
Perception of vile world + Belief in retribution +*
Worry about being murdered + − PG
Criteria Criteria Criteria
Provoked military action + +* Anti-black prejudice +* Fears About Granting Bail + +*
Pre-emptive military action +* Grant Bail: No vs. Yes.
Anti-Muslim/Iran prejudice + Recommended bail amount +*
Torture +* − Support for death penalty +*
Overall sentencing +*
Helping/Prosocial Helping/Prosocial Apprehender Items
Predictors Predictors Predictors
Empathic concern + Secular volunteering + Apprehender as good + PG
Perspective taking + Quest Apprehender in danger +*
Human-Egalitarianism + Acted same as apprehender +*  
Criteria Criteria Criteria
Peacemaking/Diplomacy + Supportive racial policies −* Support for awards + +
Humanitarian wars +* Affirmative action Support for monetary reward +
Supportive social policies −* Recommended $ reward amount +
Support needy children + Rewards increase help +
Support needle exchange Rewards set bad example
Note :  + = Positive relationship; − = Negative relationship. * = Unique predictor. PE = Prototypically Evil condition only; PG = Prototypically Good condition only.
STUDY 3STUDY 2STUDY 1
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Appendix A - Study 1 Materials 
*Participants will complete all measures below on a 1 = “Strongly Disagree” to 9 = “Strongly 
Agree” response scale. 
 
Empathy: Empathic Concern and Perspective Taking (Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 
1983) 
1.  I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.  
2.  I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.   
3.  Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.   
4.  I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.  
5.  When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.  
6.  I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
perspective.  
7.  Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. 
8.  If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's 
arguments.   
9.  When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for 
them.  
10.  I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.  
11.  I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.  
12.  I would describe myself as a pretty softhearted person.  
13. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.  
14.  Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.  
 
Perception of a Dangerous World (Duckitt, 2001) 
1. Although it may appear that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it 
really isn’t so.  
2. Every era has its problems, and a person’s chances of living a safe, untroubled life are 
better today then ever before. 
100 
 
3. Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt around us. All signs are pointing to it. 
4. There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure 
meanness, for no reason at all. 
5. Despite what one hears about “crime on the street”, there probably isn’t any more now 
than there ever has been. 
6. If a person takes a few sensible precautions, nothing bad is likely to happen to him or her; 
we do not live in a dangerous world. 
7. Every day as society becomes more lawless and bestial; a person’s chances of being 
robbed, assaulted, and even murdered go up and up. 
8. My knowledge and experiences tell me that the social world we live in is basically a safe, 
stable, and secure place in which most people are fundamentally good. 
9. It seems that every year there are fewer and fewer truly respectable people, and more and 
more persons with no morals at all who threaten everyone else. 
10. The “end” is not near. People who think that earthquakes, wars, and famines mean God 
might be about to destroy the world are being foolish. 
11. My knowledge and experience tell me that the social world we live in is basically a 
dangerous and unpredictable place, in which good, decent, and moral people’s values and 
way of life are threatened and disrupted by bad people. 
 
Perception of a Competitive-Jungle World (Duckitt, 2001) 
1. Winning is not the first thing; it’s the only thing. 
2. The best way to lead a group under one’s supervision is to show them kindness, 
consideration, and treat them as fellow workers, not as inferiors. 
3. If it’s necessary to be cold blooded and vengeful to reach one’s goals, then one should do 
it. 
4. Life is not governed by the “survival of the fittest.” We should let compassion and moral 
laws be our guide. 
5. Money, wealth, and luxury are what really count in life. 
6. It is much more important in life to have integrity in your dealings with others than to 
have money and power. 
7. It’s a dog eat dog world where you have to be ruthless at all times. 
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8. You know that most people are out to “screw” you; so you have to get them first when 
you get a chance. 
9. My knowledge and experience tells me that the social world we live in is basically a 
“competitive jungle” in which the fittest survive and succeed; power, wealth, and 
winning are everything; and might is right. 
10. One should give others the benefit of the doubt. Most people are trustworthy if you have 
faith in them. 
11. We can make a society based on unselfish cooperation, sharing, and people generously 
helping each other, and not on competition and acquisitiveness. 
12. If you have power in a situation, you should use it however you have to get your way. 
13. It is better to be loved than to be feared. 
 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Funke, 2005) 
1. What our country really needs instead of more “civil rights” is a good stiff dose of law 
and order. 
2.  It is important to protect the rights of radicals and deviants in all ways. 
3. The real keys to the “good life” are obedience, discipline, and sticking to the straight and 
narrow. 
4.  Homosexual long-term relationships should be treated as equivalent to marriage. 
5.  A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are 
submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly to the past. 
6.  It is good that nowadays young people have greater freedom "to make their own rules" 
and to protest against things they don't like. 
7.  The withdrawal from tradition will turn out to be a fatal fault one day. 
8.  Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn. 
9.  Being virtuous and law-abiding is in the long run better for us than permanently 
challenging the foundation of our society. 
10.  What our country really needs is a strong determined leader who will crush evil, and take 
us back to our true path. 
11.  There is no such crime to justify capital punishment. 
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12.  People should develop their own personal standards about good and evil and pay less 
attention to the Bible and other old, traditional forms of religious guidance. 
 
Social Dominance Orientation (Jost & Thompson, 2000) 
1. Group equality is not a worthwhile ideal. 
2. Increased social equality would be a bad thing. 
3. It would be good if all groups could be equal. 
4. Superior groups should not seek to dominate inferior groups. 
5. Treating different groups more equally would create more problems that it would 
solve. 
6. No one group should dominate in society. 
7. There is no point in trying to make incomes more equal. 
8. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.  
9. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 
10. Inferior groups should stay in their place. 
11. It’s a real problem that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom. 
12. No group of people is more worthy than any other. 
13. In getting what your own group wants, it should never be necessary to use force 
against other groups. 
14. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. 
15. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. 
16. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.  
 
Militant-Extremist Mindset: Pro-Violence and Vile World Scales (Stankov et al., 2010) 
1. We should never use violence as a way to try to save the world.  
2. Armed struggle is the only way that youths can redeem themselves and their society.  
3. All problems can be solved through negotiations and compromise.  
4. Killing is justified when it is an act of revenge.  
5. If violence does not solve problems, it is because there was not enough of it.  
6. The only way to teach a lesson to our enemies is to threaten their lives and make them 
suffer.  
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7. Our enemy’s children are like scorpions; they need to be squashed before they grow up.  
8. War is the beginning of salvation.  
9. Those who claim to be against the use of any form of force are on their way to becoming 
slaves.  
10. A good person has a duty to avoid killing any living human being.  
11. Today the human race is on the edge of an enormous calamity.  
12. Modern governments have overstepped moral bounds and no longer have a right to rule.  
13. Evil has been re-incarnated in the cult of markets and the rule of multinational 
companies.  
14. The world is headed for destruction.  
15. Our people are in danger, everybody is trying to divide us and hurt us.  
16. The present-day world is vile and miserable. 
 
Support for Militarism: Iran Provocations (Rothschild, 2008; Vail & Moytl, 2010) 
Imagine that you are the President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed forces. As the President it is your job to decide when to use your national armed 
forces (army, navy, marines and air force) knowing that as a result some innocent civilians 
are likely to be killed.  
 
Please respond to the following statements by indicating the degree to which you agree or 
disagree that you would use military force in the given scenarios. 
 
“I would support using our armed forces against Iran…” 
 
1. If hard evidence is found that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is training and supplying 
the insurgents in Iraq with weapons to use against American soldiers. 
2. If clear evidence indicated that Iran was developing a nuclear weapon. 
3. If Iran threatens to attack one of its neighboring countries. 
4. If Iran is found to be providing a safe haven for terrorists who want to attack the United 
States. 
5. If Iran takes Americans hostage again. 
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6. If Iran is found to be giving nuclear weapons technology to enemies of the United States. 
7. If Iran tries to topple neighboring regimes and install Iran like Islamic governments. 
8. If Iran threatens to attack the United States. 
9. If Iran blatantly disregards the international community. 
10.  If any American is killed by an Iranian soldier. 
11. If Iran cuts off oil supplies to the United States and tries to compel other oil producing 
nations to halt the sale of oil to the United States.  
 
Support for Extreme/Pre-Emptive Militarism (Weise et al., 2008) 
1. It is entirely appropriate to engage in preemptive attacks on countries (e.g., Iran, Syria, 
North Korea, etc.) that may pose a threat to the United States in the future, even if there is 
no evidence they are planning to attack us right now. 
2. To address the problem of terrorism, the United States’ best choice is to use military 
intervention. 
3. If we could capture or kill Osama bin Laden we should do it, even if thousands of 
civilians are injured or killed in the process. 
4. The best way for the United States to address the problem of terrorism involves 
increasing U.S. military presence in troubled areas around the world (e.g., Middle East). 
5. If necessary, the United States should use nuclear weapons to defend our interests at 
home and abroad. 
6. In order to improve security within the United States, the United States must use its 
superior military might to destroy terrorists throughout the world. 
7. If necessary, the United States should use chemical weapons to defend our interests at 
home and abroad. 
8. The only chance we have to stop international terrorism is if the United States follows a 
strict warlike and uncompromising approach to this problem. 
9. To address the problem of terrorism, the United States’ best option is to use its military to 
destroy as many terrorist cells as possible all over the world. 
 
Prejudice: Negative Group Affect (Whitley, 1999) 
1. Generally speaking, thinking about Muslims makes me feel bad. 
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2. Generally speaking, thinking about Muslims
3. Generally speaking, thinking about 
 makes me feel negative. 
Muslims
4. Generally speaking, thinking about 
 makes me feel angry. 
Muslims
5. Generally speaking, thinking about 
 makes me feel relaxed. 
Muslims
6. Generally speaking, thinking about 
 makes me feel good. 
Muslims
 
 makes me feel positive.  
7. Generally speaking, thinking about Iranians (people from Iran)
8. Generally speaking, thinking about 
 makes me feel bad. 
Iranians 
9. Generally speaking, thinking about 
makes me feel negative. 
Iranians 
10. Generally speaking, thinking about 
makes me feel angry. 
Iranians 
11. Generally speaking, thinking about 
makes me feel relaxed. 
Iranians 
12. Generally speaking, thinking about 
makes me feel good. 
Iranians 
 
makes me feel positive.  
Support for Torture (Crandall et al., 2008) 
1. I support the use of torture methods. 
2. Torture methods are effective ways of getting information. 
3. Torture techniques must be used when otherwise people refuse to talk. 
4. Use of torture techniques says a lot about the need of U.S. forces to adapt to difficult 
circumstances in interrogations. 
5. I consider the use of torture techniques to be un-American. 
6. I think that torture techniques are inhumane. 
7. Use of torture techniques says a lot about the character of U.S. forces who are involved in 
interrogations. 
 
Support for Peacemaking (Vail & Motyl, 2010) 
1. Fewer people will suffer if the United States pursued peaceful diplomacy instead of 
aggressively using its military. 
2. Frequency communication between countries is the best way to resolve conflicts. 
3. The United States should follow international agreements banning torture, even if it 
makes collecting intelligence more difficult. 
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4. The best way for the United States to address the problem of terrorism involves 
increasing cultural sensitivity in troubled areas around the world (e.g., the Middle East, 
Africa). 
5. Leaders of the United States should actively engage in diplomatic efforts with the leaders 
of states who sponsor terrorism. 
6. In order to improve security within the US, the US must improve its image throughout 
the world. 
7. To address the problem of terrorism, the US best choice is to use diplomacy. 
8. If the US wants peace, it must set a peaceful example. 
9. The best way for America to improve its image is to use its technological and economic 
advantages rather than its military might. 
10. If our leaders advocate violence solutions, they can only expect more violence in return. 
11. Diplomatically addressing the reasons that terrorists attack America is more urgent than 
militarily fighting them. 
12. America’s strong military showing undermines its peaceful goals. 
 
Support for Humanitarian Wars (Pratto et al., 1994) 
When fighting wars in foreign countries, the priority of the U.S. should be to… 
1. Ensure that human rights were respected in that country. 
2. Ensure that emergency food supplies could reach civilians. 
3. Protect unarmed civilians from battles. 
4. Minimize the suffering of unarmed civilians. 
5. Impartially and fairly treat any prisoners of war, especially if they are wounded in battle. 
6. Respect and uphold the region’s customs and culture. 
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Appendix B - Study 2 Materials 
*Participants will complete all measures below on a 1 = “Strongly Disagree” to 9 = “Strongly 
Agree” response scale, unless otherwise noted. 
 
Frequency of Religious Behavior  
(1 = “More than once a week”, 2 = “Once a week”, 3= “Every other week”, 4 = “About once 
a month”, 5 = “Every other month”, 6 = “A few times a year” 7 = “Once a Year” and 8 = 
“Never”) 
1. How often do you attend religious services? 
2. How often to you pray? 
3. How often do you volunteer for religious organizations? 
4. How often do you volunteer for secular organizations? 
 
Religious (Christian) Fundamentalism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) 
1. God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which 
must be totally followed. 
2. No single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic, fundamental truths about 
life. 
3. The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously 
fighting against God. 
4. It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right religion. 
5. There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you cannot go 
any “deeper” because they are the basic, bedrock message that God has given humanity. 
6. When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: 
the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will not. 
7. Scriptures may contain general truths, but they should Not be considered completely, 
literally true from beginning to end. 
8. To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true 
religion.  
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9. “Satan” is just the name people give to their own bad impulses; there really is no such 
thing as a diabolical “Prince of Darkness” who tempts us. 
10. Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science is probably right. 
11. The fundamentals of God’s religion should never be tampered with or compromised with 
others’ beliefs. 
12. All of the world’s religions have flaws and wrong teachings; there is no perfectly true, 
right religion. 
 
Christian Orthodoxy (Hunsberger, 1989) 
1. Jesus Christ was the divine Son of God.  
2. The Bible may be an important book of moral teachings, but it was no more inspired by 
God than were many other such books in human history.  
3. The concept of God is an old superstition that is no longer needed to explain things in the 
modern era.  
4. Through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, God provided a way for the forgiveness 
of people's sins.  
5. Despite what many people believe, there is no such thing as a God who is aware of our 
actions.  
6. Jesus was crucified, died, and was buried but on the third day He arose from the dead. 
 
Militant-Extremist Thinking: Divine Power Scale (Stankov et al., 2010) 
1. Only an idiot would go into a challenging situation expecting help from a divine power.  
2. Those who obey heaven will receive beautiful rewards.  
3. I do not believe in life after death.  
4. Martyrdom is an act of a true believer in the cause, not an act of terrorism.  
5. All suffering in this life is small in comparison to the eternal pleasures one will receive 
after death. 
6. Our leaders are decent people.  
7. If you believe you have received commands from God, you are certainly crazy.  
8. At a critical moment, a divine power will step in to help our people. 
 
109 
 
Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism (Katz & Hass, 1989) 
1. One should be kind to all people. 
2. One should find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself. 
3. A person should be concerned about the well-being of others. 
4. There should be equality for everyone—because we are all human beings. 
5. Those who are unable to provide for their basic needs should be helped by others. 
6. A good society is one in which people feel responsible for one another. 
7. Everyone should have an equal chance and an equal say in most things. 
8. Acting to protect the rights and interests of other members of the community is a major 
obligation for all persons. 
9. In dealing with criminals the courts should recognize that many are victims of 
circumstances. 
10. Prosperous nations have a moral obligation to share some of their wealth with poor 
nations.  
 
Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and Quest Religiosity (Batson, 1976; Batson & Ventis, 1982) 
1. It is important for me to spend periods of time in private religious thoughts and 
meditation. 
2. If not prevented by unavoidable circumstances, I attend church. 
3. I try hard to carry my religion over into my other dealings in life. 
4. The prayers I say when I an alone carry as much meaning and personal emotion as those 
said by me during services. 
5. Quite often I have been keenly aware of the presence of God or the Divine Being. 
6. I read literature about my faith (or church). 
7. If I were to join a church group I would prefer to join a Bible study group rather than a 
social fellowship. 
8. My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life. 
9. Religion is especially important to me because it answers many questions about the 
meaning of life. 
1. Although I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in my life. 
2. It doesn’t matter so much what I believe so long as I lead a moral life. 
110 
 
3. The primary purpose of prayer is to gain relief and protection. 
4. The church is most important as a place to formulate good social relationships. 
5. What religion offers me most is comfort when sorrows or misfortune strike. 
6. I pray chiefly because I have been taught to pray. 
7. Although I am a religious person I refuse to let religious considerations influence my 
everyday affairs. 
8. A primary reason for my interest in religion is that my church is a congenial social 
activity. 
9. Occasionally I find it necessary to compromise my religious beliefs in order to protect my 
social and economic well-being. 
10. One reason for my being a church member is that such membership helps to establish a 
person in the community. 
11. The purpose of prayer is to secure a happy and peaceful life. 
1. As I grow and change I expect my religion also to grow and change.  
2. I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs. 
3. I might be said that I value my religious doubts and uncertainties. 
4. I was not very interested in religion until I began to ask questions about the meaning and 
purpose of my life. 
5. For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious. I do not expect my 
religious convictions to change in the next few years. 
6. I find religious doubts upsetting. 
7. I have been driven to ask religious questions out of a growing awareness of the tensions 
in my world and in my relation to my world. 
8. My life experiences have lead me to rethink my religious convictions. 
9. There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing. 
10. God wasn’t very important for me until I began to ask questions about the meaning of my 
own life. 
11. Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers. 
 
Support for Racial Policy Scale (Pratto et al., 1994) 
(1 = “Very Negative” to 9 = “Very Positive” response scale) 
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“Which of the following objects, events, or statements do you have a positive or negative 
feeling towards? Please indicate your feelings by circling the appropriate number alongside 
each item.   Use one of the following responses. Remember, your first reaction is best.” 
1. Racial quotas. 
2. School busing. 
3. Civil rights for ethnic minorities. 
4. Equal pay for ethnic minorities. 
5. Helping minorities get a better education. 
6. Government helping minorities get better housing. 
7. Government helping minorities in the job market. 
 
Support for Affirmative Action (Davis & West, 1984; Swim & Miller, 1999) 
1. Achieving numerical representativeness (considering race and sex in hiring and 
promotion decisions) is as important as insuring that there are competent people in those 
positions. 
2. A certain quota of Blacks, even if not all of them are fully qualified, should be admitted 
to colleges and universities. 
3. If I were an employer, and two equally qualified applicants—one Black and one White—
applied for the same job, I would be more likely to hire the Black applicant. 
4. Blacks should receive racial entitlement such as affirmative action and other forms of 
compensation due to the past injustices of White America. 
5. To compensate for racial injustices, I feel that universities should create special 
entitlement for Black students including Black dorms or Black student unions. 
6. After years of discrimination, it is only fair to set up special programs to make sure that 
Blacks are given every chance to have equal opportunities in employment and education. 
 
Racial Argument Scale (Saucier & Miller, 2003) 
“Please read each of the following arguments and rate how well the argument 
supports the conclusion offered.  Please answer honestly, and circle an answer for each 
argument.  Remember that by indicating that an argument supports a conclusion, it does not 
112 
 
necessarily indicate that you personally endorse the argument or its conclusion.  Please keep 
in mind that these are ‘arguments’ and are not necessarily facts. 
1. Rodney King was the African-American motorist who was beaten by police officers in Los 
Angeles in an incident captured on video.  The incident was broadcast as an unmotivated racial 
assault on King by the police, but this may not be entirely accurate.  King was beaten following a 
long car chase and resisted arrest upon his capture, and the physical response by the police may have 
been somewhat warranted.   
 
Conclusion:
How much does the 
 Rodney King may have at least partially provoked the beating he received from the Los 
Angeles police officers. 
argument support the conclusion
 
?   ________ 
2. It has been argued that welfare programs are too often exploited by African-Americans in this 
country.  Welfare offices in every state appear packed with African-Americans applying for and 
collecting welfare benefits.  These high numbers of African-American welfare recipients are 
disproportionate for their numbers in the general population, and other racial groups are suffering 
because they can not receive benefits.   
 
Conclusion:
How much does the 
 The numbers of African-Americans receiving welfare should be limited to provide 
benefits for others. 
argument support the conclusion
 
?   ________ 
3. President Bill Clinton issued an apology to African-Americans for the institution of slavery that 
existed in this country over 130 years ago.  Clinton’s apology was inappropriate because he and the 
present government have no connection with the long-abolished practice of slavery, and the apology 
may instead incite current tension in race relations.   
 
Conclusion:
How much does the 
 President Clinton should not have apologized to African-Americans for slavery. 
argument support the conclusion
 
?   ________ 
4. Christians celebrate Christmas, the Jewish celebrate Chanakah, and some African-Americans 
celebrate Kwanzaa, a holiday originating from African culture, during the winter “holiday season”.  
Many people had never heard about Kwanzaa until recently and suggest that, since it appears to be a 
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“new” holiday, it must be a second-tier holiday seeking to emulate Christmas without much inherent 
significance.   
 
Conclusion:
How much does the 
 Kwanzaa is not a holiday on the same level of importance as Christmas.  
argument support the conclusion
 
?   ________ 
5. It has been shown that White Americans score 15 points higher on IQ tests than African-
Americans.  This difference in IQ scores has even been shown when other variables such as education 
levels and socioeconomic status are taken into account.   
 
Conclusion:
How much does the 
 Whites are more intelligent than African-Americans. 
argument support the conclusion
 
?   ________ 
Support for Social Programs (Pratto et al., 1994) 
(1 = “Very Negative” to 9 = “Very Positive” response scale) 
“Which of the following objects, events, or statements do you have a positive or negative 
feeling towards? Please indicate your feelings by circling the appropriate number alongside 
each item.   Use one of the following responses. Remember, your first reaction is best.” 
1. Government sponsored, universal health care. 
2. Building more homeless shelters. 
3. Building more clinics for those needing psychological help. 
4. More support for early education programs (e.g., Head Start) 
5. Free school lunches for low-income children. 
6. Integration of low-income and high-income housing. 
7. Arresting or busing out homeless people. 
8. Guaranteed jobs for all. 
9. Reducing benefits for the unemployed. 
10. Free healthcare for children in low-income households. 
11. Increased taxation of the very rich (i.e., the top 1% of households making 
$200,000/year or more). 
12. Equalizing salaries (based on sex, ethnicity, etc.). 
13. Legalizing same-sex marriage. 
114 
 
14. Decreased funding for family planning organizations, such as Planned Parenthood. 
15. Defunding the Arts (music, art, etc.). 
16. Legalizing or deregulating illegal drugs in general. 
17. Increasing the age at which one is eligible for Social Security benefits. 
18. The ability to create and pass legislation favoring one religion over another. 
19. Corporate industry 
20. A totally free market/unbridled capitalism 
21. Corporate regulation by national government 
22. Environmental rules and regulations by national government 
 
Attitudes toward Needle Exchange Programs (Jones et al., 1998) 
“Needle-exchange programs allow intravenous (i.e., drugs administered by needles) drug 
users to exchange their used, dirty needles for clean needles for free, usually at public clinics. 
Often laws are simultaneously established to allow pharmacies to sell clean needles to 
anyone.  Please provide your thoughts on needle-exchange programs by responding to the 
items below.” 
1. I am quite familiar with how needle-exchange programs work. 
2. Needle-exchange programs help reduce diseases transmitted diseases. 
3. If needle-exchange programs reduce stigma or negative attitudes toward drug users, it is a 
good thing. 
4. Pharmacies should allow anyone to buy clean needles. 
5. Needle-exchange programs only encourage addicts to continue abusing drugs. 
6. Needle-exchange programs probably have no effect on rates of diseases (e.g., HIV/AIDS) 
contracted through intravenous drug use. 
7. Needle-exchange programs would only increase the number of drug addicts in the area. 
8. I have never really heard of needle-exchange programs before. 
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Appendix C - Study 3 Materials 
*Participants will complete all measures below on a 1 = “Strongly Disagree” to 9 = “Strongly 
Agree” response scale, unless otherwise noted. 
 
Items Concerning the Perpetrator, Mr. Beatty 
 
“Below are questions concerning the perpetrator in the newspaper article, Mr. Beatty. Please 
respond to them using the scale provided.” 
1. Very simply, I can see nothing good in Mr. Beatty. He seems like a waste of space. 
2. I feel that everything would be better if Mr. Beatty simply ceased to exist, but not before 
he suffers a lot. 
3. The worst harm I could possibly imagine still seems too good for him. 
4. If every reminder that Mr. Beatty ever existed were destroyed, the world would be a 
better place. 
5. This crime was caused entirely by the Mr. Beatty’s evilness. 
6. Mr. Beatty is only motivated to destroy everything that is benevolent. 
7. Mr. Beatty seems to enjoy hurting others. 
8. Mr. Beatty is immoral. 
9. When thinking of Mr. Beatty, I can only imagine how mean he is. 
10. I cannot really think of any situation that would justify Mr. Beatty’s murder of the young 
woman.  
11. I think there may be circumstances that we are not yet aware of that would help explain 
why Mr. Beatty murdered the young woman. 
12. There might be circumstances that we don’t know about that would influence my 
judgment of Mr. Beatty in this crime. 
13. There must be some logical reason for Mr. Beatty murdering his victim. 
 
“We would like you to provide your recommendations for bail and punishment for the 
perpetrator, Mr. Beatty. 
 
116 
 
First, allowing Mr. Beatty to ‘post bail’ means that he will deposit money so he can be 
released from jail on the understanding that he would return for his criminal trial; however, 
some courts deny suspects bail because there is too much risk that the suspect would harm 
themselves or others, or flee from the area.” 
 
1. If the suspect (Mr. Beatty) was released from jail on bail, I would fear that he would 
harm himself or other people. 
2.  If the suspect (Mr. Beatty) was released from jail on bail, I would bet that he would try 
to flee the area. 
3. Would you recommend allowing Mr. Beatty to post bail? (0 = Yes, 1 = No) 
4. If Mr. Beatty was allowed to post bail, what dollar ($) amount would you recommend for 
his bail? Keep in mind that in cases similar to this one, the bail amount typically ranges from 
$25,000 to $1,000,000. (open-ended, numerical) 
 
“If Mr. Beatty is convicted in a court of law for murder, what punishment would you 
recommend as a juror? You can decide the punishment in terms of community service, 
probation, jail time, and the death penalty.  
Community service is when perpetrators must participate in some activity that benefits the 
community as a whole (e.g., picking up garbage, working at homeless shelters or retirement 
homes). 
Probation means that a convicted criminal is freed from jail but still must meet conditions set 
forth by the court and regularly meet with a probation officer. Typically, offenders are 
required to refrain from possession of firearms, ordered to remain employed, abide to a 
curfew, live at a directed place, participate in rehabilitation programs, and not leave the 
immediate area. 
Jail time is the time that the perpetrator must serve “behind bars” in jail. 
Death penalty
 
 means that the perpetrator will be put to death for his crime. 
Your options for Mr. Beatty’s punishment are below:” 
1. Community service only (no probation, no jail time) 
2. Probation with community service (no jail time) 
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3. Imprisonment followed by probation and community service 
4. Imprisonment with NO opportunity for parole (i.e., life in prison) 
5. The death penalty 
6. If Mr. Beatty was sentenced to jail time, how many years
7. If Mr. Beatty was released from jail on 
 should Mr. Beatty serve? 
(open-ended, numerical) 
probation, how many years
8. If Mr. Beatty was released from jail and had to do 
 should Mr. Beatty be 
on probation? (open-ended, numerical) 
community service, how many hours
  
 
should Mr. Beatty serve? (open-ended, numerical) 
Items about Criminal Punishment/Murder in General 
 
“Please respond to the following items concerning crime, the death penalty, and murder.” 
1. Cruel and unusual punishment, like the death penalty, is the just way to compensate 
victims or their family in the case of murder 
2. The death penalty is necessary to maintain beliefs in justice. 
3. Those who kill deserve to be killed in return. 
4. There is a moral obligation to severely punish lawbreakers. 
5. Execution discourages others from committing the crime. 
6. Death penalty laws make criminals think twice before committing capital crimes. 
7. Executing a person for murder discourages others from committing murder in future. 
8. The death penalty helps decrease crime. 
9. Execution is a cruel punishment. 
10. No matter what crime a person has committed, executing the person is too cruel a 
punishment. 
11. Life in prison is more humane than death. 
12. With the death penalty, innocent people may be killed. 
13. There are good moral reasons for opposing death penalty. 
14. It is important to have the death penalty to save the price of life in prison. 
15. I often worry about being murdered. 
16. I do not really dwell on the possibility that I will be a victim of murder. 
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17. I think my chances of being murdered are really low. 
18. I believe that there is a high probability that I will be murdered. 
19. Murder is a serious threat in the greater Kansas City area. 
20. The Kansas City area should concern itself about other more relevant crimes besides 
murder. 
21. Lastly, could you please estimate the number of murders you think occurred in the 
Kansas City metro area, including Manhattan and Lawrence, in the year 2010? (open-
ended, numerical) 
 
Items Concerning Mr. Beatty’s Apprehender, Mr. Carter 
 
“Below are questions concerning Mr. Carter, the person who helped apprehend the murder 
suspect (Mr. Beatty) in the newspaper article. Please respond to them using the scale 
provided.” 
1. The apprehender’s (Mr. Carter’s) actions were caused entirely by his goodness. 
2. Mr. Carter was only motivated to protect everything that is kind. 
3. Mr. Carter seems to enjoy helping others”, “Mr. Carter is a moral man. 
4. When thinking of Mr. Carter, I can only imagine how compassionate he is. 
5. Very simply, I can see nothing but good in Mr. Carter. 
6. I feel that the world would be worse off if Mr. Carter simply ceased to exist. 
7. I could not give enough praise for Mr. Carter’s actions. 
8. If every reminder that Mr. Carter ever existed were destroyed, the world would be a 
worse place. 
9. If I had been in Mr. Carter’s place, I would have done the exact same thing he did. 
10. I think I would have acted differently if I had been in Mr. Carter’s place. 
11. I would encourage all people to act as Mr. Carter did. 
12. Mr. Carter put himself at much risk by confronting Mr. Beatty. 
13. Mr. Carter was NOT really in a lot danger when he tried to stop Mr. Beatty from fleeing 
the area. 
14. Mr. Carter helped stop Mr. Beatty just for the glory of capturing him. 
15. Mr. Carter had no ulterior motive in helping capture Mr. Beatty. 
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16. Mr. Carter definitely felt good inside by stopping Mr. Beatty from fleeing. 
17. Mr. Carter helped apprehend the bad guy just because Mr. Carter was truly a good guy. 
18. Mr. Carter was arrogant in boasting about apprehending the suspect, Mr. Beatty. 
19. Mr. Carter is a hero for helping apprehend the suspect. 
20. Mr. Carter’s actions to apprehend the suspect were not heroic. 
 
“Below are items concerning possible rewards for Mr. Carter’s helpful actions. Please 
respond to them using the scale provided.” 
 
1. I would recommend Mr. Carter for an official mayoral award from Kansas City. 
2. I would recommend Mr. Carter for Kansas’s statewide Good Samaritan Award. 
3. I would recommend Mr. Carter for the National (U.S.) Good Samaritan Award. 
4. I would recommend a monetary award. 
5. “If Mr. Carter does receive a monetary award from authorities, how much money do you 
think Mr. Carter should receive? Monetary awards in such cases typically range from 
$500 to $5,000.” 
 
“Please respond to items below concerning rewards for prosocial actions using the scale 
provided.” 
1. Giving money to people for helping increases people’s motivations to help long-term. 
2. Giving money to people for helping sets a bad example because people will not help in 
the future unless they expect money in return. 
3. Giving awards to people for helping sets a bad example because people will not help in 
the future unless they expect an award. 
4. Giving awards to people who help increases people’s motivation to help long-term. 
5. We should give commendations, not monetary awards, to people who help. 
6. There is nothing much we can do to make people be more helpful and altruistic. 
 
 
 
 
